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A b s t r a c t
I defend and develop the new tenseless token-reflexive theory o f  time. I 
begin by charting the development o f  the debate between the tensed and the old 
tenseless theories o f  time. The tensed theory o f  time maintains that time exists and is 
intrinsically tensed. According to the old tenseless theory, time exists and is 
intrinsically tenseless, the notions o f  past, present and future being analytically 
reducible to tenseless temporal relations. The new tenseless theory o f  time concedes 
that tense is an irreducible feature o f  language and thought. However, it rejects the 
claim o f  the tensed theory that tense is an irreducible feature o f  temporal reality. 
Tensed sentences have truth conditions statable in entirely tenseless terms, so the 
irreducibility o f  tensed language and thought does not imply that the metaphysical 
nature o f  time is such that it is intrinsically tensed.
The new tenseless theory o f  time must be defended on two fronts. It must be 
shown that the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences can indeed be stated in entirely 
tenseless terms. I consider and reject the date version o f  the new tenseless theory o f  
time. I then consider and defend the token-reflexive version o f  this theory. It must 
also be shown that tense is not a feature of reality. I argue that the notion o f  tense 
has two essential features. It involves the ontological distinction between past, 
present and future, and the objective reality o f  temporal becoming. A careful 
examination o f  these two essential features reveals that they cannot, under any 
interpretation, be consistently held together. The supposition that tense is an 
objective feature o f  reality is thus logically unsustainable.
I develop the new tenseless token-reflexive theory o f  time in three substantial 
areas. I argue that, despite appearances, there is no analogy between this theory o f  
time and the theory o f  genuine modal realism, according to which all possible worlds, 
including the world we inhabit, are equally real. This comparative analysis between 
these two theories reveals that the new tenseless theory o f  time is on firmer ground 
than both its apparent modal counterpart and various tensed theories o f  time.
I undertake a conceptual analysis o f  the notion o f  the direction o f  time. I 
argue that the tensed theory o f  time is singularly unable to account for this notion, 
while the new tenseless theory has the conceptual equipment necessary to provide a 
satisfactory and perspicuous account o f  it. Finally, I consider the notion o f  tensed 
meaning. I argue that the distinction between character and content can be combined 
with the token-reflexive account o f  the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences to yield a 
highly illuminating account o f  tensed meaning that is consistent with a tenseless 
ontology.
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K e y  t o  N o t a t io n
The logical symbols used in this thesis are those o f  Cass and Le Poidevin 
(1993). I include an ordinary language equivalent for each symbol which is its most 
common rendering. Where logical notation occurs within the text, I there provide an 
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'...and...'
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'It is not the case that...' 
'If..., then...'
'If..., and only if...'
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Chapter 1
T h e  G e n e s i s  o f  t h e  T e n s e d / T e n s e l e s s  D e b a t e : F r o m  M c T a g g a r t
t o  M e l l o r  a n d  B e y o n d
1.1 Introduction
The subject matter o f  many o f  the debates in the philosophy o f  time owe a 
great deal, not least, arguably, their origin, to the insights and arguments o f  
McTaggart. Curiously, McTaggart's project was to prove, on a priori grounds, the 
unreality o f  time. While few philosophers have adopted wholeheartedly his 
conclusion, believing that time itself is real in some sense, the arguments McTaggart 
employed in order to arrive at his conclusion have generated many debates about the 
genuine metaphysical nature o f  time. In this chapter I intend to illustrate how it is 
that McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time engendered the various debates 
about the nature o f  time that have been, and are now being carried out.
I do not intend to subject McTaggart's argument to a critical evaluation. 
There have been countless attempts to elucidate, endorse and criticize this argument, 
and various aspects o f  it over the years. For some o f  these see Broad (1938), 
Dummett (1960), Christensen (1974), Oaklander (1984) and Farmer (1990). The 
task that I set myself with respect to McTaggart's argument is to illustrate how it 
served as the impetus for the debate between the tensed and the tenseless theories of 
time, since this is the debate that I intend to take up.
I will begin this chapter by introducing the concepts o f  the A series and the B 
series, concepts which are crucial to McTaggart's analysis and argument for the 
unreality o f  time. I will then formally expound the key steps in McTaggart's 
argument. Each step in this argument, I will argue, is responsible for the generation 
and development o f  various constituents o f  the debate between the tensed and the 
tenseless theories of time. For each step in the argument I will examine some o f  the 
arguments in support of it offered by both McTaggart and others who have defended 
it. I will also examine some o f  the responses to it and criticisms o f  it. I will then 
show how this preliminary debate developed into the more recent and contemporary 
debates, and how these latter came to be carried out in terms o f  the concepts that 
ultimately became fundamental to them. Once I have undertaken a thorough 
investigation o f  the genesis o f  the debate between the tensed and tenseless theories 
o f  time in this way, I will endeavour to illustrate the most recent developments in the
2debate. Hugh Mellor (1981) is a proponent o f  one o f  the newest versions o f  the 
tenseless theory o f  time, a theory which has changed significantly since its inception, 
brought about by the work o f  McTaggart and Russell. I will expound Mellor's 
theory in some detail, emphasizing the respects in which it differs from older versions 
o f  the tenseless theory and also its underlying metaphysics which render it a 
genuinely tenseless account. Mellor's theory will then serve as the platform from 
which I take up the debate between the tensed and the tenseless theories o f  time.
1.2 The A Series and the B Series
I shall give the name o f  the A series to that series o f  positions which 
runs from the far past through the near past to the present, and then 
from the present through the near future to the far future, or 
conversely. The series o f  positions which runs from earlier to later, 
or conversely, I shall call the B series. (McTaggart (1927) p. 10).
Here, McTaggart articulates two fundamental, and fundamentally different 
kinds o f  temporal concept. Each kind o f  concept is employed by us in our everyday 
temporal language and temporal thought, and they differ from each other in the 
following ways. The A series is a series o f  temporal positions at which we identify 
events as being located. Any event that we might care to think about is located in 
either the past, present, or future, and it is these temporal distinctions that serve as 
the identifying mark o f  the A series. However, the A series admits o f  finer 
distinctions than merely that between past, present and future. We can pick out the 
A series location o f  an event as, for example, two weeks ago, or some time during 
the last millennium; as now this minute, or now this century; as 0.2  milliseconds 
hence, or as next year. Each o f  these expressions locates an event in the A series, 
but at some more or less specific degree of pastness, presentness or futurity. 
Various kinds o f  linguistic expression enable us to identify the A series positions o f  
events. We can employ the diverse inflections o f  verbal tenses, as, for example, 
when we say 'The daffodils were in season, the bluebells are in season, and the roses 
will be in season1. We can also employ numerous adverbial expressions to locate 
events in the A series. For example, 'It is two days since they found the body' or 
'Summer will soon be upon us'. Thus, we have at our disposal a number o f  linguistic 
devices for identifying the A series positions o f  events in time. Positions in the A 
series have also come to be known as tenses.
3Once we have understood the nature o f  the A series, and the distinctions 
between past, present and future that are constitutive o f  it, we are in a position to 
notice a peculiar feature o f  the A series. This is that no event is ever permanently 
located at one particular A series position. 1 Events appear to change their series 
position from one moment to the next. The 1996 European Cup Championships is 
currently occurring. It is an extended present event. Last month, however, it hadn't 
yet started; it was still a future event, and each day it became less and less future, 
occupying A series positions o f  less and less remote futurity. Soon it will be over, 
and as the European cup is presented to the winners it will become a past event. 
Then, as each day passes, it will occupy A series positions o f  gradually more and 
more remote pastness. Characteristic o f  the A series, then, is the notion o f  the 
passage o f  time, of transiency and temporal flow. A series positions are not 
occupied permanently, but merely momentarily, or fleetingly.
The B  series is McTaggart's name for an alternative conceptual tool that we 
employ for the purpose o f  locating events in time. Constitutive o f  the B  series are 
the temporal relations of'earlier than', 'later than', and 'simultaneous with '.2 Like the 
A series, the B series is a series o f  temporal positions at which we identify events as 
being located. However, positions in the B  series are essentially relational, unlike 
(ostensibly) positions in the A series. We cannot simply identify an event as earlier 
or later, as we can identify an event as past, present or future. I f  I were to assert of 
an event that it is earlier, I would have asserted something incomplete, and would 
face the question 'Earlier than what? '.3 B series positions can thus only be asserted 
o f  events in relation to other events. Or, to put it another way, an event can only be 
located at a B  series position in relation to another event or B  series position. The 
temporal relations o f  'earlier than', 'later than' or 'simultaneous with' thus locate
One might be tempted to think that, if time is infinitely extended, then some events will 
always have been past and others will always be future. However, to draw this conclusion from the 
possibility of infinitely extended time is to make an invalid inference. If time is infinitely extended, 
it does not follow that any event is temporally located at an infinite distance from the present. It 
merely follows that no matter how far from the present an event is located, there will be another 
that is even more distant.
McTaggart does not mention the temporal relation of simultaneity when expounding the 
nature of the B series. This is bccause he is articulating how we distinguish between positions in 
time, and no two distinct positions in time can be simultaneous with each other. However, two 
distinct events in time may be located at the same position in time, and are thus simultaneous with 
each other. Thus, for the purpose of articulating how we identify the temporal location of events in 
time, it is necessary to include the temporal relation of simultaneity.
Expressions such as 'It happened earlier' or 'It will happen later' are implicitly tensed since 
they imply that the event referred to happened earlier, or will happen later than now.
4events in the B series, but only in relation to one another. Every event is either 
earlier than, later than, or simultaneous with every other event.
The striking feature o f  the B series, in contrast with the A series, is that 
events do not change their B  series positions. A consequence o f  the essentially 
relational nature of the constituent elements o f  the B  series is that the temporal 
relation that one event stands in to another event is an unchanging relational 
property o f  that event. Events do not move closer together or farther apart from 
each other in time, nor can the successive order in which they occur be reversed. 
Thus, if it is true that the opening match o f  the Wimbledon tournament o f  1996 
precedes the final o f  the same tournament (two uniquely identifiable events), then it 
can never be the case that the final precedes the opening match, or that these two 
events occur simultaneously. If the opening match precedes the final by two weeks, 
then it can never be the case that these two events are temporally separated by any 
more than, or any less than two weeks. The temporal relation in which one event 
stands to another is something which does not change, regardless o f  the A series 
positions which those events occupy. In other words, if an event, ex, occurs earlier 
than another event, e2, then that temporal relation holds between those events 
wherever they are located in the A series. They might both be past events, ex being 
more past than e2, they might both be future events, e2 being more future than ex. 
Alternatively, e x might be past or present, and e2 still future, or ex might be past, and 
e2 either present or future. Crucially, the A series positions o f  ex and e2 gradually 
change over time, but the temporal separation between them, the temporal relation in 
which they stand to each other, remains constant.
One important corollary o f  this difference between the A series and the B 
series, which will play a significant part in the ensuing discussion, is as follows. 
Since the A series position o f  an event changes, a sentence asserting o f  an event that 
it occupies a certain A series position does not have a constant truth-value. The 
sentence type 'The festival began two days ago' will be true if uttered at certain 
times, but false if uttered at certain other times. However, since the B  series 
relations between events do not change, a sentence asserting o f  an event that it 
stands in a particular temporal relation to another event does have a constant truth- 
value. If  the sentence type 'The festival occurs after the summer solstice' can ever be
5truly asserted, then it can always be truly asserted, since B  series relations between 
events remain constant over time .4
McTaggart's introduction o f  the distinction between the A series and the B 
series, it is important to note, was based on an observation o f  the kinds o f  temporal 
concept that we employ as a matter o f  fact. The A series and the B  series are not 
merely conceptual devices that McTaggart constructed for the purpose o f  using 
them as the foundation for his refutation o f  the reality o f  time. They are de facto 
features o f  our ordinary temporal experience. McTaggart noticed that we employ 
these two different conceptual tools for ordering events in time, and then analysed 
and codified them into the A series and the B  series. Further analysis o f  these two 
different kinds o f  temporal series, and o f  the conceptual connections between them 
led to his argument for the unreality o f  time. In the next section I will formally 
propound the key steps in this notorious argument.
1.3 A Formal Exposition o f McTaggart's Argument
It will be convenient to begin our enquiry by asking whether anything 
existent can possess the characteristic o f  being in time. I shall 
endeavour to prove that it cannot. (McTaggart (1927) p. 9).
McTaggart's argument for the unreality o f  time, as I see it, consists o f  five 
key steps. McTaggart provides arguments and support for each step, and I will 
examine these in each o f  the next five sections. In this section, however, I will 
comment only upon the formal validity, or otherwise, o f  the argument.
The five key steps in McTaggart's argument, then, are as follows:
(1) The reality o f  time entails the existence o f  change.
(2) The existence o f  change requires the existence o f  an A series.
(3) It is not possible for a B series to exist unless an A series also exists.
(4) The notion o f  the A series is self-contradictory, and therefore, the A series 
cannot be a constituent o f  reality.
(5) Since the A series does not exist, change does not exist, and therefore time 
does not exist, so time is unreal.
This point will be developed and explored throughout this chapter, and throughout this
thesis.
6Clearly, the argument is formally valid, so whether or not it is sound depends on 
whether or not the premises are true. If  premises (1) and (2) are true, there can only 
be time if there is change, and there can only be change if the A series has objective 
and independent existence. Premise (3) provides support for premise (2) by ruling 
out the alternative possibility that the B  series alone might be sufficient to account 
for the existence o f  change, and thereby for the existence o f  time. Clearly, if it is not 
possible for a B  series to exist unless the terms o f  that series also form an A series, 
then it is not possible for a B series alone to provide the basis for the existence o f  
change, and thereby for the existence o f  time itself. Thus, by steps ( 1), (2 ) and (3 ), it 
is clear that the A series must exist objectively if time is to exist at all. However, by 
premise (4), the notion o f  an A series is inherently self-contradictory, and since 
nothing that is self-contradictory can exist in its own right, the A series cannot exist 
independently and objectively. The existence o f  time is dependent on the existence 
o f  change, which in turn is dependent on the existence o f  the A series. I f  the truth of 
premise (4) can be adequately substantiated, then the A series does not exist. This 
rules out the existence o f  change, which in turn rules out the existence o f  time itself.
Thus we have a formally valid argument for the unreality o f  time. Those who 
are not prepared to accept the truth o f  this conclusion have therefore turned their 
attention to proving the falsity o f  one or more of the premises. Thus, arguments 
have been generated which oppose or support each premise. Depending on which 
premises are supported, and which contested, very different pictures o f  the nature o f  
time have emerged. McTaggart's opponents agree with each other that his 
conclusion must be false, and that time must be real in some sense. They disagree 
with each other, however, over which o f  McTaggart's premises are true and which 
are false, and consequently over the essential nature o f  time itself.
In the next five sections I will examine some o f  the arguments for and against 
the truth o f  each premise, and show how these have yielded the recent and 
contemporary debates within the philosophy o f  time. I will also indicate the two 
main kinds o f  theory about the nature o f  time that have emerged from McTaggart's 
argument, and how, essentially, they differ from one another.
1.4 The Reality oj Time Entails the Existence o f  Change
It would, I suppose, be universally admitted that time involves 
change. (McTaggart (1927) p. 11).
7The truth o f  premise ( 1), or o f  some variant o f  it, is not seriously disputed. It 
is generally thought, no matter what one's particular view o f  the nature o f  time, that 
time somehow involves change, or that time is the dimension o f  change. However, 
the precise nature o f  the connection between time and change has been debated. 
McTaggart's premise, as it stands, sets up a fairly close connection between time and 
change. It requires that change must be going on if time is to be real. This 
effectively rules out the possibility o f  changeless time, or o f  periods o f  time in which 
nothing whatsoever changes. I f  all change stopped, time itself would cease to exist 
on this view. I f  one were concerned about this, and wanted to remain agnostic 
about whether or not time without change is a genuine possibility, then the assertion 
o f  a weaker connection between time and change would suffice, without 
jeopardizing the validity o f  the argument as a whole .5 For example, the assertion of 
a connection between time and the mere possibility o f  change would be suitable in 
place o f  McTaggart's first premise. In other words, the assertion that the reality of 
time entails, rather than the existence o f  change, the mere possibility o f  change, 
would establish the intimate connection between time and change that McTaggart is 
concerned to demonstrate without ruling out the possibility o f  time without change. 
Some such interpretation o f  premise ( 1) is thus almost universally accepted. Since 
premise ( 1) has not been subjected to serious dispute, it has not been responsible for 
generating much in the way o f  debates about the nature o f  time.
1.5 The Existence o f  Change Requires the Existence o f  an A Series
I f  there is no real A series, there is no real change. (McTaggart
( 1927) p. 13).
McTaggart's argument in support o f  this premise takes the following form. 
He supposes that there is no A series; that the distinctions o f  past, present and future 
do not apply to reality. He then asks whether such a picture o f  temporal reality can 
accommodate the notion o f  change, and concludes that it cannot. Thus, he reasons, 
change cannot exist unless the distinctions o f  past, present and future apply to 
reality, that is, unless the A series is real.
In what way, then, does McTaggart argue that the existence o f  the B  series 
alone is insufficient to account for the possibility o f  change? McTaggart argues that
Shoemaker (1969) and N cuton-Sm ith (1980) both argue that there can be time without
change.
8if time consists solely o f  the B  series, then all events are related to each other by the 
permanent B series relations o f  'earlier than', 'later than' and 'simultaneous with'. 
Nothing about the temporal manifold thus constituted can change. If  any two events 
are temporally related to each other, then the temporal relation which holds between 
them always has held and always will hold between them. B  series facts about events 
are permanent and unchanging, so the possibility o f  change is inconsistent with time 
being constituted solely by the B  series. The only respect in which events, and facts 
about them, change is in terms o f  the different A characteristics that they possess at 
different times. Genuine change, for McTaggart, is the continual change that events 
undergo from future to present to past. If  the distinction between past, present and 
future is rejected, and with it the A series change that events undergo, then the B  
series time that we are left with is inconsistent with the possibility o f  change.
In the Principles o f  Mathematics (1903), Russell puts forward an alternative 
account o f  change. He argues that
Change is the difference, in respect of truth or falsehood, between a 
proposition concerning an entity and the time T, and a proposition 
concerning the same entity and the time T , provided that these 
propositions differ only by the fact that T  occurs in the one, where T  
occurs in the other. (Russell (1903) p. 469).
According to Russell, then, it is objects and not events that are the proper subjects o f  
change. Change occurs if and only if an object has a property at one time that it 
lacks at another time. If  Russell's analysis of change is correct, then the existence o f  
the A series is not required in order for change to be possible. Change consists in the 
variation o f  properties possessed by objects over time.
McTaggart considers and rejects Russell's analysis on the following grounds. 
Suppose an object, 0 , has a property, P, at time T, and then lacks P  at time T . For 
McTaggart this cannot constitute genuine change because it is a fact at all times that
O has P  at 7 and that O lacks P  at T . Genuine change must be something over and 
above such changeless facts. Temporal change, for McTaggart, only occurs if facts 
change, and the only respect in which facts can change is their position in the A 
series. In order to reinforce his dissatisfaction with Russell's analysis o f  change, 
McTaggart draws an analogy with spatial variation:
9The meridian o f  Greenwich passes through a series o f  degrees o f  
latitude. And we can find two points in this series, S  and S', such that 
the proposition A t S the meridian o f  Greenwich is within the United 
Kingdom' is true, while the proposition 'At S ' the meridian o f  
Greenwich is within the United Kingdom' is false. But no one would 
say that this gave us change. Why should we say so in the case o f  the 
other series? (McTaggart (1927) p. 15).
The point that McTaggart makes by drawing this analogy is that there is no formal 
difference between Russell's analysis o f  change that does not involve the A series, 
and spatial variation. However, there clearly is a difference between change and 
spatial variation. The question then arises, 'How is Russell to account for this 
difference?'. If  he argues that the case o f  temporal variation constitutes change while 
spatial variation does not on the grounds that temporal variation occurs along the 
temporal dimension, then it appears that he is merely begging the question against 
McTaggart. This is because he would be introducing time as the dimension of 
change into his definition o f  change. However, given its similarity to an analogous 
definition o f  spatial variation, the choice o f  time as the dimension o f  change would 
seem to be purely arbitrary. Furthermore, McTaggart's thesis is that without the A 
series there can be no change, and without change there can be no time. 
Consequently, a B series whose terms do not also possess A characteristics is not, 
for McTaggart, a temporal series.6 Russell's analysis o f  change assumes that such a 
B  series is a temporal series, and it is in this way that, it is claimed, it begs the 
question against McTaggart.
This brief examination o f  the second step o f  McTaggart's argument, in which 
he argues that the A series must exist if there is to be change, contains the seeds o f  a 
number o f  debates in the philosophy o f  time which have since developed. Firstly, the 
question o f  whether the A series and A series change, as McTaggart has described 
them, are objectively real is at issue. Those who think they are objectively real have 
come to be known as tensed theorists, and those who reject them have come to be 
known as tenseless theorists. Henceforth I will adopt this terminology.
The debate over the reality o f  the A series, and o f  A series change, has been 
carried out in a number o f  different ways. Some tensed theorists have defended 
McTaggart's account o f  A series change in terms o f  the successive acquisition and
This aspect o f McTaggart's argument will be explored in the next section
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loss o f  the properties o f  futurity, presentness and pastness .7 Others have developed 
their own account o f  A series change, or temporal becoming, and thus also o f  what 
the A series itself consists in.8 Broad (1923), for example, argues that temporal 
becoming cannot consist in the successive acquisition and loss o f  A characteristics, 
because this is to treat temporal becoming as if it were a species o f  qualitative 
change. Mere qualitative change, however, presupposes temporal becoming, 
according to Broad. He argues that temporal becoming consists in the successive 
coming into existence o f  present events, which subsequently become past. The 
future does not exist, so there is no characteristic o f  futurity as such. Broad's 
account is tensed because it asserts the objective existence o f  the distinction between 
past, present and future.
Tenseless theorists who reject the objectivity o f  the A series and of temporal 
becoming have done so in a number o f  ways. Some have argued that the alleged 
phenomenological experience o f  temporal flow is merely mind-dependent. Russell 
(1915) is one of the earliest proponents o f  this thesis. According to Russell, if an 
event can be truly described as past, this is because it occurs earlier than some 
specified conscious experience or sense datum. The presentness o f  an event consists 
in its being simultaneous with some sense datum, and its futurity consists in its being 
later than some sense datum. Thus, for Russell, if there were no minds, or conscious 
subjects, there would be no past, present or future. Events would still be temporally 
related to one another by the relations 'earlier than', 'later than' and 'simultaneous 
with, but the status of the distinction between past, present and future is merely 
mind-dependent. In McTaggart's terms Russell rejects the objective existence o f  the 
A series, and of A series change, but maintains that the B  series is real, and that it is a 
genuinely temporal series. Other tenseless theorists9 including Griinbaum and Baker 
have developed more sophisticated versions o f  the mind-dependence o f  temporal 
becoming.
Another strategy adopted by tenseless theorists to account for the supposed 
experiential feel o f  temporal flow has been to argue that it is, in some sense, 
language-dependent. For example, Smart (1963) argues that tensed language is 
implicitly anthropocentric, and that this creates the illusion o f  an objective distinction 
between past, present and future, and of an objective flow o f  time. He then argues
For example. Smith (1993), M arkosian (1992) and Zeilicovici (1986).
8 For example, Broad (1923), Prior (1968), Schlesinger (1991), Bigelow (1991) and 
Christensen (1993). Some of these accounts will be examined critically in Chapter 3.
For example, Griinbaum (1964, 1968, 1971) and Baker (1974, 1978).
that since tensed language is responsible for this mistaken metaphysical picture of 
temporal reality, we ought to aim to divest language o f  tenses so that we may 
conceive of temporal reality as it really is. The hidden anthropocentricity o f  tensed 
language, according to Smart is concealed in its implicit self-referential nature. For 
example, the truth-value o f  an assertion that an event is past is dependent on the 
temporal location of the assertion itself, and the temporal relation in which it stands 
to the event that it is about. Smart infers from this that tensed utterances implicitly 
refer to themselves. He then concludes that, since tensed language generates 
metaphysical confusion about temporal reality, it should be eliminated in favour o f  a 
tenseless language that employs only temporal relations that obtain between events 
and assertions about them. He writes
When we use tenses and token-reflexive words such as 'past', 'present' 
and 'future' we are using a language which causes us to see the 
universe very much from the perspective o f  our own position in 
space-time. Our view o f  the world thus acquires a certain 
anthropocentricity, which can best be eliminated by passing to a 
tenseless language. By the use o f  such expressions as 'earlier than 
this utterance' and 'later than this utterance' we make quite explicit the 
reference to our particular position in space-time. Once we recognize 
this anthropocentric reference and bring it out into the open we are 
less likely to project it onto the universe. (Smart (1963) p. 142).
There is one aspect o f  tensed language that Smart claims is not translatable 
into tenseless language. Sentences that express the temporal passage o f  events from 
future to present to past, for example, 'This event was future, is present and will be 
past', he argues, cannot be expressed in a purely tenseless language. Smart sees this 
limit to his translation project as a benefit, because he takes it as proof o f  the 
concealed token-reflexivity o f  tensed language, and o f  the metaphysical confusion 
generated by such sentences. Nelson Goodman (1977) has also argued in support o f  
the thesis that tenses and temporal becoming are in some sense language-dependent. 
However, he sees sentences that express the temporal passage o f  events, and indeed 
o f  times, as fully translatable into a tenseless language. According to Goodman, the 
sentence 7 was future, is now present and will be past'
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says merely that this utterance is at time t, is later than some earlier 
time, and earlier than some later time. (Goodman (1977) p. 270).
However, he notices that a sentence that appears genuinely to express the flow of 
time, such as 'A time is at first future, then becomes present, then becomes past', 
despite appearances, is not a tensed sentence at all. What the sentence as a whole, 
and each o f  the individual clauses says does not depend, for its truth or falsity, on the 
time at which it is uttered.
Both Smart and Goodman thus focus their arguments for the language- 
dependence o f  temporal becoming on an analysis o f  the language that we ordinarily 
use to express this notion. Both o f  their arguments depend on the truth o f  the claim 
that tensed language can be translated into tenseless language. This claim has since 
been disputed by both tensed and tenseless theorists, as we will see in section 1.6 .
An alternative strategy adopted by some tenseless theorists who aim to prove 
that McTaggart's notions o f  the A series and o f  A series change are not objective 
features o f  temporal reality has been to argue that, when subjected to scrutiny, they 
cannot coherently be maintained. Unlike the projects o f  proving that temporal 
becoming is mind- or language-dependent, this strategy does not try to make sense 
o f  the alleged intuition that time flows in some sense. Instead, it seeks to prove that 
the concept o f  temporal flow is logically unsustainable, and thus cannot be a 
constituent o f  temporal reality no matter what our intuitions might tell us. Two 
examples o f  philosophers who have adopted this strategy are Smart (1949) and 
Williams (1951). Smart argues that the notion o f  the flow o f  time is merely a 
metaphor, albeit one which feels very natural to us. I f  we were to lose sight o f  that 
fact, and treat it as having a more significant status than that o f  a mere metaphor, we 
would find ourselves entangled in various logical absurdities. For example, if it is 
true to say that time flows, it ought to make sense to ask how fast time flows.10 The 
only way in which we can make sense o f  this question is by positing a second time 
dimension against which the rate o f  flow of the first time dimension can be 
measured. The introduction o f  a second time dimension is unsatisfactory in itself, 
but even more problematic is the fact that the question as to the rate o f  flow o f  time 
insidiously reappears with respect to this second time dimension. Again, in order to
Prior (1958) and Webb (I960) argue (hat this approach docs not succecd in proving the 
absurdity of the notion of the flow of time. Schlesinger (1982) offers an account in which he claims 
that questions about the rate of flow of time can be answered meaningfully. MacBeath (1986) 
argues, successfully I think, that Schlesingcr's account fails.
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make sense o f  this apparently innocuous question, we would have to introduce a 
third time dimension against which the rate o f  flow o f  the second time dimension 
could be measured. Clearly, Smart argues, taking seriously the idea o f  time as 
something which flows is the first step on this infinite regress o f  otherwise redundant 
dimensions o f  time, and it is the first step that we ought to avoid. Williams has 
similar objections to the notion o f  time's passage, and remarks that 'Time 'flows' only 
in the sense in which a landscape 'recedes into the west" (Williams (1951) in Gale 
(1968a) p. 105).
According to this strategy then, no matter what our intuitions might tell us 
about the transiency of time, taking them seriously results in logical absurdities. 
Therefore, we ought not to take them seriously. McTaggart's notion o f  A series 
change does not stand up to logical scrutiny and ought, on those grounds, to be 
rejected.
There is one more debate generated by step (2) o f  McTaggart's argument 
that I will briefly examine here. McTaggart's notion o f  A series change, and its 
essential connection, in his view, with the concept o f  change itself, is closely related 
to the way in which propositions about the A series positions o f  events appear to 
change in truth-value. McTaggart writes:
There can be no change unless some propositions are sometimes true
and sometimes false. (McTaggart (1927) p. 15).
This claim o f  McTaggart's has generated a debate about the connection between 
time and truth.
The fact that tensed sentences such as 'The hay has been harvested' express 
propositions which appear to be true at some times and false at others is indicative, 
according to some tensed theorists, o f  the fact that events genuinely undergo A 
series change. The sentence 'The hay has been harvested' expresses a true 
proposition when, and only when, the event reported by the sentence, the harvesting 
o f  the hay, is a past event. At all other times the proposition expressed by the 
sentence is false. So, according to some tensed theorists, propositions actually 
undergo changes in their truth-values over time, and this is a reflection o f  the A 
series change that the events which they are about themselves undergo.
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The response of the tenseless theory to this feature o f  tensed sentences has 
generally been along the following lines. 11 Truth, it is claimed, is a timeless, or 
eternal property of propositions. The validity of the laws of logic depend upon such 
a claim. Thus, when a sentence expresses a proposition which appears to change its 
truth-value over time, that is an indication that we are dealing with an incomplete 
proposition. The time at which a tensed sentence is uttered must be included in the 
full expression o f  the proposition expressed by it. Thus, if the sentence 'The hay has 
been harvested' is uttered at time /, the proposition expressed by that utterance must 
be supplemented by the time of utterance in order to be complete. The full 
expression of the proposition expressed by such an utterance will be something like 
'The harvesting of the hay occurs earlier than t. It is only when we have completed 
the proposition by relativizing it to the time at which the sentence is uttered that we 
are in a position to determine whether or not the proposition is true. Furthermore, 
the truth-value that it possesses is permanent. The temporal relation between the 
event reported by a proposition and the time at which that proposition is expressed 
does not change.
Thus, on the one hand it is claimed that some propositions are irreducibly 
tensed, and thus change their truth-value over time. The metaphysical implications 
o f  this are taken to be that A series change is a real and irreducible feature of 
temporal reality. On the other hand, it is claimed that all propositions have a 
constant truth-value. The propositions expressed by tensed sentences contain an 
implicit reference to the time at which they are expressed, and this needs to be made 
explicit in order to complete the proposition, and thus determine its truth-value. The 
metaphysical implications o f  this are taken to be that A series change is no part of 
temporal reality. Propositions that seem to imply that A series change is real are 
merely ambiguous, and once we remove the ambiguity we are in a position to realize 
that it is only temporal relations between events that are constitutive of time. 
Propositions only appear to change their truth-values because distinct utterances 
which express them stand in different temporal relations to the events they report. 
The introduction of A series change to account for this temporal ambiguity in 
language is unnecessary and metaphysically superfluous.
The second step of McTaggart's argument has thus provided fertile ground 
for the development o f  a number of debates about the nature o f  time. To sum up 
briefly, these debates are as follows. Firstly, there is McTaggart's own claim that the
li For example, Russell (1903). Broad (1921), Reichenbach (1947) and Goodman (1977).
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A series must exist in order for there to be change, and Russell's counter-claim that 
the B  series is sufficient to account for change. Tensed theorists have then defended 
the objective existence of the A series in a number o f  ways. Tenseless theorists have 
argued in response that A series change is merely an illusion which can be fully 
explained in terms of its dependence on minds, or on language. An alternative 
strategy adopted by tenseless theorists has been to argue that the notion o f  A series 
change is logically unsustainable, and thus should be rejected no matter what our 
intuitions about temporal flow might tell us. Finally, a debate has arisen over 
whether propositions have changing truth-values, thus reflecting real A series 
change, or whether they have permanent truth-values, thus reflecting the permanent 
B  series relations between events. In the course o f  introducing these debates, two 
further debates were hinted at. These concern the question o f  whether tensed 
sentences can be translated into tenseless sentences, or vice versa, and whether the B 
series can be reduced in some sense to the A series, or vice versa. I will introduce 
these two debates in greater detail in the next section, since they derive mainly from 
the third step in McTaggart's argument.
1.6 It is Not Possible For a B Series to Exist Unless an A Series Also Exists 
The B series, therefore, is not by itself sufficient to constitute
time.....so it follows that there can be no B series when there is no A
series. (McTaggart (1927) p. 13).
As I noted in section 1.3, this step in McTaggart's argument is a variant of 
the previous step, and one whose purpose is to provide further support for the claim 
that the existence of an A series is a necessary condition for the possibility o f  change. 
I include it here under a separate heading because, as will become clear, this 
approach to proving the necessity of the A series for the existence o f  time has been 
taken up in many different ways, and is consequently the impetus for a variety of 
debates that have become central in the philosophy o f  time.
In chapter 33 of The Nature o f  Existence McTaggart does not provide an 
explicit argument for the claim that a B series cannot be a genuinely temporal series 
unless its terms also possess A characteristics and change in respect o f  them. 
However, this claim does seem to be implicit in much o f  what he says, and in 
particular, in his arguments for step (2 ) that I outlined at the beginning o f  the 
previous section. Furthermore, in chapter 51 he asserts that 'The term P  is earlier 
than the term 0  if it is ever past while 0  is present, or present while 0  is future'
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(McTaggart (1927) p. 271). In a footnote to the section in which he makes this 
assertion he writes 'The statement in the text remains an adequate definition of 
'earlier than" (McTaggart (1927) p. 2 7 In). From this we may infer that McTaggart 
believes that the B series is in some sense dependent on the A series. The nature of 
this dependence is not entirely clear, although, from his remark in the footnote it 
could be argued that he believes that the B series is definable in terms o f  the A series, 
and thus is analytically reducible to it, in the sense that B  series expressions can be 
translated without loss o f  meaning by A series expressions.
Some tensed theorists have taken up this claim and argued independently for 
the reducibility o f  the B  series to the A series.12 The metaphysical conclusion 
claimed to be derivable from such an argument is that, since the B  series is 
dependent for its existence on the A series, the A series is essential for the existence 
o f  time, and furthermore that the B  series alone could not constitute time.13 
Tenseless theorists have responded by arguing, in the first place, that the B  series is 
not reducible to the A series, and further, that the A series is in fact reducible to the 
B  series.14 Those who argue that the A series is reducible to the B  series have 
claimed that it is the B series that is fundamental for the existence o f  time, and our 
notion o f  the A series is dependent for its existence on the B  series.
The notion o f  reducibility has thus played an important part in the debate 
between the tensed and tenseless theories o f  time. However, the question arises o f  
just what kind o f  reduction is at issue in these arguments. Hinckfuss (1975) outlines 
four different kinds of reduction. In the first place there is the analytic reduction in 
which one statement is reduced to another statement on the grounds that the two 
statements are synonymous with each other. Hinckfuss notes that there are mainly 
two areas in which an analytic reduction can be o f  significance. The first is where 
the synonymy o f  the two statements is not immediately apparent, and has to be 
accompanied by supporting argumentation. The second is where the grammar o f  the 
statement to be reduced is logically, and perhaps ontologically, misleading, but the 
grammar of the reducing statement is not. He gives as an example Ryle's claim that 
the statement 'Colour involves extension' is reducible to 'Whatever is coloured is 
extended'. The statement to be reduced uses the term 'colour' as a referring term
For example. Gale (1968b) and Loizou (1986).
A ralher maverick tensed position on the issue of reducibility is that advocated by Plecha 
(1984). Plecha argues that 'One can both acknowledge that language can be detensed and accept 
the absolute present' (Plecha (1984) p. 529).
14 For example. Smart (1963) and Goodman (1977).
17
which might suggest that there is a thing called 'colour', whereas the reducing 
statement avoids this potential ambiguity.
The second kind o f  reduction is an explicatory reduction. In an explicatory 
reduction no claim for synonymy is made. The reducing statement is simply more 
explicit about the kind o f  implications that may be drawn from it than is the 
statement to be reduced. An example is that o f  replacing use o f  the term 'space' with 
reference to spatial relations. O f those who employ the term 'space', some wish to 
refer to an objectively existing entity, and others do not. However, the need to refer 
to spatial relations is common among those who generally use the term 'space'. 
Thus, the possibility o f  making dubious implications is avoided.
The third kind o f  reduction discussed by Hinckfuss is an ontological 
reduction. Once more, no claim for synonymy between the two statements is made. 
The statement to be reduced has unacceptable implications, for example, by 
purporting to refer to an entity which, it is claimed does not exist. The reducing 
statement avoids all such misleading implications, but retains all the useful and 
informative implications o f  the original. I do not see any significant difference 
between Hinckfuss' accounts o f  the explicatory and the ontological reductions. 
Neither makes any claim for synonymy between the statement to be reduced and the 
reducing statement. They both seek to clarify the ontological implications o f  the 
statement to be reduced. Henceforth, therefore, I will make no reference to these 
two types o f  reduction as distinct, and I will refer to the ontological reduction when 
discussing reductions which exemplify them.
Finally, Hinckfuss discusses the notion o f  a theoretical reduction. Ordinary 
language contains terms which refer to entities with which we are acquainted 
through ordinary experience. Scientific discoveries sometimes reveal the underlying 
nature o f  such entities, and terms are introduced which describe their underlying 
nature. Thus, water is theoretically reducible to H 20 ;  temperature is theoretically 
reducible to mean kinetic energy. Again, no claim for synonymy between two such 
terms is made. The two terms have significant application in different fields o f  
discourse. However, the entities they refer to are, it is claimed, contingently 
identical.
Of the four kinds o f  reduction described by Hinckfuss, into which category 
do the reductionist claims o f  tensed and tenseless theorists fall? I think it is clear that 
neither the reduction o f  the B series to the A series, nor the reduction o f  the A series 
to the B  series is a theoretical reduction. No claims for the contingent identity o f  the 
two series are made. Furthermore, neither A expressions nor B expressions are the
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result of scientific discoveries about the underlying nature o f  time. I will thus rule 
out theoretical reduction as a candidate for the type o f  reduction at issue here. The 
metaphysical claims of the tensed theory are that the A series is more fundamental 
than the B  series, and that the latter is dependent for its existence, or for its 
temporality, on the former. The metaphysical claims o f  the tenseless theory are that 
the B  series is more fundamental than the A series, and that the A series is dependent 
for its existence on the B  series. The pertinent question is by what reductionist 
means are these metaphysical theses claimed to be achieved?
According to Hinckfuss, if any claims for synonymy are made between the 
reducing statement and the statement to be reduced, then the reduction is an analytic 
one. I f  not, then, having ruled out the theoretical reduction, and having dismissed 
the distinction between the explicatory and the ontological distinctions, the reduction 
is ontological. What, then, are the reductionist claims o f  tensed theorists who assert 
that the B  series is reducible to theA  series?
For McTaggart's part, his belief that the temporal relation 'earlier than' could 
be adequately defined in terms o f  the A characteristics o f  its relata would seem to 
constitute an analytic reduction. The claim that 'P is earlier than O' can be defined as 
'P is past while 0  is present or P  is present while 0  is future' seems to be a claim for 
the synonymy o f  the two statements. This is not a straightforward analytic reduction 
in Hinckfuss' terms however, because it does not seem to be the case that the former 
statement is misleading in a way in which the latter is not. I suggest that 
McTaggart's reasons for defining the former statement in terms o f  the latter are that, 
unless it is made explicit that the relata, P  and O, possess A characteristics, the fact 
that 'earlier than' is a temporal relation is not confirmed. Thus, the reducing 
statement makes explicit the temporal nature o f  the statement to be reduced, and 
shows the order o f  ontological dependence between A characteristics and B  
relations.
The motivation behind McTaggart's claim for reducibility is clear, however, 
as we have seen, he offers no explicit argument for his conclusion. Some tensed 
theorists have taken up his cause, providing a variety o f  arguments for the claim that 
the B  series is reducible to the A series. Gale (1968a) argues that the B  series is 
reducible to the A series on the grounds that certain A sentences entail B sentences 
but the converse entailment relation does not hold. For example, the sentence 'X  is 
present and Y is future', which asserts the specific A characteristics o f  X  and Y, 
entails the sentence X  is earlier than Y. However, the sentence that expresses the 
temporal relation in which X  and Y stand to each other entails nothing about the
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positions in the A series occupied by X  and Y. Thus, there is an asymmetry in the 
information expressed by A sentences and B sentences such that the former are more 
informative than the latter. The information expressed by B sentences can be derived 
from A sentences, but the reverse is not the case. Gale concludes from this that 
tensed language cannot be eliminated without loss of information, and therefore that 
there are certain entities in the world, namely tensed properties, which we can only 
refer to by using tensed language. Since we can derive information about the 
position in the B series o f  events from sentences expressing their position in the A 
series, but not vice versa, he concludes that the B  series is ontologically dependent 
on the A series; the existence o f  the A series is o f  primary importance to time.
Gale elsewhere (1962, 1968b) provides additional arguments to support his 
conclusion. He examines examples where a tensed sentence can be used to convey 
certain information, but no tenseless sentence can do so. He concludes from this 
that A characteristics are fundamental features of events, and are not reducible to B 
relations. The example he uses is o f  a man, Joe, whose job it is to warn his military 
company when the enemy are within 100 yards o f  their position. If  Joe shouts 'The 
enemy are now within 100 yards', then his company are duly warned o f  the position, 
and may take appropriate action. If, however, he tries to capture the information 
contained in this tensed sentence in terms of the tenseless relations between the event 
he is reporting and his utterance of the sentence, or the time at which he utters it, he 
will be unable to convey the appropriate information. If, for example, Joe shouts 
'The enemy are within 100 yards at noon', his company will not be warned o f  the 
situation unless they know that it is now noon, and this is a piece o f  tensed 
information. He concludes that tensed information is essential for successful 
communication, and thus that tensed sentences cannot be reduced to tenseless 
sentences. Tensed language thus refers to a feature o f  the world, the A series, that 
must exist, and on which the B  series must depend.
Elsewhere (1968b) Gale attempts an explicit reduction o f  sentences 
expressing B relations between events to sentences expressing the A characteristics 
o f  those events. He argues that the sentence 'P is earlier than O' is reducible to the 
sentence 'P is past and O is present or P is past and O is future or P  is present and O 
is future or P is more past than O or O is more future than P . According to Gale 
the analysans and the analysandum are logically equivalent, but the analysans is 
ontologically more perspicuous on the grounds that it is in virtue o f  the possession 
by P  and O o f A characteristics that they stand to each other in the temporal relation 
that they do. Arguably, however, the reduction fails because o f  the inclusion in the
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analysans of the last two disjuncts. An assertion that P  is more past than O entails 
that P and 0  are both past, and that P  is earlier than O. Similarly, an assertion that
0  is more future than P  entails that P and O are both future, and that O is later than 
P. Consequently, this attempt at an analytic reduction o f  sentences expressing B 
relations between events to sentences expressing the A characteristics o f  those 
events appears to be circular because the analysans makes implicit use o f  the 
analysandum.
Broad (1938) offers an alternative argument for the claim that the B  series is 
dependent on the A series. He frames it in terms o f  an argument that the relation 
'earlier than' can only obtain between terms that have A  characteristics. The 
argument appeals to an analogy. Broad claims that, just as harmonic relations can 
only hold between terms that have pitch, so B  relations can only hold between terms 
that have A characteristics. Furthermore, the harmonic relation that obtains between 
two notes depends on the difference between the absolute pitches o f  the two notes. 
Similarly, he argues, the B  relation that obtains between two events depends on the 
difference between the absolute values of their A characteristics. Thus, he claims, B 
relations are founded upon differences in the A characteristics o f  their relata. 
Whatever the merits o f  this argument by analogy, Broad is clearly persuaded by it. 
He writes:
This view seems to me to be a highly plausible one, and I know o f  no 
positive argument against it. If  it were accepted we should have to 
grant to McTaggart that there could not be B  relations between terms 
unless the terms had A characteristics, even if we refused to admit 
that B relations are definable in terms of A characteristics and their 
differences. I should consider that this theory holds the field unless it 
can be shown that sentences which contain the words 'past', 'present', 
or 'future', or their equivalents, can be translated without loss o f  
meaning into sentences which do not contain these words or 
equivalents of them, but do contain the phrase 'earlier than' or some 
equivalent ofit. (Broad (1938) p. 303).
It is clear from this that the reduction Broad envisages to be viable from the 
B  series to the A series is not analytic, since he does not seem to accept that B 
relations can be defined in terms o f  A characteristics and their differences. I would 
suggest that the reduction is thus ontological, because o f  the claim for the
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ontological dependence of B relations on A characteristics. It is interesting to note 
however that Broad claims that the only way in which his position can be 
undermined is if an analytic reduction can be effected from A characteristics to B 
relations. Arguably, an ontological reduction would suffice. However, I do not 
believe that Broad's argument is sufficiently robust that it can only be undermined if 
it can be shown that the A series is reducible to the B  series. All that Broad has done 
is to draw our attention to a potential analogy between, on the one hand, harmonic 
relations and absolute pitch, and on the other hand, B relations and A characteristics. 
How strong is this analogy? Arguably, it is not as strong as Broad thinks. For one 
thing, it is difficult to make sense o f  a harmonic relation obtaining between two 
entities unless those entities have pitch. However, it is quite simple to make sense o f  
a B  relation obtaining between two entities where those entities do not possess A 
characteristics. For example, we can understand what it is for two events that occur 
in a work of fiction to be temporally related, such that one is earlier than the other, 
but neither of these events are either past, present or future.15 I submit that Broad 
appeals to the close connection between harmonic relations and absolute pitch, and 
makes the unwarranted assumption that the same close connection obtains between 
B  relations and A determinations. Clearly, however, the requisite connection does 
not obtain in the latter case as it does in the former.
The response o f  the tenseless theory to the claim that the B  series is reducible 
to the A series has been twofold. The tenseless theory has aimed to disprove the 
arguments to the effect that the B series is reducible to the A series. Furthermore, its 
proponents have aimed to prove that the A series is, in some sense, reducible to the 
B  series. Once more the question arises, by what reductionist means has the claim of 
the priority of the B series been effected? For a long time during the development of 
this debate tenseless theorists sought to achieve an analytic reduction o f  the A series 
to the B  series. 16 They argued that it is tensed language which gives rise to our 
notion o f  the A series, but that tense is a feature o f  our language, rather than a 
feature o f  temporal reality. We have already touched on some o f  the attempts to 
show how tense is language-dependent in the previous section, but that was in the 
context of attempts to prove that temporal becoming is language-dependent. In this 
section I will outline more exhaustively the various arguments by which tenseless
15 See, for example, Currie (1992).
16 See, for example. Thalbcrg (1963). Fisk (1971), Fitzgerald (1974) and Williams (1974, 
1977).
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theorists claimed to show that tensed language is wholly reducible to tenseless 
language, and thus to prove that tense is not a real feature o f  the world.
I f  tense is to be completely eliminable from language, then the first 
phenomenon o f  tensed language to be dealt with is the apparent variability in the 
truth-values o f  tensed sentences. Tensed sentences, as we saw in the previous 
section, seem to have the curious capability o f  changing their truth-values over time; 
o f  being true at some times and false at others. According to tenseless theorists this 
is merely a superficial phenomenon that can be completely dispelled once we 
appreciate fully the distinction between sentence types and sentence tokens. A 
sentence token is a particular instance or occurrence o f  a sentence. It may be a 
spoken, written, or even mental token o f  a sentence, but it is a particular and unique 
entity. My utterance of 'T he  cow jumped over the moon' is a unique sentence token 
that has a definite location in time and a definite truth-value. A sentence token is a 
token o f  a particular sentence type. I f  I utter the sentence 'The cow jumped over the 
moon' twice in succession, then I have uttered two distinct tokens o f  the same 
sentence type. The sentence type is a particular grammatical formation o f  words that 
all tokens o f  that type share. A sentence type is thus a somewhat abstract object that 
has no definite location in time, except insofar as one could say that it exists at all the 
spatiotemporal locations at which its tokens exist.
According to the tenseless theory then, when it is claimed that tensed 
sentences have variable or unstable truth-values, it is clearly only sentence types that 
have this characteristic. A sentence token has a determinate truth-value .17 A 
sentence type has a variable truth-value if and only if some o f  its tokens are true and 
others false. Thus, according to the tenseless theory it is misleading to talk o f  the 
changing truth-values o f  tensed sentences, or o f  tensed propositions, since nothing 
really changes its truth-value over time. It is simply the case that different tokens 
produced at different times o f  the same tensed sentence type have different truth- 
values. This gives the impression that the sentence type itself is a determinate object 
which changes its truth-value over time.
I f  tense is to be eliminable from language, then it must be shown how 
particular tokens o f  tensed sentences can be translated into tenseless sentences. Any 
attempt to translate tensed sentence types into tenseless sentences will fall at the first
It is important to emphasize that this is a tenseless explanation of the phenomenon that
tensed sentences appear to have variable or unstable truth-values. There are some tensed theorists
for example Priest (1986) and Tichy (1980), who hold that a particular unique sentence token can 
change its truth-value over time.
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hurdle. This is precisely because tensed sentence types do not have determinate 
truth-values, but tenseless sentence types do. A necessary condition o f  the 
translatability o f  one sentence by another is that they should have the same truth- 
value, but no tenseless sentence type can have the same truth-value as a tensed 
sentence type because the latter does not have a single determinate truth-value, 
whereas the former does. Thus, the distinction between sentence types and sentence 
tokens successfully dispels the apparent phenomenon o f  the variable truth-values o f  
tensed sentences.
Attempts by tenseless theorists to show how tensed sentence tokens can be 
translated into tenseless sentences have been o f  three main types. Each type of 
translation claim has aimed to show how the tenses o f  events are really disguised 
temporal relations between events. Thus, what appears to be a monadic property of 
an event is really a dyadic relation which that event stands in to another event or 
moment. The three types o f  translation claim differ from each other insofar as they 
each choose a different entity to stand as the second relatum o f  the appropriate 
temporal relation. According to the first kind o f  translation claim the A 
determination o f  an event is a disguised temporal relation between that event and 
some conscious event or sense datum. According to this translation claim tense is 
mind-dependent. The second kind o f  translation claim sees the tense o f  an event as a 
disguised temporal relation between that event and the date at which that tense is 
ascribed to it. This yields a date version o f  the translation claim. Finally there is the 
token-reflexive version o f  the translation claim. According to this claim a tensed 
sentence token which ascribes a tense to an event is translatable into a tenseless 
sentence which ascribes a temporal relation between that event and the event 
constituted by the production o f  the sentence token itself
According to the mind-dependence translation claim tense is a subjective 
feature o f  our temporal experience. Events are only past, present or future in 
relation to some mental event, such as an act o f  perceiving or o f  remembering. A 
tensed sentence token which ascribes an A determination to an event can be 
translated by a tenseless sentence which ascribes a B  relation between that event and 
some mental event. Russell (1915) advanced such a view, arguing that a tensed 
sentence token such as 'e is now' means the same as, or can be translated by 'e is 
simultaneous with this' where 'this' is a logically proper name o f  a sense datum o f  
which the utterer is aware while he is uttering the sentence token. Similarly 'e is 
past' can be translated by 'e is earlier than this1, and 'e is future' can be translated by 'e 
is later than th is . Thus, events are only past, present or future in relation to the
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mental activity o f  a perceiver. That this is so is shown by the translatability o f  tensed 
sentence tokens into tenseless sentences that ascribe temporal relations between 
events and subjective experiences.
There are a number o f  problems with this translation claim. In the first place, 
the alleged translation contains the term 'this' which itself is a context-dependent 
term. Thus, the tenseless translation o f  the tensed sentence token is not a sentence 
type whose tokens all have the same truth-value. Thus, the translation procedure 
has not achieved the aim o f  divesting language o f  all temporally context-dependent 
expressions. Secondly, a mental event is one which, in principle, cannot be 
experienced by anyone other than the one who experiences it. Only the speaker can 
know the reference of'this ' which stands in the appropriate temporal relation to the 
relevant event. Thus, it would seem that communication is rendered impossible 
among individuals employing tensed language on this analysis. Finally, it is possible 
to ascribe A determinations to mental events, for example, truly to assert 'This sense 
datum is present'. Proponents o f  the mind-dependence translation claim would have 
to say that such a tensed sentence token is translatable by a sentence such as 'This 
sense datum is simultaneous with itself. Arguably, this is unsatisfactory as a 
translation o f  the ascription o f  a tense to an event, since it is true o f  every event that 
it is simultaneous with itself, but it is not true o f  every event that it is present.
The date version o f  the translation claim attempts to eliminate tense in favour 
o f  the tenseless ascription o f  dates to events. According to this date theory, despite 
the fact that a tensed sentence token appears to ascribe a monadic tensed property to 
an event, it really does nothing o f  the sort. A token o f  the present tensed sentence 
The cow is jumping over the moon' uttered at time t, can be translated without loss 
o f  meaning by the tenseless sentence 'The cow jumps over the moon at The verb 
in the tenseless sentence is to be taken as tenseless, and not present tense, and 
consequently the tenseless sentence is completely divested o f  tense. Similarly, a 
token o f  the past tensed sentence 'The cow jumped over the moon', uttered at time t, 
is fully translatable as 'The cow jumps over the moon earlier than /'. A token o f  the 
future tensed sentence 'The cow will jump over the moon' uttered at t is translated by 
'The cow jumps over the moon later than t'. Thus, according to this theory, 
ascriptions o f  tense are to be replaced by ascriptions o f  temporal relations between 
events and moments o f  time referred to by dates .18 The metaphysical implications o f
This theory requires the existence of times in some sense, but it is neutral as to the 
particular conception of times that is adopted. For example, it is consistent with both a relational 
and a substantival conception of times.
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this translation claim are held to be that, since tensed language can be completely 
eliminated in favour of the more perspicuous language o f  tenseless temporal 
relations and dates, tense is not a genuine feature of temporal reality.
One reason that the tenseless date language is held to be more perspicuous 
than tensed language is that it avoids the potentially misleading notion o f  sentences 
which appear to change their truth-value over time. Two tokens o f  the sentence 'It 
is now raining' uttered at different times, according to this theory, actually say 
different things which explains why they may have different truth-values. A token 
uttered at t says 'It is raining at t' and a token uttered at t ’ says 'It is raining at t \  
These tenseless date translations have fixed truth-values. By bringing the time of 
utterance into the translation o f  a tensed sentence token, any confusion over the 
apparent changing truth-value o f  the tensed sentence type is eliminated.
The date version o f  the translation claim, however, faces a number of 
problems. The first problem is generated by its use of dates. A use of 'now ' appears 
to refer to the time at which it is uttered, so if it is uttered at time t it seems prima 
facie plausible to translate that use of 'now' with the expression 'at /'. However, a 
use of'now' is immune to error through misidentification by both speaker and hearer, 
while a use o f  'at /' is not. I f  I utter a token of 'You may start writing now' at t, 
everyone concerned will know at what time they may start writing. If, however, I 
utter at t 'You may start writing at /', it is possible for someone not to know at what 
time they may start writing. Someone who does not know that it is t now will not 
know that they may start writing now. Thus it seems that the tenseless date sentence 
is not a successful translation o f  the tensed sentence token, since it is possible for 
someone to understand both sentence tokens at the same time and yet to take 
different attitudes to the truth-value of each.
Another problem with the date version o f  the translation claim arises in 
connection with tensed sentence tokens such as 'It is 5pm now'. Such sentence 
tokens can clearly be used informatively. They convey tensed information about 
what time it is now. If the date version o f  the translation claim is correct, however, 
such a sentence token is to be translated by the tenseless sentence 'It is 5pm at 5pm', 
This sentence does not have the same information content as the tensed sentence 
token that it purports to translate, and furthermore it is trivially true. These two 
sentences cannot have the same meaning, and cannot provide adequate translations 
o f  each other. Thus, the date version o f  the translation claim appears to be unable to 
deliver the conclusion that it sets out to establish. It does not provide an adequate
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formula for translating every tensed sentence token into a tenseless sentence without 
loss o f  meaning, so it fails to prove that tense can be eliminated from language.
The final version o f  the translation claim that has been put forward by 
tenseless theorists is the token-reflexive version. According to this theory, tense can 
be completely eliminated from language in favour o f  tenseless sentences that assert 
that a temporal relation holds between events and token utterances about them. 
There are a number o f  ways in which a translation such as this has been claimed to 
be effected. Take a tensed sentence token such as 'It is now raining'. It has been 
claimed that this token can be translated by the tenseless sentence 'Rain occurs 
simultaneously with this token'. The motivation behind this attempt at translation is 
that attributions o f  tense are merely disguised attributions o f  temporal relation 
between the event that a tensed sentence token is about and the event constituted by 
the production o f  the tensed token itself. Thus, this version avoids the problems we 
have seen connected with introducing dates into the translation. It merely 
countenances events and the temporal relations between them. However, the 
tenseless sentence is inadequate to the task of eliminating tense from language. That 
this is the case can be seen by asking oneself what the expression 'this token' in the 
alleged translation refers to. I f  it refers to the token o f  the tensed sentence, then 
clearly the tensed token must be produced in order for this expression to refer to it. 
Tensed sentences must therefore be retained within our language. I f  it refers to the 
tenseless sentence in which it occurs, then the tenseless sentence is covertly behaving 
as if it were a tensed sentence token. The sentence 'Rain occurs simultaneously with 
this token is temporally context-dependent in the same way as it 'It is raining now', 
so tense has not been eliminated from our language by this alleged translation.
Another attempt at a token-reflexive translation o f  tensed sentence tokens is 
as follows. I h e  token 'It is raining now' is translated by the tenseless sentence 'Rain 
occurs simultaneously with the utterance o f  'It is raining now". Here, the tensed 
sentence is mentioned rather than used. However, once more the alleged translation 
is ineffective. I f  the occurrence o f  the tensed token is replaced by an occurrence o f  
the tenseless sentence, the tenseless sentence once more behaves as if  it were tensed. 
The occurrence in the tenseless sentence o f  the tensed token imparts the relevant 
tensed information; the information that it is raining now.
Another problem with the token-reflexive translation claim is as follows. It 
depends for its viability on the assumption that tensed sentence tokens implicitly 
refer to themselves. It is for this reason that the various translations attempt to make 
this self-reference explicit. Now, it has been argued, most notably by tensed
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theorists, that tensed sentence tokens are not self-referring. I f  these arguments are 
successful, then the token-reflexive translation claim fails on these grounds. 
However, it seems to me that the translation claim will fail even if tensed sentence 
tokens can be shown to be self-referring. This is because, by attempting to make the 
self-reference explicit, the tenseless sentence which is supposed to translate the 
tensed sentence token is not, itself, self-referring. A sentence token which is self- 
referring cannot be translated by a sentence which is not self-referring, because any 
two such sentence tokens obviously differ significantly in meaning in precisely this 
respect. Therefore, two such sentence tokens cannot be synonymous. I f  the alleged 
translation is based on the claim that tensed sentence tokens are self-referring, then 
the claim of translatability is self-defeating. In principle, no two such sentence 
tokens can convey the same information.
I conclude that attempts to translate tensed sentence tokens by tenseless 
sentences fail for one o f  two reasons. The alleged translations either fail to convey 
the same information as is conveyed by the tensed token, or they behave as if  they 
are tensed sentence tokens, and thus fail to eliminate the function that tense 
performs. Thus, attempts at an analytic reduction o f  tensed to tenseless language are
futile.
It seems that much of the debate between the tensed and tenseless theories of 
time since McTaggart and until about 1980 has been carried out in terms o f  attempts 
to prove an analytic reduction from the B series to the A series or vice versa. In my 
discussion of attempts to prove an analytic reduction o f  the B  series to the A  series I 
showed how any such attempt implicitly appeals to B  relations while claiming to 
eliminate them. My discussion o f  attempts to prove an analytic reduction from the A 
series to the B series showed that any such attempt faces a variety of problems. 
Arguably the most serious of these problems was that the alleged tenseless 
translations o f  tensed sentence tokens either fail to convey the same information as 
the tensed tokens or they take on the context-dependent role o f  tense, and thus fail 
to eliminate the function that tense performs. Thus, I believe my discussion has 
shown that neither kind o f  analytic reduction can work. It seems that ordinary 
language cannot do without tense, but neither can it do without statements of 
temporal relation. A language without tense that adequately described the temporal 
relations that obtain between every event in the history o f  the universe would 
certainly be informative, but it would lack one vital piece o f  information; it would 
omit to tell us which o f  the times so described is now. To employ such a language 
would be like being in possession of a map of the world, but without knowing which
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place on that map one could truly describe as 'here'. Conversely, a language divested 
o f  expressions o f  temporal relation would be completely opaque. As Mink (1960) 
has said,
A pure A language is impossible because, once purged o f  the 
presupposed schema o f  B  relations, every statement would employ a 
strictly unique tense. Tenses, in such a language, would carry the 
burden o f  indicating remoteness as well as temporal direction from 
the utterance. Hence the meaning o f  no two statements could be 
compared - although perhaps this would be no matter, since neither 
logic nor science could be formulated in such a language in any case.
(Mink (1960) p. 259).
Thus, claims for the ontological priority o f  the A series or the B  series cannot be 
achieved through attempts at analytic reductions.
1. 7 The Notion o f  the A Series is Self-Contradictory
The attribution o f  the characteristics past, present, and future to the 
terms o f  any series leads to a contradiction. (McTaggart (1927) p.
22 ).
McTaggart's argument in support of this premise is deceptively simple, and 
has proved notoriously difficult to counter. He argues that the three A 
characteristics of past, present and future are mutually incompatible. This seems 
eminently plausible. If an event is past, then it is not present or future; if it is present 
then it is not past or future, and if it is future, then it is not past or present. He goes 
on to assert that every event has all o f  these three incompatible determinations. 
Thus, to assume that the A series exists is to commit oneself to the contradictory 
position that every event possesses each o f three incompatible determinations.
The immediate response to this contradiction, as McTaggart duly notes, is to 
assert that the contradiction only holds if events possess these incompatible 
determinations simultaneously, but as they possess them successively, the problem 
does not arise. The problem, however, does not evaporate quite as simply as that. 
There are two ways in which we can say that events possess different A 
characteristics successively. We can say that they possess them at successive B  
series times, or at successive A series times. I f  we take the first option, we can say
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that an event is future at present at t2 and past at /3, where tx is earlier than t2, 
which in turn is earlier than t3. This option is not open to one who has accepted 
McTaggart's argument so far, because for McTaggart there can be no B  series 
without an A series, and this approach presupposes the B series in order to make 
sense o f  the A series. However, even if one does not see this as an obstacle, this 
option to make sense o f  the A series is still unacceptable. This is because to interpret 
the A series in this way is to relinquish that feature o f  it that is essential to it. In 
other words, to understand the A series in this way is to relinquish A series change. 
That an event, e is future at present at t2 and past at t3 are features o f  e that never 
change. They are thus not genuine A characteristics. To assert that these are 
features o f  e is equivalent to the assertion that e is earlier than tu that e occurs at t2 
and that it is later than ty  This way out of McTaggart's contradiction thus renders 
the A series dependent on the B series.
The alternative option is to say that events possess different A characteristics 
at successive A series times. Thus e is present, will be past, and has been future. 
However, the possession by an event o f  A characteristics at successive A series times 
is a changing feature o f  those A series times. To say that e is present, will be past 
and was future is just to say that e is present at a present moment o f  time, past at a 
future moment of time, and future at a past moment o f  time. However, those 
moments o f  time at which e possesses incompatible A characteristics are themselves 
subject to A series change. Thus the contradiction is transferred to the A series times 
at which events possess A characteristics. McTaggart argues that one thus embarks 
on a vicious infinite regress because in any attempt to dispel the contradiction, it 
simply reappears in the explanation. It is A series change, the essential feature o f  the 
A series, which is responsible for its self-contradictory nature.
The paradox that McTaggart thus reveals in the essential nature o f  the A 
series has generated many responses. Some have simply failed to appreciate the 
force o f  the paradox. Gunn (1929), for example, thought he had dispelled the 
paradox merely by taking the first step of the vicious infinite regress:
Although past, present and future are used of the same event, they
are so used at different times. (Gunn (1929) p. 348).
Others have attempted to undermine the contradiction on various grounds. For 
example, some have sought to show that McTaggart's analysis o f  A series change is
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misleading because it treats A series change as a species o f  qualitative change. 19 
They argue, rather, that A series change is unanalysable, and is presupposed by 
qualitative change. This approach seems to me to be simply a refusal to address the 
problem posed by McTaggart's paradox. Others have argued that there is a regress, 
but it is not vicious.20 They support this by saying that 'e is present' does not mean, 
but simply entails that 'e is present at a moment o f  present time'. The regress is thus 
o f  the same kind as one which moves from 'p is true' to "p is true' is true' and so on, 
and is thus benign. However, the claim does not follow through for 'e has been 
future' and 'e will be past', and amounts to the claim that all tenses are simply 
unanalysable.
In chapter 3 I will examine closely various attempts to avoid McTaggart's 
paradox, but here I will simply outline the metaphysical agendas o f  those who object 
to and those who endorse the paradox. I f  the A series is inherently self­
contradictory, then tense can be no part o f  temporal reality. This conclusion leaves 
the way clear to argue that time is tenseless, so tenseless theorists have sought to 
reinforce McTaggart's argument. Thus, the contradiction has been reiterated and 
reformulated by tenseless theorists in order to prove that time is not intrinsically 
tensed. Dummett (1960) and Mellor (1981) have both offered restatements o f  
McTaggart's paradox in an attempt to make the contradiction more apparent.
The tensed theory, on the other hand, which holds that time is intrinsically 
tensed, has tried to find a flaw in McTaggart's argument in order to prove that the A 
series is not self-contradictory. Alternative approaches by the tensed theory have 
been to attempt to make sense o f  A series change in ways which avoid McTaggart's 
paradox. I examine some o f  these attempts in chapter 3. I f  the A series can be 
shown not to be contradictory, then tense can be a part o f  reality, and the way is 
clear to argue that it is an essential constituent o f  temporal reality.
1.8 Time is Unreal
Nothing is really present, past, or future. Nothing is really earlier or 
later than anything else or temporally simultaneous with it. Nothing 
really changes. And nothing is really in time. (McTaggart (1927) p.
22).
For example, Broad (1923), Pears (1956), Lloyd (1978) and Lucas (1989).
For example, Wisdom (1928), Stebbing (1936) and Cleugh (1937).
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As we saw in section 1.3, McTaggart's argument for the unreality o f  time is 
formally valid, so its soundness depends on the truth-values o f  its premises. As we 
have seen in the preceding discussion, the overall soundness o f  McTaggart's 
argument has generally been rejected. However, I have tried to outline how this 
argument has been responsible for the generation o f  many debates between the 
tensed and tenseless theories o f  time. Thus, while his conclusion has been rejected, 
alternative conclusions about the nature o f  time have been drawn on the basis o f  his 
argument. Put simply, the issue is as follows. McTaggart's argument can be seen as 
the conjunction o f  a positive and a negative thesis. His positive thesis is that the A 
series is essential for the existence o f  time. His negative thesis is that the A series is 
inherently self-contradictory. The tensed theory has adopted his positive thesis, but 
rejected his negative thesis. The conclusion it has drawn from this is that the A 
series is a necessary feature o f  time, and since the A series is not self-contradictory, 
time exists and is intrinsically tensed. By contrast, the tenseless theory has rejected 
his positive thesis and adopted his negative thesis. Thus, its proponents have argued 
that the A series is self-contradictory, so it cannot be a constituent o f  temporal 
reality. However, since the existence o f  the A series is not essential for the existence 
o f  time, time exists and is intrinsically tenseless.
McTaggart's argument has thus generated debate about the ontological 
nature o f  time. I f  tense is real, then there is support for the claim o f  ontological 
disparity between past, present and future. In chapter 3 I examine various tensed 
claims for such an ontological asymmetry. If, on the other hand, tense is not real, 
then there is support for a tenseless ontology. Thus, although McTaggart's 
conclusion has been almost universally rejected, it should now be clear just how 
important it has been in the context of debates within the philosophy o f  time. 
However, as we have seen in the discussion so far, all the arguments generated 
between the tensed and tenseless theories have been subject to criticism. It would 
seem that the debate has reached an impasse. In the next section I will examine 
some recent developments in the debate which may offer a possible route out o f  this 
impasse.
1.9 A New Direction For the Debute
In my discussion o f  the arguments put forward by the tenseless theory in 
favour o f  a reduction from the A series to the B series, we saw how a complete 
analytic reduction in linguistic terms was shown to be impossible. This conclusion 
was reinforced in the 1960s and 1970s by various philosophers working in the field
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o f  the philosophy of language. It was argued by, among others, Castaneda (1967), 
Kaplan (1978), Perry (1979) and Wettstein (1979), that indexicals such as 'now', 
'here' and T, and other context-dependent expressions, are essentially irreducible. 
They cannot be translated without loss o f  meaning into non-context-dependent 
expressions. Thus, tense, being a temporally context-dependent feature o f  language, 
is irreducible, and the project o f  effecting an analytic reduction from the A series to 
the B  series is futile.
However, as we have seen, there is another kind o f  reduction that make no 
claims for synonymy between the reducing statement and the statement to be 
reduced. Might not an ontological reduction from the A series to the B series be 
possible? If  so, then the impossible burden o f  proving tense to be completely 
eliminable could be discharged, while retaining the important metaphysical 
conclusions to be established by such a reduction. Two philosophers, writing 
independently o f  each other at about the same time came up with arguments for an 
ontological reduction from the A series to the B  series. They were Smart (1980) and 
Mellor (1981).
The theses o f  both Smart and Mellor are motivated by the thought that, even 
though tensed language is ineliminable, tensed sentence tokens only require the 
existence o f  tenseless facts to account for their truth-values. Thus, the aim is to 
prove that tensed sentence tokens have tenseless truth conditions. If  this can be 
shown, then the metaphysical conclusion to be drawn is that a tenseless ontology is 
both necessary and sufficient to account for tensed truths. This conclusion, together 
with McTaggart's argument for the self-contradiction in supposing tense to be real, it 
is claimed, justifies the conclusion that tense is a feature o f  language and thought, 
and not o f  reality.
Smart (1980) puts forward a date version o f  what has come to be known as 
the new tenseless theory o f  time.21 According to this theory a sentence token which 
purports to ascribe a tense to an event is true if and only if that event stands in the 
appropriate temporal relation to the time at which the sentence token is produced. 
So, the truth o f  a sentence token which ascribes a particular tense to an event 
depends on the time at which that tense is ascribed to that event. Thus, a token o f  
the tensed sentence 'It is now raining', uttered at time t, is true if  and only if it is
Another proponent of the date version of the new tenseless theory of time is Williams
(1992).
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raining at t. A token o f 'I t  was raining' uttered at t is true if and only if it rains earlier 
than t, and a token o f  It will rain' uttered at t is true if and only if it rains later than t.
Mellor (1981) offers a token-reflexive version o f  the new tenseless theory. 
According to this theory a token, ?/, o f  the tensed sentence 'It is now raining' is true 
if  and only if rain occurs simultaneously with u. A token, v, o f 'I t  was raining' is true 
if and only if it rains earlier than v. A token, w, o f 'I t  will rain' is true if and only if it 
rains later than w. The date theory uses the time at which a tensed sentence token is 
produced as one o f  the relata o f  the appropriate temporal relation, the other relatum 
being the event reported by the sentence token. Thus, the time at which the token is 
produced occurs in that token's truth conditions. The token-reflexive theory, by 
contrast, uses the event constituted by the production o f  the tensed sentence token 
itself as one relatum o f  the temporal relation, the other being, again, the event 
reported by the sentence token. In this case, the occurrence o f  the tensed sentence 
token occurs in that sentence token's own truth conditions. This theory gives the 
truth conditions o f  tensed sentence tokens in terms o f  the temporal relation which 
obtains between two events. The events in question are the event reported by the 
sentence token and the production o f  the sentence token itself. The date theory 
gives the truth conditions o f  tensed sentence tokens in terms o f  the temporal relation 
which obtains between an event and a time. The event is that reported by the 
sentence token, and the time is that at which the sentence token is produced. In 
chapter 2 I will give a detailed examination o f  these two versions o f  the new 
tenseless theory of time. I will examine the differences between these theories, their 
implications, and some objections to them. At this point, however, I will point out 
some important ways in which the new tenseless theory o f  time overcomes the 
problems o f  the old tenseless theory .22
The new tenseless theory denies that tensed sentence tokens can be translated 
without loss o f  meaning by tenseless sentences. This shift in the strategy o f  the 
tenseless theory is responsible for its ability to overcome the problems that faced the 
old theory. In the first place, the new theory does not have to argue that tensed 
sentence tokens are self-referring, and then face the problems associated with 
translating a self-referential sentence token into a non-self-referential sentence.
22 In the ensuing discussion I will focus on how the token-reflexive version of the new 
tenseless theory overcomes the problems o f the old tenseless theory. The key feature of the new 
theory that distinguishes it from the old is the fact that it rejects the translation claim and offers a 
tenseless account of the truth conditions of tensed sentence tokens instead. This feature is common 
to both versions of the new theory, so it will suffice to discuss just one version. Furthermore, I will 
discuss the differences between these two theories in chapter 2.
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Tensed sentence tokens, according to the new theory, are token-reflexive. All this 
means is that tensed sentence tokens occur in their own truth conditions. The 
ontological conclusions to be drawn from this thesis are still that time is tenseless, 
and that tense is merely a feature o f  language. However, this conclusion can be 
achieved without making the contentious claims about the self-referential nature o f  
tensed sentence tokens, together with claims o f  their translatability that the old 
theory makes.
Many o f  the attempts to translate tensed sentence tokens into tenseless 
sentences found themselves unable to divest language completely o f  all context- 
dependent expressions. Expressions such as 'this token' or 'this utterance' inevitably 
crept into the alleged translation. The new theory recognizes that language cannot 
be divested of all context-dependent expressions and, rather than attempting to 
reduce them all to one context-dependent expression such as 'this token', it embraces 
them all, in their wide variety, as irreducible. However, it argues that the 
irreducibility o f  tense in language has no implications for the existence o f  tense in 
reality, since all tensed sentence tokens have tenseless truth conditions.23 The 
mistake made by proponents o f  the old tenseless theory was to think that the only 
way in which tense could be shown not to exist in reality was by showing how tense 
could be eliminated from language. Once it was realized that tense could be retained 
in language without implying that tense is a feature o f  reality, the problems o f  the old 
tenseless theory could be dispelled.
In the remainder of this chapter I will sum up my findings so far, and give an 
outline o f  the questions I will address in the rest o f  this thesis.
1.10 The Way Fun vard
In this chapter I have been concerned to illustrate how McTaggart's 
argument for the unreality o f  time was largely responsible for generating the debate 
between the tensed and the tenseless theories of time. I have examined in detail the 
development of this debate up to, and including the most recent advances made by 
proponents o f  the new tenseless theory o f  time. It is in defence o f  this modified 
version o f  the new tenseless theory o f  time that I take up the debate.
In chapter 2 I will examine the significance o f  truth conditions for the current 
status o f  the debate for both tensed and tenseless theories. I will consider the 
differences between the date version and the token-reflexive version o f  the new
Butterfield (1985) also argues explicitly for this conclusion.
35
tenseless theory, and argue that the date version faces problems to which the token- 
reflexive version is immune. I will then defend this latter theory against a series of 
penetrating objections.
Chapter 3 will explore in detail the nature o f  the tensed theoiy o f  time. I will 
examine all the different ways in which its proponents have tried to make sense o f  
real tense. Ultimately, I will argue, the supposition that tense is real is in principle 
unsustainable. Thus, I intend to establish that the new tenseless token-reflexive 
theory o f  time offers the correct account o f  the nature o f  time. In the rest o f  this 
thesis I will concern myself with three independent problems for the theory I defend, 
and I will attempt to resolve them.
The problem I address in chapter 4 concerns the striking analogies between 
the theory I defend and David Lewis' theory o f  genuine modal realism. Given the 
prima facie existence o f  these analogies, is a proponent o f  the new tenseless theoiy 
o f  time committed, by parity o f  reasoning, to genuine modal realism?
The tenseless theoiy o f  time rejects the doctrine o f  temporal passage, and its 
corollary that there is an ontological asymmetry between the past and the future. 
Given this rejection, I will consider in chapter 5 whether the theory I defend can 
provide a satisfactory account o f  the direction o f  time. Finally, in chapter 6 , I 
address a particular objection to the token-reflexive version o f  the new tenseless 
theory o f  time. This objection was put forward by Smith (1987b, 1993), and is 
potentially devastating for Mellor's theory. Smith claims to prove that Mellor's 
theory is self-contradictory, and furthermore, that the only way in which to avoid 
this charge results in Mellor's theory collapsing into the old tenseless theory, one 
which, it has been conceded, fails. I will show how, with some clarification and 
modification, Mellor's theory can survive Smith's attack. However, my resolution of 
this problem raises an important question for the new tenseless token-reflexive 
theory o f  time. As it turns out, there is an objective difference in meaning between a 
tensed sentence token and the tenseless sentence that states its truth conditions 
which is not discernible in the truth conditions o f  those sentence tokens. Can the 
new tenseless theory of time provide a satisfactory account o f  tensed meaning, or 
must real tense be invoked to do so?
In conclusion, the aims o f  this thesis are to provide a solid defence o f  the 
new tenseless token-reflexive theory o f  time, together with arguments to the effect 
that the tensed theory o f  time is wholly unsatisfactory. In addition I aim to develop 
the new tenseless token-reflexive theory o f  time on three broad fronts, thus showing
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that it is not only the correct account o f  time, but also the most theoretically 
advantageous.
Chapter 2
A  T e n s e l e s s  T h e o r y  o f  T i m e : T w o  R i v a l  A c c o u n t s ?
The debate between the tensed and tenseless theories o f  time is now focused 
on the nature of the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences. Does the objective truth or 
falsity o f  tensed sentences require the existence o f  tense as a constituent o f  temporal 
reality? I f  the answer to this question is yes then, it is claimed, real tense is an 
objective feature of reality, and the tensed theory is vindicated. If, on the other hand, 
this question is answered in the negative, the tenseless theory is supported, as time 
need not be tensed in order to account for the objective truth or falsity o f  tensed 
sentences. The tenseless theory aims to prove that tensed sentences have truth 
conditions that appeal only to the existence o f  dyadic tenseless temporal relations, 
and not to the existence o f  monadic tensed temporal properties. I f  it is the case that 
the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences can be stated in a purely tenseless 
metalanguage, then this can be taken as providing support for the conclusion that 
reality is tenseless. In addition, McTaggart's paradox claims to show that any 
conception o f  temporal reality as tensed is logically incoherent. Thus, arguments in 
support o f  the self-contradictory nature o f  a tensed reality, and arguments in support 
o f  the conclusion that the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences are tenseless, together 
provide grounds for the conclusion that time is tenseless.
In the next chapter I will examine arguments that seek to prove that temporal 
reality is tensed, and I will reinforce McTaggart's argument that any such conception 
o f  temporal reality is inherently self-contradictory. In this chapter I will focus my 
attention on the question o f  whether a satisfactory account o f  the truth conditions o f  
tensed sentences can be given in entirely tenseless terms. The pursuit of the unitary 
aim o f  providing such an account has yielded two distinct accounts o f  the tenseless 
truth conditions of tensed sentences. According to one version, a tensed sentence, if 
true, is true in virtue o f  its token-reflexivity. According to the other, if a token o f  a 
tensed sentence is true, it is made true by virtue o f  the tenseless temporal relation 
that obtains between what the sentence is about and the date at which the token is 
produced. Following Smith (1993) I shall refer to these as the token-reflexive theory 
and the date theory respectively. Both versions seek to achieve their common aim by 





sensitivity o f  those sentences. However, each follows its own strategy in providing 
this explanation.
In this chapter I intend to examine these two tenseless accounts o f  the truth 
conditions o f  tensed sentences. I will consider some arguments that have been 
levelled against each, and I will explore the relationships between them. However, in 
order to effect a complete examination o f  these two accounts it will be important not 
to lose sight o f  the ultimate objectives o f  any such theory. What, then, are the 
objectives o f  a tenseless theorist who provides a tenseless account o f  the truth 
conditions o f  tensed sentences? I believe that this question has been neglected by 
those involved in the debate but not, as yet, to its serious detriment. However, as 
will become clear in the ensuing discussion, neglecting it can give rise to serious 
confusion which could be damaging to the progression o f  the debate. Therefore, in 
order to pre-empt any such confusion, I will address this question first. Once I have 
established what conclusions can legitimately be drawn from an account o f  the truth 
conditions o f  tensed sentences, I will turn to the date theory and the token-reflexive 
theory, and consider the extent to which they each succeed in achieving their 
objectives.
2.1 The Significance o f  Truth Conditions
In the debate between the tensed theory and the old tenseless theory o f  time, 
the central issue was that o f  translatability. The reason why translatability was the 
focal point for the debate was that it was thought by tensed theorists that if tensed 
sentences were untranslatable by tenseless sentences, the former must convey 
information that cannot be conveyed by the latter. The reasoning continued that 
tensed sentences conveyed this peculiar information by ascribing irreducible tensed 
properties to moments and events. It was then claimed that the objective truth of 
some tensed sentences bore witness to the fact that these monadic temporal 
properties were genuinely instantiated.
The old tenseless theory responded to this line o f  argument by claiming that, 
as a matter o f  fact, tensed sentences could be translated by tenseless sentences 
without any loss o f  meaning. It was thought that this rebutted the argument o f  the 
tensed theorist because it showed that there was no additional information conveyed 
by tensed expressions over and above that conveyed by tenseless expressions. 
Hence, it was concluded by the old tenseless theorist, tensed expressions did not 
ascribe monadic temporal properties to their subjects. The old tenseless theorist 
wanted to prove that tense could, in principle, be eliminated from language.
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Consequently, her claim was that tenseless expressions were more fundamental than 
tensed expressions; that tensed expressions were dependent for their meanings on 
tenseless expressions. Furthermore, there were ontological conclusions to be drawn 
from such a reduction. I f  tensed expressions were ultimately dependent for their 
existence on tenseless expressions, then they cannot depict any feature o f  temporal 
reality that is not also depicted by tenseless expressions. Thus, if  all temporal 
language could be reduced to tenseless language, only the latter would be genuine 
temporal language. Tenseless language alone would have ontological significance 
and depict the true nature o f  temporal reality. Therefore, according to the old 
tenseless theory o f  time, a true and complete picture o f  temporal reality does not 
include tense: time is tenseless. The issue o f  translatability was thus crucial for both 
the tensed and the old tenseless theory for two reasons. It had semantic significance, 
allowing conclusions to be drawn regarding the nature o f  temporal language. It also 
had ontological significance, warranting conclusions to be drawn regarding the 
nature o f  temporal reality.
However, as has already been discussed in chapter 1, the project o f  the old 
tenseless theory failed because it is not the case that every tensed sentence can be 
translated without loss o f  meaning by a tenseless sentence. The untranslatability 
thesis is now almost universally held. As a result, the central issue in the debate 
between the tensed and tenseless theories is no longer translation; it is now a 
question o f  truth conditions. Why are truth conditions the key to the current debate? 
What is a tenseless theorist aiming to establish by arguing that every tensed sentence 
has truth conditions statable in a tenseless metalanguage?
As I mentioned earlier, I believe this question has been neglected, and yet it is 
an important question to consider if we are to avoid unnecessary confusion. One of 
the reasons for this neglect is that the answer to the question is often taken to be self- 
evident. Talk o f  truth conditions is commonplace throughout the philosophy of 
language, and much o f  metaphysics, and it is thought that its significance is well 
understood .1 Various intuitions about the significance o f  truth conditions reflect this 
attitude, but also, paradoxically, reveal at least two distinct notions o f  the nature of 
that significance. The first notion is illustrated by such intuitions as 'to know the 
meaning o f  a sentence is to know under what conditions it is true'; 'to give the truth 
conditions o f  a sentence is to give its meaning', and 'to understand a sentence is to
There has been at least one dissenter to this view. Baker and Hacker (1983) argue that 
discourse concerning truth conditions is ultimately unintelligible.
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grasp its truth conditions '.2 The common theme running through these intuitions is 
that there is some significant connection between the meanings o f  sentences, our 
grasp or understanding o f  those sentences, and their truth conditions. Thus, the 
notion o f  truth conditions is taken to have some kind o f  semantic, or cognitive 
significance. The second notion can be illustrated by such intuitions as 'the truth 
conditions o f  a sentence state what must be the case if that sentence is to be true'; 'a 
sentence is true if and only if its truth conditions obtain or are satisfied', and 'a 
statement o f  the truth conditions o f  a sentence states what the world must be like if 
that sentence is to be true '.3 There is a different common theme running through 
these intuitions which is that there is some significant connection between truth 
conditions and the ontological commitments o f  a sentence. Thus, the notion o f  truth 
conditions is also intuitively taken to have some kind o f  ontological significance. So, 
stating the truth conditions o f  an ordinary language sentence is intuitively thought to 
have, on the one hand, some kind o f  semantic, or cognitive relevance, and on the 
other, some kind o f  ontological relevance.
One can discern in the literature varying levels o f  adherence to each o f  these 
intuitions. Some philosophers emphasize the semantic significance o f  truth 
conditions,4 while others concentrate on examining their ontological significance.5 
Donald Davidson recognizes both aspects o f  the nature o f  truth conditions when he 
says 'The truth o f  an utterance depends on just two things: what the words as spoken 
mean, and how the world is arranged' (Davidson (1986) p. 309). Whatever the 
varying allegiances to these two intuitions by different philosophers, I think it is clear 
that both o f  them are, in some sense, correct. On the basis o f  that perfectly 
reasonable assumption, it follows that any complete and satisfactory account o f  the 
nature o f  truth conditions ought to do justice to both kinds o f  intuition. Indeed, it 
has been argued on the grounds o f  theoretical advantage, most notably by Wright
Such intuitions are variously expressed by, for example, Davidson (1984) and M artin
(1987).
These intuitions are expressed by, for example, Davidson (1986) and Dummett (1978).
For example, Horgan argues that 'Although the providing of truth conditions may still be a 
useful and important part of semantics for natural language, it is not likely to be an ontologically 
perspicuous enterprise' (Horgan (1986) p. 13). Similarly, M artin says o f the project o f providing 
truth conditions for sentences, 'The object of such an enterprise is to provide an account of the 
meanings o f each sentence by telling, in essence, what the truth conditions of that sentence are' 
(M artin (1987) p. 207).
Kirkham criticizes Dummett for reducing the debate about the nature of truth to a debate 
about ontology. Kirkham comments 'Arguing about theories o f truth is not just a roundabout way of 
arguing about ontology, nor is the latter debate a roundabout way of arguing about the proper theory 
of truth' (Kirkham (1992) p. 191).
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(1992), that the best conception o f  truth, and therefore o f  truth conditions, is one 
that does justice to both our cognitive, or semantic intuitions regarding truth 
conditions, and to our intuitions regarding their ontological significance. I believe 
that the potential for confusion can arise if it is thought that the semantic and the 
ontological significance o f  truth conditions are entirely distinct aspects o f  this notion; 
that they have no bearing on each other.
Some examples o f  the sort o f  confusion that can arise if  an account o f  the 
notion o f  truth conditions is offered that fails to take account o f  both sets of 
intuitions are as follows. Skidmore (1994) argues that the notion o f  truth conditions 
can be construed ambiguously either as a Fregean sense or as a state o f  affairs. To 
conceive o f  truth conditions as a Fregean sense is to recognize the semantic, or 
cognitive significance o f  truth conditions, while to conceive o f  them as a state o f  
affairs is to recognize their ontological significance. Skidmore sees these construals 
as mutually exclusive, and opts for the first construal. Consequently, he puts 
forward an account o f  truth conditions that renders the connection between language 
and reality irrelevant to the notion o f  truth. Another philosopher who treats these 
two aspects of truth conditions as wholly independent o f  each other is Smith (1993). 
He argues for a distinction between the new tenseless theory o f  time and what he 
calls the 'nonsemantic tenseless theory of time'. That he sees a distinction here at all 
is, I believe, evidence o f  his having taken each o f  the two aspects o f  the notion o f  
truth conditions to be significant only to the exclusion o f  the other. In what follows I 
will endeavour to show this.
Smith characterizes the new tenseless theory o f  time as 'the theory that 
tenseless truth condition sentences provide a 'logically adequate representation o f  
ordinary temporal language" (Smith (1993) p. 13), and then remarks that one o f  its 
proponents (Smart (1980)) 'is concerned with the logical structure o f  ordinary 
language and is interested in how the meaning o f  ordinary expressions should be 
understood or represented in theories o f  meaning for ordinary language.' (Smith
(1993) p. 13). Thus, according to Smith, the aim o f  the new tenseless theory o f  
time, in providing tenseless truth conditions for ordinary tensed language, is purely 
to satisfy the semantic intuitions regarding the nature o f  truth conditions. That is, as 
Smith sees it, proponents o f  the new tenseless theory o f  time intend to explicate the 
semantic significance o f  ordinary tensed language by providing a complete account 
o f  its truth conditions. According to Smith, proponents o f  the new tenseless theory 
o f  time are not concerned with giving an account o f  the ontological commitments of 
tensed language. Indeed, he criticizes Oaklander (1991) for misunderstanding the
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new tenseless theory o f  time when the latter argues that its aim in giving the truth 
conditions o f  tensed language is to fulfil the "ontological1 function o f  representing the 
metaphysical nature o f  time' (Smith (1993) p. 13). The aim o f  the new tenseless 
theory o f  time, according to Smith, is merely to provide an adequate account o f  
every aspect o f  the meaning o f  tensed language by giving an account o f  its truth 
conditions.
The nonsemantic tenseless theory o f  time is, according to Smith, a theory that 
'considers the meaning or semantic content o f  ordinary tensed discourse as irrelevant 
- or at least as not crucial to the truth or falsity o f  the tenseless theory o f  time' (Smith
(1993) p. 14). Smith is here suggesting that the aim o f  this theory in giving the truth 
conditions o f  ordinary tensed language is wholly ontological, to the exclusion o f  any 
semantic significance that truth conditions may have. It merely represents in an 
'ontological' language the metaphysical nature of time, and that 'ontological' language 
has no significance whatsoever for the meaning o f  the tensed language whose truth 
conditions it states.
I want to argue that the relationship between the semantic and ontological 
significance o f  truth conditions is far more subtle than Smith has here suggested. By 
isolating each o f  these factors from the other, to the extent o f  constructing two 
distinct tenseless theories each supporting one but not the other, he has grossly 
misunderstood the true nature o f  truth conditions .6 As I noted earlier, our semantic 
and ontological intuitions about the nature o f  truth conditions are both correct, and 
each has a role to play in any single account o f  the truth conditions o f  tensed 
language.
In order to illustrate the relation between the semantic and the ontological 
implications o f  truth conditions, I will take an example o f  an ordinary tensed 
sentence and consider what we can legitimately conclude by stating its tenseless truth 
conditions. The sentence type 'The stranger is now approaching' has no determinate 
truth-value. Some tokens o f  it will be true and others false, depending on certain 
features o f  the context in which those tokens are produced. By stating its truth 
conditions we are effectively providing a truth-conditional schema for a sentence
I remark here that it is Smith who has constructed these distinct theories, although he 
attributes them to various tenseless theorists. I believe my remark is warranted because these 
theorists do not consider themselves to be supporting distinct versions of the tenseless theory of 
time. I will shortly argue that this is a distinction without a difference, and that there is both a 
semantic and an ontological significance to any account of the truth conditions of tensed language, 
so Smith's attempt to force these theorists into distinct camps is his own, not theirs, and is 
unjustified.
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type which any token of that type must satisfy if it is to be a true token .7 The 
tenseless truth-conditional schema for this sentence type may look something like
this:8
( l a )  Any token u o f 'T h e  stranger is now approaching' is true if and only if  the 
stranger's approach is simultaneous with u
The occurrences of the copula 'is' in the statement o f  the truth-conditional schema o f  
this tensed sentence are to be taken as tenseless, rather than present tense. In 
general, any verbs that occur in a tenseless truth-conditional schema, or in a 
statement o f  the tenseless truth conditions of a tensed sentence, outside o f  the tensed 
sentence whose truth conditions are being stated, are to be taken as tenseless. It is 
important to make this assumption at this stage because the aim o f  the tenseless 
theorist is to state the truth conditions o f  any tensed sentence in tenseless terms. I f  
the statement o f  truth conditions contains present tense copulae, or tensed verbs o f  
any kind, then that aim has been frustrated from the outset. O f  course, whether the 
position o f  the tenseless theorist is tenable; whether the truth conditions o f  tensed 
sentences can be stated without the need for real tense remains to be proven. This 
truth-conditional schema can be represented in logical notation by the following 
universal quantification:
( lb )  \/u(Tu  <e-> Sen)
where e represents the event referred to by the sentence in question, Sxy represents 
the relation 'x is simultaneous with y \  and T represents the predicate '... is true'. 
According to this truth-conditional schema, a particular token o f  the sentence type, 
say, a token a will have the following truth conditions:
I am here introducing the notion of a truth-conditional schema. My reasons for doing so 
are that, within a tenseless framework, we cannot properly speak of the truth-value of a tensed 
sentence type since different tokens of it may have different truth-values. Hence, we cannot 
properly speak of the truth conditions of a tensed sentence type, since no one set of conditions can 
be necessary and sufficient for the truth of a tensed sentence type. However, where tensed sentence 
types are concerned, it is possible to provide a formula that any token of that type must adhere to if 
it is to be a tme token. Furthermore, this formula yields determinate truth conditions for any 
particular token of that type. I call this formula a truth-conditional schema.
I will shortly illustrate that it is possible for there to be at least two different accounts of the 
tenseless truth conditions of tensed sentences. In order not to pre-empt that discussion, I here offer 
one possible such account. What I have to say about truth conditions per se is applicable to any 
such account.
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(2a) a is true if and only if the stranger’s approach is simultaneous with a
This statement of the truth conditions o f  a can be represented in logical notation as 
follows:
(2b) Ta <-> Sea
Clearly, the statement in (2b) is the result o f  a straightforward application o f  the rule 
o f  universal instantiation to the statement in (lb). Thus, stating the truth conditions 
o f  a sentence type provides a general schema which any true token o f  that type must 
instantiate.
With these examples in mind we may now ask in what sense do truth 
conditions have semantic significance, and in what sense do they have ontological 
significance? Whether we are examining a sentence type or a sentence token, the 
truth conditions illustrate how the meaning o f  a sentence depends on the meanings o f  
its constituents, and on how they are combined together in its structure. However, 
when the sentence whose truth conditions we are considering is context-dependent, 
as tensed sentences are, the truth conditions are particularly illustrative as to the 
features o f  the sentence on which its meaning depends. Tensed sentences are 
context-dependent either in virtue o f  containing explicitly temporal indexical 
expressions such as 'now', 'yesterday' or 'next week', or in virtue o f  a device such as 
verbal inflection which conveys the information that the sentence is past, present or 
future tense.
As a result of being context-dependent different tokens o f  the same sentence 
type can have different truth-values. In giving a procedure for judging the truth- 
values o f  tokens o f  a sentence type, the truth-conditional schema makes explicit how 
the truth-values o f  its tokens depend on when those tokens are produced. The truth- 
conditional schema thus explicates the context-dependence o f  tensed sentence types, 
which is an aspect o f  their meaning. In so doing, it provides us with a formula 
according to which we can tell which o f  its tokens are true and which false. Thus, 
the truth-conditional schema ( la )  states that, for any token o f  this sentence type, it 
will be true if and only if a relation o f  simultaneity obtains between the token itself 
and what the sentence is about. It is in this sense that tensed sentences can be 
described as token-reflexive; the tokens themselves constitute part of the truth 
conditions. Thus, according to the token-reflexive version o f  the new tenseless
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theory o f  time, tensed sentences are token-reflexive, and the semantic significance o f  
their truth conditions is to render transparent this token-reflexivity.
In what sense do truth conditions have ontological significance? Following 
Wright (1992), I am assuming that a conception o f  truth conditions that does justice 
to both our semantic and ontological intuitions, and that accepts the explanatory 
burdens o f  both, is better than any other conception o f  truth conditions, on the 
grounds o f  theoretical advantage. On the basis o f  that assumption, the ontological 
role o f  truth conditions is to identify the ontological commitments o f  a sentence. A 
truth-conditional schema states how one aspect o f  the world must be if a token of 
that sentence is to be true. A true sentence token has truth conditions that are 
fulfilled. Thus, reality is as they say it is. Given a true token o f 'T he  stranger is now 
approaching', its satisfied truth conditions are that the token and the stranger's 
approach occur simultaneously. Its ontological commitments are that the event 
constituted by the stranger's approach, and the event constituted by the production 
o f  the sentence token stand to one another in the temporal relation o f  simultaneity. 
The satisfaction o f  the truth conditions implies that the two events and the temporal 
relation in which they stand to each other are all part o f  reality.
Thus, the truth-conditional schema o f  a tensed sentence type explicates how 
the meaning o f  a sentence depends on the meanings o f  its constituents. In particular, 
it explicates the context-dependence o f  the tensed sentence; how the truth-values of 
its tokens vary according to when they are produced. By explicating this aspect of 
the meaning of a tensed sentence, it is committed to the existence o f  a number of 
entities, specifically two events that stand to each other in a particular temporal 
relation. Thus, truth conditions have both semantic and ontological significance.
Having examined the nature o f  truth conditions, I will now return to the 
original question: what can be established by arguing that every tensed sentence has 
truth conditions statable in a tenseless metalanguage? The aim o f  any tenseless 
theorist, in arguing for this position, is to explain the semantic contribution o f  tensed 
terms to the meanings o f  sentence types in which they occur. It is also to make 
explicit the ontological commitments o f  tokens o f  those sentence types. Smith's 
distinction between the new tenseless theory o f  time and the nonsemantic tenseless 
theory o f  time is thus a specious one. The truth conditions o f  tensed sentences do 
have semantic significance; they explicate the context-dependence o f  those 
sentences, but this does not mean that for any token o f  a tensed sentence type, the 
statement o f  its tenseless truth conditions is a complete and satisfactory statement of 
the meaning of the tensed token. The tenseless theorist denies this by embracing the
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untranslatability thesis; by claiming that a sentence that states the tenseless truth 
conditions o f  a tensed token cannot translate that tensed token without some loss of 
meaning. The truth conditions o f  tensed sentences also have ontological 
significance; they claim that only tenseless temporal relations need exist in order to 
account for the truth o f  a tensed sentence. There is no need for real tense to account 
for the objective truth or falsity o f  tensed sentences. However, pace  Smith, this does 
not mean that questions o f  the semantics o f  tensed terms are irrelevant to 
establishing the ontological conclusion that temporal reality is tenseless. The aim o f 
providing tenseless truth conditions for tensed sentences is twofold. There is a 
semantic aim and an ontological aim, and each complements the other. To 
misunderstand this, as Smith clearly has, is to misunderstand the project o f  the new 
tenseless theory of time.
The true nature o f  the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences is at the heart o f  
the debate between the tensed and tenseless theories. The reason for this is that each 
theory intends to provide the definitive explanation for a peculiar feature o f  tensed 
language. This feature is that tensed sentence types have no determinate truth-value. 
Their truth-values appear to 'change' over time. Or, to frame the feature in terms o f  
a tenseless conception, the truth-values o f  different tokens o f  a particular tensed 
sentence type depend on when those tokens are produced. The definitive account o f  
the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences will provide an adequate account o f  why this 
is so. It will explain why, and how, the truth-values o f  different tokens o f  tensed 
sentence types differ from one another depending on when they are produced.
The definitive account o f  the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences will also 
make perspicuous the ontological commitments o f  tensed language. I f  the correct 
account o f  the truth conditions o f  tensed language commits us to the objective reality 
o f  temporal becoming, then we are committed to the metaphysical conclusion that 
time is tensed. If, on the other hand, the correct account o f  the truth conditions of 
tensed language commits us only to the existence o f  tenseless temporal relations, 
then that, together with arguments for the paradoxical nature o f  objectively real 
tense, provides support for the metaphysical conclusion that time is tenseless. This is 
why the true nature o f  the truth conditions o f  tensed language is crucial to the debate 
between the tensed and tenseless theories. The correct account will explicate the 
peculiar semantics o f  tensed language and will also make perspicuous the true 
metaphysical nature o f  time.
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2.2 Tensed Truth Conditions
The tensed explanation for the variation in truth-value am ong different tokens 
o f  the same tensed sentence type (a phenomenon I shall henceforth call the variable 
truth-value phenomenon), is that the truth conditions o f  these sentences are tensed. 
Fo r  example, a token o f  the sentence type 'The stranger is now  approaching1 will be 
true if the event referred to by the token, the stranger's approach, is a present event. 
Some tensed theorists explicate this in terms o f  the event's possessing the property o f  
presentness.9 So, one possible tensed account o f  the truth conditions o f  this sentence 
is as follows:
(3a) Any token u o f  'The stranger is now approaching' is true  if  and only i f  the 
stranger's approach is present
In logical notation this would be represented as follows:
(3b) Vw(7'» <-» Ne)
where the predicate 'N...' represents the property o f  presentness, while the predicates 
'P...' and 'F...' represent the properties o f  pastness and futurity respectively. I f  this 
tensed account o f  the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences is the correct one, then 
ontologically, w e  are committed to the reality o f  the tensed properties o f  pastness, 
presentness and futurity, because the truth-conditional schema invokes such 
properties as constituents o f  reality. With these properties as objective constituents 
o f  reality, the tensed explanation o f  the variable truth-value phenomenon is that 
events acquire and shed these properties in succession. An event is first future, then 
present and then past. I f  a future tense sentence token is uttered about an event 
while that event is future (i.e. possesses the property o f  futurity), then the token will 
be true. I f  that event is present or past when the token is uttered then the token will 
be false. For example:
(4a) Any token u o f  'The stranger will be approaching' is true if  and only if  the 
stranger's approach is future
(4b) \/u(Tii < - »  Fe)
9 For example, Smith (1993), Zcilicovici (1986) and Markosian (1993).
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Similarly:
(5a) Any token u o f  'The stranger was approaching' is true if and only if the
stranger's approach is past
(5b) Vm(7i/ <-> Pe)
The variable truth-value phenomenon is explained, under this account o f  the 
truth conditions o f  tensed sentences, by whether or not the event referred to  by a 
tensed sentence actually possesses the tensed property that the sentence ascribes to 
it. This explanation o f  the phenomenon commits us to  the reality o f  tensed 
properties. The successive acquisition and loss o f  these properties by events 
constitutes temporal becoming which, on this account is an objective feature o f  
reality. This explanation commits us to the metaphysical conclusion that time is 
tensed.
In chapter 3 I will examine closely the supposition that temporal reality is 
tensed, and I will present a number o f  arguments, on several fronts, that such a 
conception o f  time is inherently paradoxical. However, I will here note one 
immediate problem for a tensed account o f  the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences 
such as that outlined above. I f  this account o f  the truth conditions o f  a tensed 
sentence are correct, then all tokens o f  a given tensed sentence are made true by the 
same fact, regardless o f  when those tokens occur. The tensed truth-conditional 
schema makes no reference to  the time at which a token is produced, but appeals 
only to the tensed fact that the event referred to by the sentence possesses a 
particular tensed property. So, for example, all tokens o f  the sentence type 'The 
stranger was approaching' have the same truth conditions. They will all be true i f  it 
is the case that the event referred to by the sentence type, the stranger's approach, is 
a past event. The problem with this is that a given token o f  this sentence type may 
be false, because for example, the event referred to is a present event. However, the 
event will then become past, and then the truth conditions for that particular sentence 
token will obtain. Thus, on this account, a false sentence token can change its truth- 
value and become true. Similarly, a true sentence token can change its truth-value 
and become false. Furthermore, the truth-value o f  a given tensed token does not 
depend on when that token is produced.
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Hugh Mellor (1981) has argued that this tensed account o f  the truth 
conditions o f  tensed sentences generates a truth-conditional version o f  M cTaggart's 
paradox, because it results in particular tensed sentence tokens being both true and 
false. W hether or not this is the case, it would seem to be at least counter-intuitive 
to hold that particular sentence tokens actually change their truth-values over time. 
O ur intuitions regarding the truth-value o f  a particular tensed sentence token are that 
it is either true or false, that it remains either true or false, and that whether it is true 
or false depends on when it is produced, and consequently on the temporal relation 
that obtains between its production and the event that it is about. A  tensed account 
o f  the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences as described above jettisons all these 
intuitions. However, there are some proponents o f  the tensed theory  who are quite 
happy to maintain that particular tensed tokens change their truth-value over time, 
and that their truth-value depends wholly on whether or not a particular tensed fact 
obtains.10 I mention this potential problem for such an account only in passing, since 
I will be presenting independent arguments against the tensed theory in the next 
chapter, and my main concern in this chapter is to  establish whether the tenseless 
theory can provide a satisfactory account o f  the objective truth or falsity o f  tensed 
sentences.
2.3 Tenseless Date-Involving Truth Conditions
The tenseless theory denies that time is tensed, that temporal becoming is an 
objective feature o f  reality, and that tensed properties are constituents o f  temporal 
reality. It must therefore find an alternative explanation for the variable truth-value 
phenomenon, one that appeals only to the existence o f  tenseless temporal relations. 
A close look at the variable truth-value phenomenon reveals that the temporal 
relations could play a key role in accounting for it. W hat appears to  be crucial to this 
phenomenon is not merely that given tokens o f  a tensed sentence type have different 
truth-values, but that the truth-value an individual token has depends on when it is 
produced. It seems that all we need in order to account tenselessly for the truth- 
values o f  tensed sentence tokens are the tenseless temporal relations of 'earlie r  than', 
'later than' and 'simultaneous with', together with a system for identifying objectively 
the times at which sentence tokens are produced. Our conventional system o f  dates 
appears to fit the bill as we can use it to identify objectively the times at which events 
occur, and also to calculate the temporal separation between events.
For example. Priest (1986, 1987).
50
Thus, we have the apparatus we need to construct a tenseless account o f  the 
variable truth-value phenomenon. It is reasoning such as this that constitutes the 
motivation for the date version o f  the tenseless theory o f  time. Dates are non- 
indexical expressions for referring to times,11 and hence they provide a means o f  
identifying objectively the time o f  the context o f  utterance o f  a tensed sentence 
token. By using the system o f  dates we have an objective means o f  telling whether 
the event a tensed sentence is about stands in the appropriate  tem poral relation to the 
time at which a token o f  the sentence is uttered. Therefore, we have an objective 
means o f  telling whether the sentence token is true or false.
There are other reasons which have motivated the date version o f  both the 
old and new tenseless theories o f  time. For example, the explanations o f  the 
meanings o f  temporal indexical expressions are generally given along the following 
lines:
Clearly, for example, 'now', said at noon, refers to noon, said at
midnight, to midnight. (Yourgrau (1990) p. 1).
Temporal indexical expressions are commonly taken to be directly referential; they 
refer directly to the moment at which they are uttered, and not via any definite 
description o f  that m om ent.12 In this sense they are taken to be exactly analogous to 
o ther indexical expressions. For example, the spatial indexical 'here' refers to the 
place at which it is uttered. W e have non-indexical names for places which enable us 
to refer to them objectively from wherever we happen to  be located. Similarly, we 
have non-indexical names for times which allow us to refer to them even when we 
are not located at those times. This seems to have constituted evidence to 
proponents o f  the date theory for the view that we should explicate the meanings o f  
all temporally context-sensitive language in terms o f  the non-context-sensitive 
language o f  dates.
Further motivation for the date theory is that tensed sentence tokens and their 
corresponding tenseless date sentences are intersubstitutable salva veritate in
In the ensuing discussion I will make reference to times, but I do not intend to enter into 
the debate concerning the nature o f  times. Important as it is, this debate is not directly relevant to 
the discussion I am engaged in, which is compatible with both a reductionist and a substantival 
conception o f limes.
12 In chapter 6 1 examine closely the directly referential nature o f  indexicals, and argue that 
the motivation for it is consistent with a token-reflexive account o f  the mechanism by which 
indexicals operate to fix the truth-value o f tokens in which they occur.
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extensional contexts. In other words, a token o f  'The stranger is now approaching' 
uttered at date D can be substituted in extensional contexts by 'The stranger is 
approaching at D\ and retain the same truth-value.13 Ultimately, the date theory has 
been taken up as a means o f  providing tenseless truth conditions for tensed 
sentences, together with an objective, tenseless explanation o f  the variable truth- 
value phenomenon, that is committed merely to a tenseless ontology.
H o w  does the date theory ascribe truth conditions to  tensed sentences? To 
illustrate the date theory in practice, I will provide examples o f  the tenseless date 
truth-conditional schemata for a past, present and future tense sentence type. I will 
also give an example o f  the tenseless date truth conditions o f  a given token o f  each 
sentence type.
The Present Tense 
Truth-conditional schema
(6) For any token u o f 'T h e  stranger is now approaching' uttered at t, u is true if 
and only if  the stranger's approach is simultaneous with t
Truth conditions o f  a aiven token, a. uttered at date tx
(7) a at /[ is true if and only if the stranger's approach is simultaneous with tx
The Future Tense 
Truth-conditional schema
(8) For any token u o f 'T h e  stranger will be approaching' uttered at t, u is true if 
and only if the stranger's approach is later than t
Truth conditions o f  a given token, h. uttered at date t2
(9) h at /2 is true if and only if  the stranger's approach is later than t2
The Past Tense 
Truth-conditional schema
(10) For any token u o f 'T h e  stranger was approaching' uttered at t, u is true if and 
only if the stranger's approach is earlier than t
13 Smith (1993) recognizes that this is the case, but denies that it provides any evidence for 
the date version o f the tenseless theory o f time.
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Truth conditions o f  a given token, c. uttered at date t2
(11) c at t3 is true if and only if  the stranger's approach is earlier than t3
The above account o f  the tenseless date-involving truth conditions o f  tensed 
sentences aims to account for the objective truth or falsity o f  every tensed sentence. 
It appeals only to the tenseless temporal relations that obtain betw een the times at 
which tensed sentences are tokened and the events that those  sentences are about. 
Its semantic aim is to account for the variable truth-value phenomenon. Its 
ontological aim is to do so by invoking only the existence o f  tenseless temporal 
relations, and thereby to support the conclusion that time is tenseless. The question 
that now  arises is whether the date theory so described is adequate to the task o f  
accounting for every instance o f  the variable truth-value phenomenon, and whether it 
can withstand criticism from proponents o f  the tensed theory o f  time.
The date version o f  the tenseless theory o f  time seems, at first sight, to  be 
both extremely plausible, and capable o f  meeting the requirements o f  the tenseless 
theory. The truth-values o f  tokens o f  tensed sentences depend on when those tokens 
are produced. The date theory provides us with non-context-dependent means o f  
referring to those times, so that once we have identified objectively the time at which 
a token  is produced, we can establish objectively whether the token is true or false. 
Thus, the date version o f  the tenseless theory delivers tru th  conditions in an 
epistemically valuable way. It accounts for the variable truth-value phenomenon 
while remaining ontologically committed only to tenseless temporal relations, and 
not to tensed temporal properties.
However, despite this initial plausibility, there is a powerful argument against 
this theory that has been put forward by Smith (1993), and which needs to  be 
examined closely. Smith considers an utterance, U, o f  the tensed sentence type 
'Henry is ill' which is produced on July 28, 1940. H e states that its date-involving 
tru th  conditions would be given as follows:
(12) 'Henry is ill' is true as spoken by John on July 28, 1940 if and only if  Henry is
ill on July 28, 1940.
Smith's aim is to establish that the clause which occurs to the right o f  the 
biconditional, 'Henry is ill on July 28, 1940', is not a necessary condition for the truth 
o f  U. I f  he succeeds it follows that (12) is not a statement o f  the truth conditions o f  
U, a conclusion that would signal the failure o f  the date theory. The first step in his
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argument is to presuppose the indirect reference theory, such that the date 
expression refers to a time via a propositional definite description o f  it. With this 
assumption in place he argues that to assert that (12) is a necessary condition for the 
truth o f  U is to assert that U is not true in any world in which Henry is not ill on July 
2 8 ,1 9 4 0 .  He then continues:
But this is not the case. In the actual world, U  occurs at a time that 
possesses the date-property o f  being 1,939 years, 6 months, and 27 
days later than Christ's birth. Let us first suppose that the 
reductionist theory o f  times is true and that this time is a set o f  
simultaneous events, two o f  which are U and Henry's illness. This set 
o f  events does not possess the aforementioned date-property in each 
possible world in which it exists. In one o f  these worlds, Wx, Christ 
was not born at all; and in another world, W2, Christ was born 1,938 
years earlier than the set o f  events that contains Henry's illness. In 
both o f  these worlds, U is true, since U is simultaneous with Henry's 
illness. But 'Hem y is ill on July 28, 1940' is false in W1 and W2, 
since, in these worlds, Henry is not ill at whatever set o f  events has 
the property o f  being 1,939 years, 6 months, and 27 days later than 
Christ's birth.
The same result follows if we assume the substantival theory 
o f  times. In the actual world, U  and Henry's illness occupy the 
moment that has the date-property o f  being 1,939 years, 6 months, 
and 27 days later than Christ's birth. But in Wx and W2, the moment 
occupied by U and Henry's illness does not possess this date- 
property; consequently, the date-sentence - but not U - is false in 
these worlds. (Smith (1993) p. 35).
W hether we adopt a substantival or a reductionist theory o f  times, Smith's 
argument purports to prove that what occurs on the right hand side o f  the 
biconditional in (12) is not a necessary condition for the truth o f  U, and consequently 
does not state the truth conditions o f  U. His strategy is to  interpret (12) according 
to  possible worlds terminology, and then to provide counter-examples to that 
interpretation. I think it is clear that, granted Smith's assumption concerning the 
mechanism via which the date expression refers to a time, there are indeed many
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possible worlds in which U is true and the date-clause is false, and consequently (12) 
is not a statement o f  the truth conditions o f  U. But must w e grant the assumption?
I f  the direct reference theory is true and date expressions refer directly to 
times, not via propositional definite descriptions o f  them, then Smith's argument fails. 
This is because, according to this theory, the date expression is used referentially 
rather than attributively, and directly refers to the set o f  simultaneous events or 
moment that is, in the actual world, 1,939 years, 6 months, and 27 days later than 
Christ's birth. Furthermore, this directly referential expression refers to this same set 
o f  simultaneous events or moment in every possible world in which it exists, 
irrespective o f  whether it possesses that date property in that world. Consequently, 
in eveiy world in which U exists, Henry's illness also exists at the same time, so both 
U  and the sentence containing the referentially used date expression are true. 
Specifically, they are both true in Wx and W2.
Smith is, however, aware that the direct reference theory has the means to 
avoid his argument concerning the worlds Wx and W2. H e goes on to put forward 
arguments that purport to defeat this interpretation o f  the date theory:
There are worlds in which U is true but the referentially used date- 
description is not. There is a world W3 in which S  [the set o f  
simultaneous events that actually contains U] does not exist but in 
which U occupies a set S { that contains all and only the events that S 
contains except that .S’, contains a certain dust like particle on the 
planet Venus hitting the ground, whereas S  does not. In this world U 
is true since it is simultaneous with Henry's illness, but 'Henry is ill at 
S' is false, since Henry is ill at Sx, instead.
I f  we adopt the substantival theory, the direct reference theory 
will also fail to give necessary conditions for the truth o f  U. There is 
a world, WA in which U and Henry's illness and all the o ther events in 
S  (or S {) occupy A/*, rather than M  [the moment at which U actually 
occurs]; consequently, U is true, but 'Henry is ill at M  is false.
(Smith (1993) p. 36).
Smith's scenarios involving the worlds W3 and W4 that he uses to argue 
against the date theory that takes date expressions to be used referentially seem 
compelling. W3 is a world in which U and Henry's illness are members o f  a different 
set o f  simultaneous events, to which the directly referential date description does not
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apply. W4 is a world in which the set o f  events containing U and Henry's illness 
occupies a different moment from the one it occupies in the actual world, and 
consequently the directly referential date description does not apply to  that moment. 
It is my belief that these two arguments succeed provided we allow Smith one crucial 
assumption. This is that the utterance, U, that is a member o f  S l in W3 and the 
utterance, U, that occupies M* in W4 is the same utterance, U, that occurs in the 
actual world. I f  this is not the case, then it is possible for U  in S x and U in M * to 
have their own date-involving truth conditions. The fact that the directly referential 
date-involving truth conditions for U in the actual world are not necessary conditions 
for the truth o f  U in W3 or o f  U in W4 would be irrelevant. The point is arguable, but 
I will not pursue it here as there is another, more decisive objection to the date 
theory.
The date theory's account o f  the truth-conditional schemata for past, present 
and future tense sentence types does not appear to conform to the usual format for 
truth-conditional schemata. The date theory requires that the time o f  the context o f  
utterance is specified in the truth-conditional schema o f  a tensed sentence type, and 
in the statement o f  the truth conditions o f  a tensed sentence token. Consequently 
there is an extra term on the left hand side o f  the biconditional. The usual format for 
truth-conditional schemata and statements o f  truth conditions is to have the sentence 
w hose truth conditions are being given mentioned on the left hand side o f  the 
biconditional, with its truth conditions stated on the right hand side. It is possible 
that this slight deviation from the usual format could mean that the date theory does 
not state the correct ta i th  conditions o f  tensed sentences. An examination o f  the 
logical form o f  the truth-conditional schemata and o f  the statements o f  truth 
conditions should shed some light on this matter. In order to facilitate this 
examination I will reproduce the date theory's account o f  truth conditions, together 
with representations in logical notation o f  the logical form o f  those truth conditions.
The Present Tense 
Truth-conditional schema
(6a) For  any token u o f 'T h e  stranger is now approaching' uttered at t, a is true if 
and only if the stranger's approach is simultaneous with t
(6b) Vu\/t(Sut —> (In  <r> Set))
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Truth  conditions o f  a given token, a. uttered at date
(7a) a at /, is true if and only if the stranger's approach is simultaneous with tx
(7b) Satl —> (Ta <-» Set{)
The Future Tense 
Truth-conditional schema
(8a) For  any token u o f 'T h e  stranger will be approaching' uttered at t, u is true if 
and only if the stranger's approach is later than t
(8b) \/u\/t(Sut ->  (Tu <h> Let))
Truth conditions o f  a given token, b. uttered at date t2
(9a) b at t2 is true if and only if the stranger's approach is later than t2
(9b) Sbt2 - » (Tb <-» Let2)
The Past Tense 
Truth-conditional schema
(10a) For any token u o f 'T h e  stranger was approaching' uttered at t, u is true if  and 
only if the stranger's approach is earlier than t
(10b) \/u\/t(Sut —> (Tu <r-> Eel))
Truth conditions o f  a given token, c. uttered at t3
(11a) c at t3 is true if and only if  the stranger's approach is earlier than t3
( l i b )  Sct3 ->  (7c  <-> Eet3)
The logical form o f  these truth-conditional schemata and statements o f  the 
tru th  conditions o f  tensed sentence tokens reveals why the date theory fails to  state 
the correct truth conditions o f  tensed sentences. The requirement o f  this theory to 
specify the time o f  utterance results in the biconditional being contained within 
another conditional, and occurring as its consequent. In each o f  (7b), (9b) and ( l i b )  
it is possible for the antecedent to be false and the consequent true, while the 
statement as a whole is true. Therefore, it is possible for, say, b not to  be
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simultaneous with t2, while the biconditional is true. In o ther words, b could be true 
because the requirements laid down by the biconditional are satisfied, while b is not 
simultaneous with t2. Therefore, date-involving truth conditions thus specified, do 
not state the correct truth conditions for tensed sentences. They leave it open for the 
tensed sentence token to be true, while the appropriate relation between the token 
and the date specified does not obtain.
The question remains, however, why it was that the date theory seemed 
initially to be so plausible, when logically it is unable to  provide the correct truth 
conditions for tensed sentences. It seemed initially that the date theory was able to 
explain the variable truth-value phenomenon because the truth-values o f  tokens o f  
tensed sentence types really do vary according to when they are produced. It also 
seemed to be able to achieve that aim while being ontologically committed only to 
those temporal entities that are acceptable to the tenseless theory. I f  the problem 
Smith identified with the date theory is a genuine one, it arises as a result o f  the 
ascription o f  dates to times. Our dating system is a contingently created convention. 
Times, however conceived, have the dates they do only contingently. They might 
have had other dates. Smith exploits this aspect o f  the date theory by showing that 
there are possible worlds in which U and Henry's illness are simultaneous, and 
consequently U  is true, but in which the date ascribed to  the time at which U  and 
Henry's illness occur is not the same date as that at which they occur in the actual 
world.
Similarly, the problem I identified concerning the logical form o f  date- 
involving truth conditions arose as a result o f  the occurrence o f  dates as contextual 
features o f  sentence tokens in the truth condition sentences. W hat this problem 
showed was that a sentence token, such as a, could be true because o f  its 
simultaneity with the stranger's approach, while not occurring at the date specified in 
the truth conditions. Again, what is crucial to the truth o f  a is the temporal relation 
that obtains between the token and the event it is about. Employing our contingent 
dating system to specify objectively the times at which tokens occur seemed to 
provide the answer for the tenseless theory, when in fact it results in the failure o f  the 
date version o f  this theory.
However, this examination o f  why the date theory fails also reveals what is 
crucial to the truth o f  tensed sentence tokens. It is the tenseless temporal relation 
that obtains between the event a sentence token is about, and the sentence token 
itself. Events can stand in temporal relations to o ther events as well as to times 
specified by dates. The production o f  a sentence token constitutes an event.
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Therefore, it would make sense to specify the truth conditions o f  a tensed sentence 
token  by appealing only to the event the sentence is about, the event constituted by 
the production o f  the token, and the temporal relation that obtains between those 
tw o events. There is no need to  invoke the system o f  dates, which alone is 
responsible for the difficulties facing the date theory. The resulting account o f  the 
truth conditions o f  tensed sentences will retain all the advantages o f  the date theory: 
its account o f  the variable truth-value phenomenon and its tenseless ontology, while 
discarding that which was responsible for its failure: its appeal to  the system o f  dates. 
The token-reflexive theory o f  the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences is thus 
motivated by the same reasons that tend to motivate the date theory. However, now 
w e have seen precisely why the date theory fails, and how  a token-reflexive theory 
may avoid the same pitfalls, it is all the more appealing.
2.4 Tenseless Token-Reflexive Truth Conditions
The truth or falsity o f  a tensed sentence token depends on the temporal 
relation that obtains between the event the sentence is about and the event 
constituted by the production o f  the token itself. A  token-reflexive theory that 
explains this dependence would be able to account for the variable truth-value 
phenomenon, while remaining ontologically committed only to  tenseless temporal 
relations, in addition to events. In such a theory, the production o f  the token itself 
constitutes part o f  the truth conditions o f  the tensed sentence. The part it plays is 
that it is one o f  the relata o f  a dyadic temporal relation, the o ther being the event 
referred to by the sentence. To illustrate the token-reflexive mechanism involved in 
giving the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences I will construct the token-reflexive 
truth-conditional schemata for a past, present and future tense sentence type. I will 
also give an example o f  the token-reflexive truth conditions o f  a given token o f  each 
sentence type.
The Present Tense 
Truth-conditional schema
( l a )  Any token n o f 'T h e  stranger is now approaching' is true i f  and only i f  the 
stranger's approach is simultaneous with u
( l b )  V //(Tu <-> Sen)
59
Truth conditions o f  a given token, a
(2a) a is true if and only if the stranger's approach is simultaneous with a
(2 b) To <-> Sea
The Future Tense 
Truth-conditional schema
(13a) Any token u o f  T h e  stranger will be approaching' is true if and only if  the 
stranger's approach is later than u
(13b) \/u(Tu <-> Leu)
Truth conditions o f  a given token, b
(14a) b is true if and only if the stranger's approach is later than b
(14b) Tb <-> Leb
The Past Tense 
Truth-conditional schema
(15a) Any token u o f  'The stranger was approaching' is true if and only i f  the 
stranger's approach is earlier than u
(15b) \/u(Tu Eeu)
Truth  conditions o f  a aiven token, c
(16a) c is true if and only if the stranger's approach is earlier than c
(16b) Tc <-> Eec
The first thing to note about the above account o f  the truth conditions o f  
tensed sentences is that, unlike the date theory, it has the correct logical form for 
such an account. It certainly achieves its semantic goal o f  accounting for the variable 
truth-value phenomenon. It does this by making perspicuous the token-reflexivity o f  
tensed sentences. In achieving this semantic goal, it satisfies the ontological 
requirements o f  the tenseless theory.
60
W e now have before us a tenseless token-reflexive account o f  the truth 
conditions o f  tensed sentences, together with an explanation o f  why one might be 
motivated to adopt that account. There can be no doubt that this account does 
explain the variable truth-value phenomenon. H ow ever, because it has the 
ontological implications that it does, those who reject a tenseless ontology have 
sought to undermine it. In general, there are tw o strategies available to  any 
opponent o f  the tenseless token-reflexive analysis. The first is to  argue that what 
occurs on the right hand side o f  the biconditional in a tenseless token-reflexive 
statement o f  truth conditions fails to state the truth conditions for the particular 
tensed sentence. According to this strategy, tenseless token-reflexive truth 
conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for the tru th  o f  a given tensed 
sentence. The second strategy is to concede that tensed sentences have tenseless 
token-reflexive truth conditions, but to argue that these truth conditions are merely 
necessary, but not sufficient for the truth o f  tensed sentences. I will be looking at 
arguments o f  the second kind in chapter 4 ,14 but here I want to address a number o f  
arguments, each designed to prove that a tenseless token-reflexive analysis is 
inadequate to the task o f  accounting for the truth o f  tensed sentences. These 
arguments were put forward by Quentin Smith, the only philosopher to have 
launched such a sustained attack against the tenseless theory o f  t im e.15
Smith's intention throughout these arguments is to show that what is 
expressed by tensed sentences can be true or false independently o f  whether or not 
tokens o f  them are uttered. However, if  the truth conditions are token-reflexive, 
such that the production o f  a sentence token itself constitutes part o f  that token's 
truth conditions, that would seem to suggest that the truth or falsity o f  what a tensed 
sentence expresses depends on whether or not tokens o f  it are produced. In other 
words, the token-reflexive account seems to suggest that tru th  is token-dependent, 
whereas Smith wishes to argue that it is token-independent. The first argument for 
the failure o f  tenseless token-reflexive truth conditions is thus directed at showing
In particular, those pul forward by Smith (1993) and Lowe (1987a, 1987b, 1992, 1993),
The arguments that I am about to propound were not put forward by Quentin Smith in 
direct opposition to the tenseless token-reflexive account that I have outlined above. Smith argues 
that the new tenseless token-reflexive theory collapses 'on pain o f  self-contradiction' (Smith (1993) 
p. 67) into the old tenseless token-reflexive theory. His arguments are thus directed wholly against 
the old theory. In chapter 6 I argue that the new theory can withstand this charge o f Smith's. 
However, for the purposes of this chaplcr, his arguments against the old token-reflexive theoiy can 
be adjusted minimally so that they constitute objections to the new token-reflexive theory. It is in 
this adjusted form that I shall be exam ining them here.
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that it is not possible to give such truth conditions for tensed sentences about past or 
future truths concerning times when no language users exist.
Smith examines the sentence:
(17) It was true that the era devoid o f  linguistic utterances is present.
His argument that this sentence cannot have tenseless token-reflexive truth 
conditions is based on the stipulation that 'this sentence is a past tensed ascription o f  
a truth-value true to the truth vehicle expressed by the clause following the operator 
'It was true that," (Smith (1993) p. 73). Smith goes on to put forward three 
conditions which together, he claims, are necessary and sufficient for the truth o f
(17):
(a)  There is an era devoid o f  utterances earlier than the utterance o f  (17).
(b) There is some utterance-independent truth vehicle V that is expressed by the 
clause prefixed by 'It was true that',
(c) Vis true during the era devoid o f  utterances.
Smith states these necessary and sufficient conditions tenselessly so as not to be seen 
to be presupposing a tensed theory. However, it is his contention that the truth 
vehicle V referred to in (b) and (c) is an irreducibly tensed truth vehicle. H e goes on 
to argue for this aspect o f  his position later. As far as the truth conditions o f  (17) are 
concerned, Smith offers no argument for the necessity o f  conditions (b) and (c). His 
affirmation that they are necessary conditions for the truth o f  (17) is a mere 
stipulation with no reasons or argument offered to support it. O f  course, his 
motivation for including them in the truth conditions o f  (17) is that the component o f
(17) that is operated on by the past tense sentential operator is a sentence that could 
never be truly uttered, and yet it expresses something o f  which we can clearly make 
sense. His explanation o f  this is that during the era devoid o f  linguistic utterances, a 
proposition, or some other truth vehicle, existed which expressed the presentness o f  
that era.
I disagree with Smith's explanation. The token-reflexive theory has the 
conceptual equipment to deal with sentences such as (17). Let us examine first o f  all 
the core sentence 'The era devoid o f  linguistic utterances is present'. Any token, u, 
o f  this sentence type is true if and only if u occurs simultaneously with the era devoid 
o f  linguistic utterances. Quite clearly, no uttered token o f  this sentence type can
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satisfy this schema, and thus, there can be no true tokens uttered o f  this type. The 
token-reflexive analysis explains why this is so. The content o f  the sentence type 
denotes the state o f  affairs constituted by the era in which no linguistic utterances 
occur. The truth-conditional schema requires that an utterance occurs 
simultaneously with this state o f  affairs. However, if such an utterance were to 
occur, the state o f  affairs denoted would not be the era devoid o f  linguistic 
utterances. Thus, the token-reflexive analysis shows how  the meaning o f  the 
sentence depends on the meanings o f  its parts, and how  there  can be no true tokens 
o f  this sentence type.
W hen that sentence type is prefixed with a past tense sentential operator, as 
in (17), its token-reflexive truth-conditional schema can be given as follows. Any 
token, u, o f ' I t  was true that the era devoid o f  linguistic utterances is present' is true 
if  and only if the era devoid o f  linguistic utterances is earlier than u. Clearly, there 
can be ta ie  tokens o f  this sentence type, since its truth-conditional schema requires 
only that the era devoid o f  linguistic utterances occurs earlier than a given token o f  
the type. It is quite possible for tokens o f  this type to occur after the era devoid o f  
linguistic utterances. Thus, there is no need to invoke mysterious, abstract truth 
vehicles which come into and go out o f  existence depending on what the world is 
like to  account for the truth o f  tokens o f  this type. Smith's mistake was tacitly to 
assume that (17) is a sentence w hose primary function is to tell us something about 
the presentness o f  the era devoid o f  linguistic utterances. H e  wanted to prove that a 
token-reflexive account o f  the ta i th  conditions o f  (17) would require a token 
utterance o f  the core sentence o f  (17) to exist simultaneously with the era devoid o f  
utterances, which o f  course is logically impossible. H ow ever, the token-reflexive 
analysis is not forced to meet this impossible challenge.
The next argument that Smith puts forward against the tenseless token- 
reflexive theory also rests on the contention that such an account renders truth 
token-dependent. He aims to prove that this theory is committed to the token- 
dependence o f  truth, while offering counter-examples to prove that it is token- 
independent. He remarks that the sentence,
(18) I am not uttering anything
is logically contingent. I f  uttered aloud it is thereby false, but it can be thought 
silently to  oneself, and thereby be true. He then suggests that a token-reflexive
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analysis cannot account for the possibility for such true tokens o f  (18) because its 
token-reflexive 'translation' would be:
(19) I am not uttering anything simultaneously with this utterance
and (19) is necessarily false. The new tenseless theory does not seek to provide 
tenseless translations o f  tensed sentences, so as it stands this is no argument against 
that theory. However, it might be possible to modify Smith's argument to  see 
w hether a token-reflexive account o f  the truth conditions o f  (18) would require a 
token o f  it actually to be uttered. I f  it turns out that it does, then it cannot account 
for the truth o f  silent tokens o f  (18), and therefore could not be the correct account 
o f  the truth conditions o f  all tensed sentences. Taking (19) as an indication o f  how 
Smith would state the token-reflexive truth conditions o f  (18), it is likely that he 
would suggest the following:
(20) 'I am not uttering anything' is true if and only if I am not uttering anything 
simultaneously with this utterance.
It is clear that (20) does not state the correct truth-conditional schema o f  (18). N o 
token o f  (18) could satisfy this truth-conditional schema, so if this were the correct 
schema there could be no true tokens o f  (18). As we have seen, there can be true 
tokens o f  (18), so this is not the correct truth-conditional schema. M oreover, it fails 
to distinguish between the sentence type and individual tokens o f  it, and the 
expression 'this utterance' is ambiguous. Does it refer to (20) or to (18)? The 
correct token-reflexive truth-conditional schema for (18) is:
(21) Any token // o f  'I am not uttering anything' is true if and only if I am not 
uttering anything simultaneously with //.
I will leave aside any possible complications that might arise as a result o f
(18)'s being context-dependent in two different respects. Its truth-value depends not 
only on when tokens o f  it are produced, but also on who produces them. Clearly the 
truth-conditional schema (21) can only be satisfied by tokens o f  (18) that are not 
uttered. Smith states that he is taking 'utterance' to mean 'a spoken token or the 
earliest time-slice o f  an inscribed token, this time-slice being the period during which 
the token is being written down' (Smith (1993) p. 79). It follows that (21) can only
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be satisfied by silent, mental tokens o f  (18), which are just the sorts o f  tokens that 
Smith uses to illustrate how tokens o f  (18) can be true. Therefore, provided that u in 
(21) can represent mental tokens o f  the sentence type as well as spoken ones, then
(21) successfully states the token-reflexive truth-conditional schema for the sentence 
type (18). Smith remarks that the token-reflexive theory 'disallows the possibility 
that these sentences refer in some instances to unuttered tokens o f  sentences, to 
mental tokens' (Smith (1993) p.82). He does not make it clear what reasons he has 
for making this assertion, but it seems to me to be a dubious one. W hat reason could 
there possibly be for limiting the legitimate application o f  the term 'sentence token' to 
spoken and written such tokens? Smith gives none, and I can think o f  none. Indeed, 
the  leading proponent o f  the tenseless token-reflexive theory o f  time, D.H. Mellor, 
writes:
Thoughts can be tokens o f  sentence types just as written or spoken 
specimens can be - in particular, they can just as easily be true or 
false. I need not say 'It's raining', or write it, to generate  a true or 
false token o f  that sentence type. A token o f  it occurs each time I 
think it. My making a mental judgment may not be a very audible or 
visible event, but it is an event nonetheless, and quite able to be a 
token o f  a sentence type. (Mellor (1981) p. 37).
Mellor allows all sorts o f  things to count as legitimate sentence tokens. The 
face o f  a clock with the minute hand pointing at '12' and the hour hand pointing at '2' 
is a token o f  the sentence type 'It is now 2 o'clock' according to Mellor. This 
unrestricted position with respect to the nature o f  sentence tokens seems to me to be 
perfectly reasonable, and 1 am quite happy to adopt it along with Mellor. It then 
follows that (21) is the correct tenseless token-reflexive truth-conditional schema for 
the sentence type (18). Any token o f  (18) that satisfies this schema will thereby be 
true. Because o f  the content o f  (18) only unuttered tokens will satisfy it, so only 
unuttered tokens o f  it will be true.
Smith's next argument is designed to reinforce the previous argument, which 
I have just shown to be ineffectual against the new tenseless token-reflexive theory 
o f  time. It will be worth disposing o f  this argument to reinforce the position o f  the 
token-reflexive theory. Smith argues that it is true o f  all 'normal' tensed sentences 
that they are utterance-independent, and that token-reflexive truth conditions cannot 
account for this. By 'normal' tensed sentences, Smith is referring to  those tensed
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sentences that are not 'token-mentioning'; sentences unlike 'This utterance is present'. 
H e  uses as an example the 'normal' tensed sentence,
(22) The forest is now burning
and remarks that it is possible silently to think to oneself a true token o f  (22). He 
goes on to argue that a token-reflexive account o f  the truth conditions o f  (22) would 
not be able to  account for the truth o f  such a silent token because it requires the 
existence o f  an utterance o f  the sentence type. However, as we saw above, a token- 
reflexive truth-conditional schema can account for the truth o f  silent, mental tokens 
just as it can account for the truth o f  written or spoken tokens. I suggest that the 
tenseless token-reflexive truth-conditional schema for (22) is:
(23) Any token u o f 'T h e  forest is now burning' is true if and only if  the burning o f  
the forest is simultaneous with u.
I f  w e  assume that a person, A, thinks to herself a silent token o f  (22), and w e call 
that token a, then the ta i th  conditions o f  a are:
(24) a is true if and only if the burning o f  the forest is simultaneous with a.
Therefore, in response to all o f  Smith's arguments so far, a token-reflexive analysis o f  
tensed sentences does not require those sentences to  be uttered in order for them to 
be true. As a result, his attempts to show this account to be untenable have failed.
I turn now to Smith's fourth argument against the token-reflexive theory 
which, in many ways, is an embellishment o f  the conclusions he claims to have 
established with the first three argum ents.16 Smith's claim here is that normal tensed 
sentences express sentence-token-independent truth vehicles, but no token-reflexive 
sentence expresses such a truth vehicle. The repercussions o f  this for the token- 
reflexive analysis o f  the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences are that, if the claim is 
true, there is some aspect o f  the truth o f  tensed sentences that cannot be captured by 
a true token-reflexive sentence. In particular, therefore, that aspect cannot be 
captured by the token-reflexive sentence that purports to  state the truth conditions o f  
a tensed sentence. These truth conditions would thereby be inadequate to account
16 Smith presents essentially the same argument in his (1987a).
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for the truth o f  tensed sentences. Smith provides reasons for this claim by showing 
that it is borne out by the ordinary rules o f  usage to which tensed sentences adhere. 
The particular rule that Smith wishes to employ to this end is the rule that:
I f  a normal A sentence is used on some occasion to express 
something true, what the A sentence expressed on that occasion 
would have been true then even if it had not been expressed. (Smith 
(1993) p. 83).
I intend to argue that this 'rule' represents a natural intuition that we have 
about the concept o f  truth, but that this intuition is better explained without 
appealing to  the existence o f  abstract truth vehicles. The intuition that Smith is 
trying to  convey here is that the way the world is as a m atter o f  contingent fact does 
not depend on there being utterances expressing that the world is the way it is. 
Smith's mistake is to convey this intuition in terms o f  the semantic aspect o f  truth, 
rather than in terms o f  its ontological aspect. An example will illustrate my point 
here.
Suppose the forest burns between tx and t2, and that during that period o f  
time no one utters any sentence that expresses that the forest is now  burning. 
Because the forest is actually burning during this period o f  time, our intuition 
concerning the concept o f  truth is that if  someone had uttered such a sentence it 
would have been true. Smith interprets this intuition by postulating an abstract truth 
vehicle, a proposition that exists between tx and t2, and that expresses that the forest 
is now burning. It is the existence o f  this proposition that, according to Smith, 
explains our belief that the sentence 'The forest is now burning' is true between tx and 
t2 whether or not any token o f  it is actually uttered. I would explain it by putting 
forward the following counterfactual: between tx and t2, if someone had uttered a 
token  o f  the sentence type 'The forest is now burning', that sentence token would 
have been true. The reason why that token would have been true is that its tenseless 
token-reflexive truth conditions would have been fulfilled. The truth-conditional 
schema for that sentence type is, as we have seen,
(23) Any token // o f 'T h e  forest is now burning' is true if and only if  the burning o f  
the forest is simultaneous with u.
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In order for this truth-conditional schema to be fulfilled two events must occur 
simultaneously: the burning o f  the forest and the production o f  a token o f  the 
relevant sentence type. Between tx and t2 the forest burns so if, during that period o f  
time, a token o f  the sentence type is produced, its truth conditions would ipso facto  
be fulfilled. However, if no such token is produced, it is still the case that the forest 
burns during that period o f  time, but there is no token the truth or falsity o f  which 
w e have to account for.
The concept o f  truth is connected both to meaning and to  reality. It is the 
connection between truth and reality that generates our intuition that the concept o f  
truth is independent o f  the production o f  any sentence tokens. The world is the way 
it is independently o f  what anyone happens to say about it. Smith seeks to explain it 
by appealing to the connection between truth and meaning. His example constitutes 
a sentence type, a token o f  which would have been true if  it had been uttered at a 
certain time, but no such token was uttered. Smith posits an abstract truth vehicle, a 
proposition that exists just when that sentence would have been true. H e  claims that 
it is the existence o f  this abstract truth vehicle that explains our intuition that what 
was expressed by a sentence would have been true then even if  it had not been 
expressed. As I have illustrated, this intuition can be explained perfectly well 
w ithout the existence o f  such abstract entities. I submit that we only need to account 
for truth if a legitimate truth bearer exists. N ot all sentence types have a determinate 
truth-value, but sentence tokens do have a determinate truth-value. Consequently it 
is sentence tokens that are legitimate truth bearers. I f  a sentence token is produced it 
is determinately either true or false, depending on w hether its truth conditions obtain. 
I f  no sentence token is produced there is no truth or falsity to  account for, but reality 
remains the same whether or not sentences about it are produced.
Clearly, I have not established beyond all doubt that sentence tokens rather 
than propositions are legitimate bearers o f  truth. However, it seems to me by far the 
most plausible position to ad o p t .17 Kirkham (1992) offers some 'practical 
philosophical advantages o f  choosing sentence tokens as truth bearers' (Kirkham
(1992) p. 63). I present here Kirkham's reasons as evidence o f  the inherent 
plausibility o f  my position:
• Unlike some truth bearers, such as propositions, there is no
dispute that sentence tokens exist.
17 This posilion is also defended by Haack and Haack (1970).
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• Unlike beliefs, there is no ontological dispute about what kind 
o f  thing sentence tokens are. It is agreed on all sides that they are 
material objects. (Or at least physical objects if  w e do not want to 
count the sound waves o f  spoken sentence tokens as material.)
• Unlike beliefs and most other truth bearers, there is no dispute 
over what the parts o f  a sentence are. It is agreed on all sides that 
the parts are clause tokens, phrase tokens, w ord  tokens, and letter 
tokens. (In another sense o f  'part' it is agreed that the parts o f  a 
written sentence token are the molecules o f  ink or chalk or 
whatever.)
• There is no dispute on the criterion for individuating 
numerically distinct sentence tokens. I f  I state in writing that I am 
hungry and my father states in writing that his son is hungry, are there 
tw o statements here or only one? The answer is a m atter  o f  some 
dispute. On the other hand, it is agreed on all sides that there are two 
sentence tokens here, because the molecules o f  ink that make up my 
token are numerically distinct from the molecules that m ake up my 
father's. (Kirkham (1992) p. 63-64).
I turn now to Smith's final argument against the token-reflexive theory, which 
appears to present it with a serious difficulty. Smith argues that certain logical 
relations obtain between certain tensed sentences, and that these relations cannot be 
explained if these sentences have tenseless token-reflexive truth conditions. He uses 
as an example the logically equivalent sentences:
(25) The hurricane is occurring now, 
and
(26) The hurricane is now occurring.
The tenseless token-reflexive truth conditions for a token a o f  (25) and a token b o f
(26) are as follows:
(27) a is true if  and only if the hurricane is simultaneous with a,
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(28) b is true if and only if the hurricane is simultaneous with b.
Smith argues that (27) and (28) cannot state the conditions necessary and sufficient 
for the truth o f  tokens o f  (25) and (26) because (25) and (26) are clearly logically 
equivalent, but (27) and (28) cannot account for this equivalence. This is because, 
he continues, where the relation o f  logical equivalence obtains between two 
sentences, that relation should also obtain between what those sentences express. 
According to Smith, a sentence expresses whatever occurs on the right hand side o f  
the biconditional that constitutes that sentence's truth conditions. Thus, the tenseless 
token-reflexive truth conditions o f  tokens o f  (25) and (26) cannot account for the 
logical equivalence o f  those two sentences because a token, a, o f  (25) expresses 'that 
the hurricane is simultaneous with a' while a token, b, o f  (26) expresses 'that the 
hurricane is simultaneous with b'. It is clear that the relation o f  logical equivalence 
does not obtain between an expression o f  the simultaneity o f  the hurricane and a and 
an expression o f  the simultaneity o f  the hurricane and b. The truth o f  a token o f  (25) 
does not depend on a token o f  (26) being produced. Similarly, the truth o f  a token 
o f  (26) does not depend on a token o f  (25) being produced. This seems to constitute 
a genuine problem for the token-reflexive theory. As L. Nathan Oaklander puts it:
[I]f  one sentence logically implies a second, then we should be able to 
justify the inference on the basis o f  truth conditions; we should be 
able to show that what makes the first true must make the second 
true. I f  we cannot do this there would seem to be grounds for 
concluding either that we are mistaken about the putative entailment 
relations or that w e have not got the right truth conditions for the 
sentences in question. (Oaklander (1991) p. 32).
In another essay18 Oaklander responds to this problem put forward by Smith 
by arguing that it only constitutes an objection to the old tenseless theory o f  time, 
and is irrelevant to the new theory. Oaklander argues that it is not part o f  the goal o f  
the new theory, in giving the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences, to account for the 
logical status and relations o f  these sentences. The aim o f  the new theory, in stating 
the tenseless truth conditions o f  tensed sentences according to Oaklander, is merely 
to provide an ontologically adequate representation o f  what temporal reality is like.
18 Oaklander (1990).
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I argued earlier in this chapter that the semantic and ontological aims o f  an account 
o f  the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences are subtly connected with one another. 
The new tenseless theory o f  time cannot evade Smith's most challenging argument 
simply by denying the responsibility for responding to it. The challenge must be met.
To recap briefly, Smith argues that (25) and (26) are logically equivalent, but 
that this fact cannot be accounted for if their truth conditions are tenseless and 
token-reflexive. Such truth conditions make explicit reference to the particular 
tokens o f  the sentence types (25) and (26) that are produced. Thus, such an account 
appears to  preclude the logical equivalence o f  (25) and (26) because the truth o f  one 
does not depend on a token o f  the other being produced. I believe this problem can 
be resolved. Indeed, it only exists because Smith equivocates between the notions o f  
sentence type and sentence token. The relation o f  logical equivalence obtains 
between sentence types if, and only if, they have the same truth-conditional 
schemata. Let us examine the truth-conditional schemata for the sentence types (25) 
and (26).
(29) Any token u o f  'The hurricane is occurring now' is true i f  and only i f  the 
hurricane is simultaneous with //,
(30) Any token n o f  'The hurricane is now occurring' is true if  and only if  the 
hurricane is simultaneous with u.
W hat occurs to the right o f  the biconditional in these truth-conditional schemata is 
the same in each case, therefore sentence types (25) and (26) are logically equivalent. 
Smith examined individual tokens o f  (25) and (26) which do not have the same truth 
conditions, and concluded from this that these truth conditions cannot explain the 
logical equivalence o f  the sentence types. However, it should com e as no surprise 
that individual tokens o f  (25) and (26) have different truth conditions, as these 
tokens are context-dependent. Their truth-value depends on the temporal relation 
betw een the event referred to and the token itself. The token-reflexive analysis 
explains this feature and, if the distinction between types and tokens is maintained 
correctly it can also account for the logical equivalence o f  two such sentence types.
There is one remaining objection to the token-reflexive theory that Smith 
puts forward as a variation on the previous objection. W hat is the logical relation 
betw een two distinct simultaneous tokens o f  the same tensed sentence type? Quite 
clearly, the two tokens are synonymous as they are tokens o f  the same type. Smith
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describes them as logically equivalent which, as I have suggested above, he is not 
entitled to  do as logical equivalence is a relation that obtains between types and not 
tokens. I will temporarily overlook this point in order to examine this objection 
more closely. Consider a token, c, o f ' I t  is now 1996' uttered by Chloe, and a token, 
d, o f ' I t  is now 1996' uttered by Daphne, where c and d  are uttered simultaneously. 
The tenseless token-reflexive truth conditions o f  c are that it is true if  and only i f  c is 
simultaneous with 1996, while d  is true if and only if d  is simultaneous with 1996. 
The truth conditions o f  each token appear to have no bearing on the truth-value o f  
the other token, and yet they are synonymous. Thus, whatever accounts for the truth 
o f  one token should also account for the truth o f  the other. In Smith's terminology, 
the fact stated by c, that c is simultaneous with 1996 is not logically equivalent to  the 
fact stated by d, that d  is simultaneous with 1996, whereas c and d  themselves, being 
simultaneous tokens o f  the same tensed sentence type, are logically equivalent. M y 
response is that it only appears that the fact stated by c is logically independent o f  the 
fact stated by d. It was stipulated in the premises o f  Smith's argument that c and d  
are simultaneous tokens. It is this relation o f  simultaneity, conjoined with their truth 
conditions that explains why c is true if  and only if  d  is true and vice versa.
The relation between the two sentence tokens can be illustrated by the 
following full statement o f  Smith's argument.
(1) c is true if and only i f c  is simultaneous with 1996
(2) d  is true if and only if d  is simultaneous with 1996
(3) c is simultaneous with d
(4) c and d  occur simultaneously with 1996
c and d  are synonymous
It can be seen from this argument that it was Smith's own stipulation that the two 
sentence tokens were simultaneous, and it is this premise o f  his argument, together 
with the fact that they are tokens o f  the same sentence type, that guarantees their 
synonymy. The sentence type is (o f  course) logically equivalent to itself, and hence, 
tw o simultaneous tokens o f  it are synonymous.
I have examined each and every objection o f  Smith's to the token-reflexive 
theory, and found none o f  them to be effective against it. Given the considerable 
advantages o f  this theory, together with the lack o f  any successful objections to it, I 
conclude that it does indeed provide the correct account o f  the truth conditions o f
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tensed sentences. O f  course, it must be adopted in conjunction with a sensible 
adherence to the distinction between sentence types and sentence tokens. 
Furthermore, it may be that more justification is needed for the position that only 
sentence tokens are legitimate truth bearers. I f  that is the case I am sure that such 
justification will not be hard to find. It seems to me that the tenseless token-reflexive 
analysis constitutes a complete, coherent, and eminently sensible account o f  the truth 
conditions o f  tensed sentences.
2.5 Conclusion
Having examined the nature o f  truth conditions and their importance to  the 
debate between the tensed and tenseless theories o f  time, I explored carefully two 
rival accounts o f  the tenseless theory. The date theory and the token-reflexive 
theory have each had their proponents over the years, and yet there never seemed to 
be genuine disagreement between them. It is clear now that the date theory fails, and 
I believe I have shown why it fails. It is equally clear that the token-reflexive theory 
succeeds in its aims. I believe that the reason for the lack o f  disagreement between 
proponents o f  each theoiy  is that, essentially, they are the same theory. Each has the 
same ontological and semantic aims, and the same conceptual tools, except that the 
date theory introduces our conventional system o f  dates into its account o f  truth 
conditions. As we saw earlier, this is its downfall. It is possible to understand why 
dates w ere incorporated into the account; they constitute non-indexical expressions 
for referring to times. However, a modicum o f  logical investigation reveals quite 
plainly why they fail to achieve the objectivity they w ere thought to represent. Our 
m an-made system of dates is a contingent convention, and it might have been 
otherwise than it is. Consequently, it cannot shoulder the responsibility for stating 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth o f  sentences.
I have defended the new tenseless token-reflexive analysis o f  the truth 
conditions o f  tensed sentences against the barrage o f  arguments put forward by 
Smith. I believe that it is capable o f  providing a complete and epistemically valuable 
account o f  the peculiarities o f  tensed language. When it is combined with arguments 
to  the effect that any conception o f  temporal reality as tensed is inherently 
paradoxical, it will provide the basis o f  a theory according to which time is tenseless. 
In the next chapter I will examine various attempts to make sense o f  the notion o f  
tensed reality, and I will argue, with McTaggart, that such a notion is inherently 
paradoxical.
Chapter 3
A n  In v e s t i g a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  C o h e r e n c e  o f  t h e  T e n s e d  T h e o r y  o f
T i m e
In diametric opposition to the tenseless theory o f  time is the theory that time 
is tensed. It is my intention in this chapter to  achieve a characterization o f  the tensed 
theory o f  time, and to examine it for coherence, applicability and explanatory power. 
The first step towards this goal is clearly to isolate the characteristic features o f  the 
tensed theory. So, what theses does it advocate? W hat are its central tenets? One 
could be forgiven for thinking oneself not too  far from the truth if  one said that 
central to  the tensed theory is the proposition that time flows or passes. This is 
taken to  express our natural intuitions, our 'common sense' beliefs about time. But, 
w hat does it mean to say that time flows or passes? Proponents  o f  the tensed theory 
offer no simple answer to this question. Furthermore, the rather complex 
explanations that are offered o f  this thesis differ widely from each other, so that one 
is left wondering what this natural intuition is that is so hard to  pin down. W hat is 
the common core that lies behind all these attempts to  give theoretical weight to the 
'common sense' view o f  time? In what follows I will put forw ard what I believe to  be 
the central tenets o f  any genuinely tensed theory o f  time. After a brief  overview I 
will examine each o f  these tenets in detail, exploring various ways in which they can 
be interpreted, and identifying some problems that they create for any theory that 
seeks to embrace them.
3.1 Core Components o f  a Tensed Theory
As a first attempt to capture the essence o f  the tensed theory we might say 
that it is the view that takes seriously the distinctions between past, present and 
future. It sees these distinctions as reflecting a genuine, ontological disparity. 
Events and moments that can truly be described as future are radically different in 
their ontological status from those that can truly be described as present or past. 
However, events and moments are not eternally classifiable as either past, present or 
future. An event that can truly be described as future will not always be thus 
describable. The Olympic Games o f  the year 2000 which, as I write, is a future 
event, is becoming less and less future, and will one day be present. Thereafter it will 
become a past event, and will continue to  recede further and further into the past.
74
This suggests that another essential feature o f  the tensed theory is the proposition 
that the passage o f  time is an objective feature o f  tem poral reality. Time flows, 
moves or passes in some sense. M aking sense o f  this notion has proved to be a most 
elusive goal, and there is little consensus among proponents  o f  the tensed theory 
over the extent to which this notion is metaphorical.1
The insistence o f  the tensed theory that the above tw o  features are genuine 
constituents o f  temporal reality suggests a third essential com ponent o f  the tensed 
theory. I f  the conceptual distinctions between past, present and future reflect real, 
ontological distinctions, and if  the passage o f  time is an objective feature o f  temporal 
reality, then the language w e use to describe these constituents o f  reality is an 
irreducible part o f  our conceptual scheme. Thus there is a linguistic component o f  
the tensed theory o f  time which claims that any reduction o f  tensed language and 
thought to  a tenseless language would  result in some loss o f  vital temporal concepts. 
Tensed language and thought is irreducible, and according to  the tensed theory, this 
justifies the claim that the ontology o f  time is intrinsically tensed.
Finally, I believe it is necessary to include among the core  components o f  the 
tensed theory, a claim to the effect that time is relevantly disanalogous to any o f  the 
dimensions o f  space. There is no spatial analogue o f  any o f  the above features 
which, it is held, uniquely characterize time. It is important to  include this tenet 
among the central features o f  the tensed theory in order to block the conclusions o f  
any argument that substitutes spatial for temporal terms and follows the same lines o f  
reasoning as the tensed theory. I f  this possibility w ere  not explicitly ruled out, it 
could be claimed that a proponent o f  the tensed theory is committed, by parity o f  
reasoning, to  such theses as that the conceptual distinction betw een 'here' and 'there' 
represents a genuine ontological disparity. Alternatively, analogous reasoning might 
commit a tensed theorist to the view that the passage o f  space is an objective feature 
o f  reality; that space flows or passes inexorably. The claim o f  the tensed theorist is, 
however, that time differs from any dimension o f  space in precisely these respects.
From  this brief overview o f  the claims o f  the tensed theory, I maintain that, 
characteristic o f  any tensed theory are the following core features:
(1) Tenseless language is inadequate to the task o f  providing a complete
description o f  temporal reality.
1 For some, e.g. Schlesinger (1982), Levison (1987), Smith (1993) and Markosian (1993) it
is not metaphorical at all, but for others, e.g. Prior (1968), Chapman (1982), B igelow  (1991) and 
Zeilicovici (1989) it is at least partly metaphorical.
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(2) There is an ontological distinction between past, present and future.
(3) Temporal becoming is an objective feature o f  the world, and an essential 
feature o f  time.
(4) There is no spatial analogue o f  any o f  the features (1) - (3), which uniquely 
characterize the nature o f  time.
It is important to note at this stage that these characteristic features o f  the 
tensed theory are not normative, but merely descriptive. They are not essential 
features that any theory, if  it is to  be a tensed theory, must subscribe to. Rather, they 
are descriptive o f  the kinds o f  claims generally put forward by proponents o f  a tensed 
theory o f  time. As w e will see throughout this chapter, the various tensed theories o f  
time that have been propounded differ substantially from each other, so in outlining 
the features ( 1) - (4 ) I have tried to  capture that which seems to  be common to them 
all. Consequently, the general nature o f  the wording o f  theses (1) - (4) is a reflection 
o f  the variety o f  theories o f  time which can truly be described as tensed.
Furthermore, the theses have been stated in an o rder which reflects their 
progressive strength. Few er tensed theorists subscribe to tenet (4) than to  tenet (1). 
Tenet (1) is the weakest thesis. It is entailed by tenets (2) and (3), but does not 
entail them. However, as we saw in chapter 1, for some years the debate between 
the tensed and the tenseless theories centred on whether or not (1) is true. In the 
next four sections I will discuss each o f  these features in m ore detail. I will show 
how, under different interpretations, each can yield widely divergent tenets o f  diverse 
tensed theories. I will also explore some problems that face each o f  these theses. 
M y ultimate aim is to show that any theory which seeks to embrace theses ( 1) - (4) 
faces insurmountable problems. I will argue that theses (2) and (3) capture the 
central claims o f  any tensed theory, and, through detailed examination o f  these theses 
I intend to  establish that they cannot be consistently held together. Finally I will state 
the position o f  the theory I defended in the previous chapter, the new tenseless 
token-reflexive theory o f  time, with respect to theses ( 1) - (4).
3.2 Tenseless Language is Inadequate to the Task o f  Providing a Complete 
Description o f  Reality
This tenet is crucial for any tensed theory o f  time. According to tensed 
theorists, the irreducibility o f  tensed language and thought is taken as evidence that 
tensed language brings with it a tensed ontology. It is a widely endorsed thesis that 
tensed, indexical and egocentric language cannot be translated without loss o f
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meaning by tenseless, non-indexical or non-egocentric language. Since tensed 
language can convey information over and above that which can be conveyed by 
tenseless language, the tensed theorist takes this to imply that such language has 
ontological commitments over and above those o f  tenseless language. I f  that were 
the case, then there would indeed be tensed facts; the ontology o f  time would be 
tensed.
However, these ontological conclusions cannot be derived legitimately from 
the irreducibility o f  tensed language. The irreducibility o f  tensed language itself has 
no implications for whether temporal reality is tensed or tenseless. It is consistent 
with either ontology. Tenet (1) can also be embraced by the new tenseless token- 
reflexive theory o f  time. According to  this theory, any completely tenseless 
description o f  reality would leave out an important com ponent thereof. However, 
this component is not a part o f  the temporal ontology, which is wholly tenseless, but 
an essential aspect o f  our cognitive experience o f  time. M any philosophers have 
argued that tensed beliefs are essential for successful action.2 Thus, it is a tenet o f  
the new tenseless theory, as much as o f  the tensed theory o f  time, that tenseless 
language is inadequate to the task o f  providing a complete description o f  the 
contents o f  our representations o f  reality.3
3.3 There is an Ontological Distinction Between Past, Present and Future
H ow  is one to understand this thesis? It has been interpreted and defended in 
many different ways. Fo r  example, consistent with this thesis is the position held by 
Prior (1970) and Christensen (1993) that only the present exists. I f  only the present 
exists, then it is certainly the case that there is an ontological distinction between the 
past, present and future. Similarly, the position that only the past and the present 
exist, the future being a mere realm o f  open possibilities is consistent with tenet (2). 
This position is held by, among others, Lucas (1989).4 The view that the moment 
correctly characterized as 'now' has a significant, elevated ontological status is 
another possible interpretation o f  this tenet. According to this view, the ontological 
status o f  the 'now' is something that cannot be explained simply by the token- 
reflexivity o f  the term 'now'. The moment that is, objectively, 'now' is, in some sense,
2 See, for example, M ellor (1981), Perry (1979), M acBeath (1983), Kaplan (1990), Moore 
(1987), Oaklander (1993) and Peacocke (1981).
3 I will discuss the concept o f tensed meaning in chapter 6.
4 The position of McCall (1976. 1984, 1994), according to which the past and the present 
exist determinately, but the future consists in a branching model o f  alternative possible outcomes, is 
also an example o f this position.
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more real than any other moment. Consequently, this interpretation o f  tenet (2) is 
consistent with one's taking the past and the future to  be real in some sense. Such a 
position might claim to be the theoretical backing to the intuition that 'the present is 
more real than the past, but the past is more real than the future'.
The status o f  this intuition is dubious as, arguably, taking it seriously would 
require one to subscribe to the notion o f 'deg rees  o f  reality'. I believe that, within a 
tenseless framework, the motivation behind this intuition can be accounted for. 
Ordinary experience provides us with different kinds o f  knowledge o f  the past, 
present and future. W e know  about present events directly, through perception. 
Our knowledge o f  past events is based on inference, both  from m emory and from 
traces, such as written evidence. Our knowledge o f  future events, however, is o f  a 
different order. W e anticipate, expect, predict or plan future events, but any 
btowledge o f  future events is usually highly circumspect. These considerations are 
o f  an epistemological nature, and as such they entail nothing about the ontological 
status o f  past, present and future. These epistemological distinctions are quite 
consistent with a tenseless ontology whereby all times are equally real. Any 
inference from such epistemological considerations to an ontological distinction 
between past, present and future is invalid.
Throughout the preceding characterizations o f  possible interpretations o f  
tenet (2), the language which w e use to talk about past, present and future is 
suggestive o f  the notion that these terms signify realms, or the temporal analogue o f  
places. W e say that an event is located in the past, or that w e  are moving towards 
the future. I do not think that such a characterization o f  past, present and future is 
logically sustainable. It is likely that expressions which suggest that it is are merely 
metaphorical. In any case, there have not been any serious attempts to  account for 
the notions o f  past, present and future in this way. The m ost comm on position 
among tensed theorists is that past, present and future signify temporal properties o f  
some kind. Such a characterization is consistent with ordinary language, since it 
makes sense to talk o f  describing an event as past, just as it makes sense to talk o f  
describing a ruler as straight. Furthermore, just as we can ascribe properties to other 
properties, for example, by saying 'Straightness is a geometrical property', we can 
talk o f  pastness, presentness and futurity as possessing higher-order properties. In 
any case, since the position that past, present and future signify properties o f  events
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is the most commonly defended among tensed theorists, it is the position that I will 
consider.5
I f  it is the case that past, present and future are genuine, monadic properties, 
how  might a tensed theorist account for their status as properties? Clearly, an 
account o f  the nature o f  properties in general must be given, together with an 
explanation o f  how past, present and future satisfy.one's criteria for what it is to  be a 
property. According to current debate about the metaphysical status o f  properties 
various possible positions have emerged. I will consider tw o general accounts o f  the 
nature o f  properties, and I will show that neither can support the claim that past, 
present and future constitute properties. I will then point to a general feature o f  the 
notion o f  properties that any theory o f  properties must be able to  account for. I will 
argue that any account o f  past, present and future as properties necessarily fails to 
meet the requirements o f  this general feature, and that this explains why the two 
general accounts o f  properties failed to make sense o f  past, present and future as 
properties. The tw o general accounts o f  properties that I will discuss are the theory 
that takes properties to be identical with their extensions, and the theory that takes 
properties to be universals, metaphysically distinct from the particulars which can 
ordinarily be said to instantiate them.
According to one widely held theory o f  properties, a property is identified 
with the set o f  all things, o r  particulars, to which we pre-theoretically ascribe that 
property. For example, the property F  is identical with the set o f  all things which, 
w e  ordinarily say, instantiate the property F. Proponents  o f  this theory delineate the 
group o f  all things to which we ordinarily ascribe a given property as the set which 
includes everything that has, does, and will (pre-theoretically) possess that property. 
Thus, a property is identified with its timeless extension. Fo r  example, the property 
o f  being furry is identified with the set o f  all things that have been, are and will be 
furry. H o w  might such a theory give an account o f  past, present and future as 
properties?
Any theory that supports the claim that there is an ontological distinction 
between past, present and future is also committed to the claim that events 
continually change in respect o f  these characteristics. To  endorse the first claim but 
not the second would yield a very strange picture o f  time, one in which there is a 
genuine distinction between past, present and future, but that distinction remains
The view  that past, present and future signify properties is defended by, among others, 
Smith (1986, 1993), Markosian (1993) and Zeilicovici (1986).
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static, the same events always possessing the same temporal characteristics in this 
tensed manifold. Thus, a theory that takes past, present and future to be temporal 
properties is committed to the claim that events continually change in respect o f  the 
tensed properties they possess. Events successively acquire and shed the properties 
o f  less and less remote futurity, then they acquire and shed the property o f  
presentness, and finally they acquire and shed successive properties o f  more and 
more rem ote pastness.
In order to  see how  a theory that identifies properties with their timeless 
extensions might account for the notions o f  past, present and future as properties I 
will take, as an example, the general property o f  pastness. The set o f  all things that 
have been, are and will be past is identical with the set o f  all things that have existed, 
exist and will exist. I f  the property o f  pastness is identical with its timeless 
extension, then it is identical with the timeless set o f  actual existents. Furthermore, 
the set o f  all things that have been, are and will be present is also identical with the 
set o f  all things that have existed, exist and will exist, as is the set o f  all things that 
have been, are and will be future. Since events undergo continual and inexorable 
change with respect to  the temporal properties that they possess, everything 
successively possesses them all. Consequently, a theory that identifies properties 
with their timeless extensions is unable to distinguish between the extensions o f  the 
properties o f  pastness, presentness and futurity, and hence is unable to distinguish 
between these properties themselves. The distinction between these tensed 
properties, on this theory o f  properties collapses.
One possible escape route from this conclusion would be to stipulate that the 
extension o f  the property o f  pastness is to be taken as the set o f  all things that are 
now past. This set is distinct from both the set o f  all things that are now present and 
the set o f  all things that are now future. By making this stipulation the distinction 
between the extensions o f  these properties, and hence between these properties 
themselves, can be retained. There is a cost, however. As w e have seen, events and 
times are continually changing from future to present to past, so the distinction 
betw een all things past, present and future that obtains now  is not the distinction that 
will always obtain. By specifying a time at which the extensions o f  these properties 
are determined, w e are effectively ruling out the possibility that events and times 
change in respect o f  these properties. A theory o f  tensed properties such as this 
inevitably finds itself in an unsustainable position. By claiming that properties are to 
be identified with their timeless extensions, it necessarily collapses the distinction 
between the properties o f  pastness, presentness and futurity, which have the same
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timeless extensions. The only way to avoid this is to anchor the extensions o f  these 
properties to a particular time. However, this move renders temporal becoming 
incompatible with the absolute distinction between the three properties.
One possible objection to this argument is to claim that the timeless 
extensions o f  the three temporal properties are only identical i f  there is no first or  last 
m oment o f  time. I f  there is a first or a last moment o f  time, then it is never true that 
the first moment o f  time is future, and it is never true that the last m oment o f  time is 
past. Hence, the extensions o f  the three properties do not overlap absolutely. Now, 
it seems to me that questions o f  the metaphysical nature o f  time should not depend 
on the particular topological properties that time happens to have. However, despite 
this, the objection can be met. Suppose time does have a first and a last moment. In 
that case, the extension o f  the property o f  presentness is identical with the extension 
o f  the disjunctive property o f  'being past or future'. Thus, a theory that takes 
properties to be identical with their timeless extensions cannot distinguish between 
these tw o  temporal properties.
According to the second theory o f  properties under discussion, a property is 
a sui generis entity, a universal that is metaphysically distinct from the particulars 
which are ordinarily said to instantiate it. It seems at first sight that a theory such as 
this has the conceptual wherewithal to preserve the distinction between the 
properties o f  pastness, presentness and futurity. This is because, by asserting that 
properties are sui generis entities, it can stipulate that these three properties are 
irreducible entities, and irreducibly distinct from one another. However, the timeless 
extensions o f  these three properties are identical. Indeed, they are necessarily 
identical because the nature o f  tense dictates that if an event possesses any tensed 
property, then it possesses them all. Everything that exists possesses every tensed 
property. Thus, the claim that they are distinct sui generis entities is metaphysically 
impotent. Furthermore, I believe that a theory o f  properties such as this cannot 
preserve the distinction that it stipulates between these tensed properties. This is 
because there is a general principle to which any theory o f  properties must adhere, 
and the doctrine that past, present and future are properties contravenes this 
principle.
The role o f  the notion o f  properties in our conceptual scheme is to enable us 
to  carve up the ontological landscape. It allows us to differentiate between objects, 
and to judge  that certain objects are the same in certain respects. Thus, whatever the 
metaphysical nature o f  properties, it is crucial to any coherent account o f  them that it 
provides the means for delineating their extensions. I contend that it is a general
8 1
principle to which any theory o f  properties must adhere, that if  any two putatively 
distinct properties are necessarily co-extensive, then they are the same property.6 
That is, if the extensions o f  any two properties are the same in all possible worlds, 
then there is no possible means o f  individuating them. Thus, although a theory that 
takes properties to be sui generis universals may stipulate that the properties o f  
pastness, presentness and futurity are distinct, it has no means o f  individuating them, 
because they are necessarily co-extensive. Such a theory is equally unable to 
preserve the distinction between them. Furthermore, each o f  them applies to 
everything that has existed, exists and will exist. Therefore, not only are they 
necessarily co-extensive, but their identical extensions correspond to  the timeless 
sum total o f  existence. The distinction between them cannot be preserved, and 
moreover, their application in the world does no metaphysical work. They do not 
enable us to carve up the ontological landscape, since they each apply to everything.
It is open to this theory o f  properties, just as it was to the previous theory, to 
anchor the extensions o f  these temporal properties to a particular time. In this way 
the extensions o f  the properties o f  pastness, presentness and futurity would remain 
distinct, and the means with which to individuate them would be preserved. 
How ever, just as with the previous theory, this move renders the distinction between 
past, present and future incompatible with tensed change. The distinction between 
the three properties can be maintained only at the cost o f  ruling out the possibility 
that events and times change from future to present to past.
The objection to the previous theory, that the properties o f  pastness, 
presentness and futurity are not co-extensive if there is a first or a last moment o f  
time can also be made with respect to this theory. However, it can also be met. I f  
there is a first or a last moment o f  time, then the property  o f  presentness is 
necessarily co-extensive with the disjunctive property o f  'being past or future'. 
H ence this theory is unable to individuate between these two properties.
I conclude that any theory that seeks to account for past, present and future 
as properties will fail. The two essential features o f  tense are that past, present and
In his (1996), Oliver asserts that there are four adequacy conditions that any theory of 
properties must meet. These are (i) that it must provide an account o f  the truth o f the sentence 
'Particular a instantiates the property F,  (ii) that it must preserve the truth o f  the sentence 'different 
particulars can have the very same property', (iii) that it must preserve the truth o f  the sentence 'A 
particular can have many properties', and (iv) that it must provide identity conditions for properties. 
Each o f these four adequacy conditions relates to the application o f  properties in the world. It is my 
b elief that what underlies them all is the general principle stated in the text. If a theoiy of 
properties is unable to meet that principle, then it follows that it w ill not be able to meet Oliver’s 
four adequacy conditions.
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future are ontologically distinct, and that events and times continually change from 
future to present to past. Taking past, present and future to be properties is one way 
o f  accounting for the first feature. However, the inclusion o f  the second feature 
guarantees that the extensions o f  these three properties are necessarily identical. 
Thus, any theory o f  past, present and future as properties will not be able to 
individuate between them. The general principle that if  any two putatively distinct 
properties are necessarily co-extensive, then they are the same property rules out the 
possibility that past, present and future are properties.
It is possible that the correct account o f  the nature o f  tensed properties is not 
to be found within any account o f  ordinary properties such as being furry and being 
square. One 'last-ditch' attempt to  account for past, present and future as properties 
is to follow Zeilicovici (1986), and classify them as 'non-ordinaiy properties'. 
Zeilicovici begins by noting that the supposed properties o f  pastness, presentness 
and futurity flout the principle o f  the identity o f  indiscernibles. T w o  entities, a and b 
may differ insofar as a is past and b is future, and yet the terms 'a' and 'b' may name 
the same entity. He concludes from this that tensed properties are non-ordinary 
properties. It seems to me that one would be justified in concluding from this that 
the supposed tensed properties are not properties at all. The introduction o f  a new 
category o f  'non-ordinary' properties seems rather ad hoc. Zeilicovici offers very 
little in the way o f  explanation as to the way in which non-ordinary properties differ 
from ordinary properties, apart from the fact that the former do not obey the 
principle o f  the identity o f  indiscernibles, while the latter do. H ow ever, he does offer 
the following comparison in order to clarify the nature o f  tensed properties:
The attribution o f  pastness operates somewhat like the attribution o f  
existence in the Kantian sense: it applies to the event complete with 
all its properties, and only defines its status. (Zeilicovici (1986) p.
189).
Thus, pastness is a non-ordinary property that is attributed to events 
complete with all their properties. One might describe it as a second-order property. 
As such, how  might we delineate its extension? D oes it apply to  all events that have 
been, are and will be past? I f  so, it is necessarily co-extensive with the second-order 
properties o f  presentness and futurity, and so the distinction between them collapses.
If, on the other hand, its extension includes only those events that are now  past, the 
distinction between past, present and future remains, but at the cost o f  rendering it
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incompatible with tensed change. Thus, introducing a fundamentally different kind 
o f  property, a higher-order, or 'non-ordinary' property, does not avoid the difficulties 
that appear to beset every account o f  tensed properties. The problem simply 
reappears at this higher-order level o f  existence.
An awareness o f  the difficulties that beset any account o f  tensed properties 
has prompted some alternative responses by tensed.theorists. Some have denied that 
pastness, presentness and futurity are properties at all. Lucas (1989) remarks:
I f  we assume that the w ords 'past', 'present' and 'future' are, logically 
speaking, predicates denoting properties o f  events, inconsistency 
follows at once. (Lucas (1989), p. 10).
However, an alternative account o f  their ontological status has not been 
forthcoming. Others have admitted that they are properties, but have refused to 
offer an explanation o f  their nature. An example o f  this sort o f  response is provided 
by M arkosian (1993):7
Suppose that there really are genuine, monadic temporal properties 
like being nine years past. Then a number o f  questions naturally 
arise concerning the nature o f  A properties. W hat exactly are A 
properties? Which things may possess them? W hat are the 
conditions under which it is true that a thing possesses an A property?
I don't know exactly how to answer all o f  these and related questions 
about the nature o f  A properties. In fact, I'm not even sure that it 
would be appropriate to try to answer all o f  these questions. 
(Markosian (1993), p. 834).
I can only conclude that the task o f  accounting for tensed properties 
generates one o f  three responses. Either, an account is offered that leads to 
inconsistency, or the existence o f  tensed properties is denied, but the distinction 
between past, present and future is still retained, or they are embraced into the 
ontological scheme o f  things together with an outright refusal to  explain their nature.
I cannot countenance any o f  these conclusions.
Bigelow  makes a similar remark. He says 'Nor have I said anything about how the 
properties o f  past, present and future arc to be understood. They seem, in fact, very likely to be 
unanalyzable and utterly mysterious.' (Bigelow  (1991) p. 18).
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3.4 Temporal Becoming is an Objective Feature o f  the Worhl, and an
Essential Feature o f  Time
The incorporation o f  this tenet, under some interpretation or another, is an 
essential component o f  the tensed theory o f  time. As we have seen, to omit this 
feature from a tensed theory o f  time would not result in inconsistency, but it would 
yield a strange, and rather counterintuitive picture o f  time. W ithout the passage o f  
time thesis, a tensed account o f  time would involve there being a genuine distinction 
betw een past, present and future that remains fixed and unchanging. The moments 
and events that are, as a m atter o f  fact, characterized by being present would possess 
this characteristic eternally. To avoid such a picture o f  time tensed theorists seek to 
incorporate  temporal becoming into their account o f  temporal reality.
Temporal becoming is taken, by its proponents, to be a real, objective feature 
o f  the world. It involves some kind o f  temporal change, such that events which are 
future gradually become less and less so, then they become present and then past. 
An alternative description o f  this phenomenon is that presentness or the 'Now' 
successively characterizes later and later moments and events. At first sight, these 
descriptions o f  this phenomenon, this passage o f  time, seem perfectly intuitive and 
reasonable. It is only when w e seek to understand it fully, and in particular, when 
w e attempt to reconcile it with tenet (2) o f  the tensed theory, that it begins to lose its 
intuitive appeal. In this section I will examine four very different attempts to provide 
theoretical support for the intuition that time flows in some sense.
3.4.1 The Property A cquisition and Loss Hypothesis
The first interpretation o f  the passage o f  time that I will look at is perhaps the 
most common, and also the most problematic. It involves pastness, presentness and 
futurity being thought o f  as properties, and the passage o f  time being constituted by 
the successive acquisition and loss o f  these properties by moments and events in 
time. W e have already seen how the notion o f  tensed change is incompatible with 
the view that tenses are properties o f  some kind. W hatever criteria one fixes upon to 
distinguish past, present and future from each other, that distinction collapses once it 
is recognized that every event possesses each property successively. In order to 
retain the distinction between these three tense determinations, one must specify a 
moment at which a particular distribution o f  past, present and future obtains. 
H ow ever, this produces a static 'snap-shot' picture o f  tensed time. In order to 
incorporate tensed change into the account we must recognize that different
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distributions o f  past, present and future obtain at different times. However, this 
recognition removes our means o f  retaining the distinction between past, present and 
future. The account thus collapses under the weight o f  this contradiction.
The contradiction that I have identified here is essentially the same as 
M cTaggart's, now famous, paradox o f  time. I discussed this paradox in chapter 1 o f  
this thesis, so here I will merely summarize his argument. M cTaggart argued that 
past, present and future are incompatible determinations o f  events, but that every 
event has them all. He concluded that these determinations, and the change in 
respect o f  them that events undergo are not part o f  reality. The usual response to 
M cTaggart's  paradox is that no event has these three incompatible characteristics 
simultaneously, but only successively, and there is no contradiction in something's 
possessing incompatible properties at different times. H ow ever, this response fails, 
as I outlined in chapter 1. In the terms in which I characterized the contradiction in 
section 3.3 o f  this chapter, this response fails in precisely the following way.
Tensed theorists object to the assumption that past, present and future apply 
to  each event non-successively. If  we will only recognize that these mutually 
incompatible properties apply to events and times successively, we avoid all 
contradiction. This is true, but the price o f  avoiding all contradiction is to give up 
the only means w e  have o f  distinguishing between past, present and future as 
properties. Thus, we give up the only means we have o f  rendering the notions o f  
past, present and future meaningful. The distinction between the application o f  these 
three tensed properties collapses unless we relinquish the reality o f  tensed change. 
These two features o f  tense, interpreted in this way, cannot consistently be held 
together.
Any theory o f  time which seeks to incorporate an account o f  the tenses as 
properties, or  characteristics o f  some kind must reconcile this thesis with the notion 
o f  temporal becoming. Yet, from the foregoing discussion, this would seem to be a 
futile enterprise, as the two notions are inconsistent with one another. Many 
philosophers, throughout the history o f  the debate about tense, have attempted to 
give an account o f  temporal becoming that remains coherent while past, present and 
future are taken to be properties. As an illustration o f  the problem posed by 
M cTaggart's  paradox for the tensed theory I will look at one such account which is,
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in many ways, typical o f  all the others. It is the response to M cTaggart's  paradox 
offered by Quentin Smith.8
Smith presents an outline o f  McTaggart's paradox, and then attempts to 
undermine it in the following way. He challenges the validity o f  the claim that the 
tensed theory o f  time implies that every event is past, present and future. H e 
maintains that there is only a contradiction here if an event, E, is taken to possess 
these mutually incompatible properties non-successively. H e goes on to argue that 
the claim that the tensed theory o f  time entails that every event possesses each 
tensed property non-successively is an unwarranted assumption:
Without this initial assumption, there is no contradiction in the first 
set o f  terms that needs to be escaped. The tenser, o f  course, rejects 
this initial assumption; according to him, the tensed theory o f  time 
entails not (1) [Event E  is past, present and future], but
(4) E  will be past, is now present, and was future; or E  is now 
past, was present, and was (still earlier) future; or E  is now  future, 
will be present, and will (still later) be past.
Item (4) is consistent since the properties o f  pastness, 
presentness and futurity are ascribed to E  at different times. (Smith
(1993) p. 171).
Item (4), however, tells us nothing about the tensed property that E  
possesses at any given time. At best it amounts to the simple (tensed) truism that, 
assuming E  to exist at some time or another, E  is either past, present or future. But 
how  do we distinguish between past, present and future? W e specify a time at which 
each o f  the properties past, present and future range over a particular, exclusive set 
o f  events. However, the distribution o f  tensed properties that obtains at this 
specified time will not obtain at any other time, because o f  the reality o f  temporal 
becoming. Thus, as we have already seen, the distinction betw een past, present and 
future collapses.
Smith's attempt to avoid M cTaggart's paradox fails. I conclude that any 
attempt to make sense o f  the reality o f  temporal becoming in terms o f  the successive 
acquisition and loss o f  tensed properties faces insurmountable problems.
Smith (1993). Other similar defcnccs against McTaggart's paradox are given by Gale 
(1968b), Swinburne (1990), and Whilrow (1980).
87
3.4.2 The Moving Now Hypothesis
An alternative way o f  interpreting the passage o f  time thesis is to  appeal to 
the existence o f  a moving N ow .9 This entity is taken to  be perpetually sliding along 
the series o f  events ordered by the relations 'earlier than', 'later than', and 
'simultaneous with'. The movement o f  the N ow  along this series o f  events is taken 
to be that which renders it a temporal series. The set o f  simultaneous events that 
momentarily coincides with the N ow  are those events which are objectively present, 
and which are more real than any other event. One philosopher w ho adheres to  this 
position is Schlesinger (1982). He writes:
Temporal points from the future, together with events that occur at 
those points, keep approaching the N O W  and, after momentarily 
coinciding with it, keep on receding into the past. The N O W  is o f  
course not conceived as some sort o f  an object but rather as a point 
in time at which any individual who is temporally extended 
experiences that point as being in the present, has, so to  speak, the 
spotlight o f  time focused momentarily on it. (Schlesinger (1982) p.
502).
The problem with Schlesinger's characterization o f  the N ow  is that it applies 
to  every moment, simply in virtue o f  the token-reflexivity o f  the term 'now'. Every 
moment is now relative to itself. Every moment is a 'point in time at which any 
individual who is temporally extended experiences that point as being in the present' 
(Ibid.). As an illustration o f  the moving N ow  hypothesis, this characterization is 
empty. However, let us give Schlesinger the benefit o f  the doubt, and assume that 
there is something m ore to the N ow  than merely the token-reflexivity o f  the 
expression. According to  Schlesinger, moments that are characterized by the N o w  
are privileged in some sense. Events become momentarily m ore real as they are 
embraced by the Now. Thus, it carries with it some ontological status that it 
conveys onto temporal entities that come into contact with it. Let us allow all this, 
and see what follows.
The first thing to note about this position is that if  the N o w  is merely an 
alternative expression for the property o f  presentness, as contrasted with the 
properties o f  pastness and futurity, then this characterization o f  temporal passage
9 Proponents of this hypothesis include Schlesinger (1982) and Brandon (1986).
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merely collapses back into the previous account, with all its attendant problems. If  
the thesis o f  the moving N ow is to avoid the contradictions that beset the property 
acquisition and loss hypothesis, it will have to be relevantly different. Let us assume 
then, that the moving N ow  has a role that is relevantly different from the ascription 
o f  the property o f  presentness to moments and events.
The moving N ow  is thus an entity that bestows a privileged ontological status 
onto the events and moments with which it successively coincides. In what sense 
does the moving N ow  move? The paradigm case o f  movement occurs when an 
object changes in respect o f  its spatial location as it changes in respect o f  its temporal 
location. This is not the sense in which the N ow  moves, as the N o w  does not move 
from one place to another. I f  its movement consists in its changing its temporal 
location as it changes its temporal location, then it does not constitute a genuine 
instance o f  movement. That is, we cannot say that the N o w  genuinely moves unless 
w e postulate a higher-order temporal series in respect o f  which the N o w  changes its 
location as it changes its ordinary temporal location. H ow ever, according to this 
theory, the distinguishing mark o f  a temporal series is that it contains a moving Now. 
Thus, in order for this higher-order temporal series to be a genuine temporal series, it 
too  must have a moving Now. In order to make sense o f  the  m ovement o f  this Now , 
w e will need to postulate yet another temporal series. This line o f  explanation leads 
to  an infinite regress o f  temporal series, and is thus unsatisfactory.
A similar criticism o f  this account o f  temporal becoming has been made by 
Broad (1923, 1938). Broad describes the movement o f  the N o w  along a series o f  
events by analogy with
The spot o f  light from a policeman's bull's-eye traversing the fronts o f  
the houses in a street. What is illuminated is the present, what has 
been illuminated is the past, and what has not yet been illuminated is 
the future. (Broad (1923) p. 59).
How ever, he notices the following difficulty with this picture o f  the nature o f  
temporal becoming:
The lighting o f  the characteristic o f  presentness now  on one event 
and now on another is itself an event, and ought therefore to be itself 
a part o f  the series o f  events. (Ibid. p. 60).
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Clearly, the event which is the becoming present o f  event E  cannot be a part o f  the 
series o f  events o f  which E  itself is a part. That event is part o f  a different series. 
There is a series o f  events constituted by the becoming present o f  E l followed by the 
becoming present o f  E2, and so on. As Broad notes:
All the problems which the policeman's bull's-eye analogy was 
invented to  solve are simply taken out o f  o ther events to  be heaped 
on that particular series o f  events which is the m ovement o f  the bull's- 
eye. (Ibid. p. 60).
Once again we are left with something that does not constitute genuine movement 
unless the existence o f  higher-order temporal series is recognized. However, the 
recognition o f  their existence does not solve the problems that assail the ordinary, 
first-level temporal series. It merely shifts those problems onto  the next temporal 
series.
Smart (1949) has identified a number o f  problems with this conception o f  
temporal becoming. If  the N ow  moves along a series o f  events, and if the verb 'to 
move' is used in its ordinary sense, then it should make sense to ask at what rate the 
N o w  moves along the series o f  events. A rate o f  change implies a correlation 
between a temporal series and another series, usually a series o f  spatial locations. In 
order for there to be a rate at which the N ow  moves along the series o f  events, we 
must either introduce a higher-order time series, or  offer the empty answer that time 
flows at the rate o f  one second per second. Neither response is satisfactoiy, and the 
notion o f  the moving N ow  remains mysterious and unexplained.
It seems that the only way to make sense o f  the moving N ow  without 
postulating higher- and higher-order time series is to introduce into the picture static 
reference points relative to which the N ow  can be said to move. Thus, at one time, 
tu event E  is future. The N ow  has not yet coincided with E. At a later time, t2, E  is 
embraced by the Now; E  is present. Then, at a still later time, t3, the N ow  has 
moved on to later events, and E  is past. However, the problem with this account o f  
the moving N ow  is that, by anchoring the N ow  to a sequence o f  temporal reference 
points, it has ceased to be a genuine case o f  tensed change. There is nothing tensed 
in this account at all. It merely informs us that E  occurs at t2, and is thus later than tx 
and earlier than t3. It is not a case o f  movement, but rather a case o f  a certain 
particular, E, standing in different dyadic relations to different temporal entities. I
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conclude that an account o f  the moving N ow  cannot be the correct metaphysical 
interpretation o f  temporal becoming.
3.4.3 The Worldly Becoming Hypothesis
In the face o f  the overall failure to make any kind o f  sense o f  the notion o f  
temporal becoming, there have recently been a number o f  defences o f  a new and 
innovative account o f  transience. I will refer to this approach as 'worldly becoming'. 
Its tw o main proponents are Schlesinger (1991, 1994) and Bigelow (1991), although 
neither acknowledges the o ther when presenting his own account. This approach 
can ultimately be seen as a response to the failure o f  the various moving N o w  
theories o f  temporal becoming. At the end o f  section 3.4.2 it was seen that some 
kind o f  reference point is needed relative to which the N o w  moves. Employing times 
for this purpose reduces the account to one that does not involve tensed change at 
all. Bigelow and Schlesinger respond to this impasse by suggesting that the 
reference points we use should be not times, but worlds.
Bigelow's attempt to explain temporal passage seems to deal effectively with 
the very problem that other accounts have come up against. That is, he confronts the 
difficulty o f  reconciling the claim that past, present and future are distributed 
objectively throughout all temporal entities, with the claim that temporal entities 
continually change with respect to these characteristics. B igelow postulates
A series of worlds, each containing the same things, and differing 
only in which of those things are past, which are present, and which 
are future. (Bigelow (1991) p. 11).
H e  then employs this series o f  worlds in his explanation o f  the passage o f  time. 
According to Bigelow, the passage o f  time is expressed by such sentences as that 
'what is present, was future, and will be past'. He intends to provide a non-indexical 
account o f  how such sentences can be both non-contradictory and meaningful. In 
the face o f  McTaggart's paradox he cheerfully remarks:
W e just need to find points o f  reference other than moments o f  time.
I nominate possible worlds. Not only can contrary properties attach 
to the same object at different times, but also in different possible 
worlds. (Ibid. p. 5).
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Bigelow relativizes the possession o f  the incompatible tensed properties to 
possible worlds in the following way. I f  an event, E, is present, was future, and will 
be past then, in Bigelow's terminology, E  is present in world w, past in some world x 
which is in w's future, and future in some world y, which is in w's past. Talk o f  
w orlds that are 'in the past or future o f  other worlds is idiomatic for talk o f  worlds 
that contain all and only the same temporal objects as each other, but whose 
distribution o f  past, present and future is sequentially different.
Nathan Oaklander (1994) has effectively disposed o f  this account o f  temporal 
becoming by pointing out that, despite Bigelow's efforts to avoid it, his account 
ultimately succumbs to its ow n version o f  McTaggart's paradox:
I f  all worlds are actual, then a contradiction results, and if  only one 
world is actual, then there is no tensed time and change. (Oaklander
(1994) p. 246).
The crux o f  this objection is that it forces a proponent o f  this account to address 
some rather difficult questions. Are all the worlds in this tensed multiverse actual, or 
is just one o f  them actual, the rest being merely possible? B igelow seems to want to 
say that each o f  these worlds successively becomes actual, and then, presumably 
fades back into mere possibility. I f  this is the picture intended by Bigelow, then it 
seems to  relativize actuality to B series times. A world, w, is merely possible at tt, 
actual at t2, and then merely possible again at t3. Oaklander firstly considers whether 
the worlds in vv's past and future are actual, or merely possible. I f  they are merely 
possible, then there is no tensed change. To see this, Oaklander asks us to,
Compare an apple that is green at tx in the actual world and red at t2 
in a possible world. The existence o f  these worlds does not 
constitute change in the apple unless the possible world becomes 
actual later than the 'currently' actual world. (Ibid. p. 246).
Ih u s ,  if  only one o f  these worlds is actual, then there is an objective distinction 
betw een past, present and future, but there is no tensed change. If, on the other 
hand, each possible world successively becomes actual, then every event is (actually) 
past, present and future, so the distinction between them collapses. Bigelow's 
account o f  worldly becoming thus falls prey to the very paradox it was set up to 
avoid.
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Schlesinger (1991, 1994) also postulates a set o f  possible worlds which are 
all qualitatively identical, but which differ from each other in that each assumes 
actuality at a distinct moment in their common B series o f  events. In Schlesinger's 
account a two-dimensional account o f  time is generated, with the communal B series 
running along the x-axis, and a series o f  possible worlds situated along the _y-axis, 
each with its own unique moment o f  actuality.
Schlesinger's account also succumbs to  its own version o f  M cTaggart's 
paradox, which can be arrived at in at least two different ways. In the first place, an 
objection similar to the one that Oaklander brought to Bigelow's account is 
applicable here. I f  one o f  these worlds is actual, then the distinction between past, 
present and future is retained, but there is no tensed change. How ever, if each world 
is actual in its turn in order to accommodate tensed change, the distinction between 
past, present and future collapses, as every event in the com m on B  series is actually 
past, present and future.
An alternative route to paradox is to argue that, in order to accommodate 
tensed change, every world must be actual. Yet, i f  one world, w, is actual, as it is 
when one moment in its B  series is present, then every other world must be merely 
possible. However, by that rationale, every world is both actual and merely possible, 
yet actuality and mere possibility are mutually incompatible modalities. Thus, 
according to  this position, every world is both actual and non-actual.10 One can 
avoid this contradiction if one relativizes actuality, such that each world is actual at 
itself, but this strategy rules out Schlesinger's account o f  tensed change. This is 
because, according to Schlesinger, the actual world is 'unique - not merely from its 
own perspective, but absolutely so - in that it is unreservedly actual' (Schlesinger 
(1991) p. 429). The passage o f  time, according to Schlesinger, is the acquisition and 
loss o f  this absolute, non-relational property by successive worlds, each with its own 
unique present. Just as relativizing tense to particular times rules out the possibility 
o f  tensed change, so relativizing actuality to particular worlds rules out the 
possibility o f  worldly becoming. Thus, Schlesinger's account requires that actuality 
is an absolute, non-relational property, but as we have seen, the successive 
acquisition and loss o f  such a property leads to paradox.
It seems then, that the strategy o f  finding points o f  reference other than 
moments o f  time to which one relativizes past, present and future, is unsuccessful. 
The same paradox arises, albeit in a more roundabout fashion. However, even if this
A similar objection has been made lo this theory by Buller and Foster (1992).
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had not been the case, the hypothesis o f  worldly becoming involves many other 
metaphysical perplexities. In the first place, no mention is made by either Bigelow or 
Schlesinger about the account o f  possible worlds to which they subscribe. Are they 
Lewisian realists, such that each world is real and concrete, but none are actual 
absolutely? Schlesinger denies that this is the case, but B igelow is silent on the issue. 
However, this account o f  modal reality cannot .be adopted in conjunction with 
worldly becoming because the latter hypothesis involves worlds successively 
becoming absolutely actual, but according to  Lewisian modal realism actuality is 
token-reflexive and not absolute. It is possible that proponents o f  worldly becoming 
would adopt fictionalism over possible worlds, or see possible worlds as maximal 
consistent sets o f  sentences, o r some other ersatz version o f  modal realism. 
However, it is not clear what sense can be made o f  such abstract entities becoming 
actual. W hatever account o f  modal reality is adopted, none are without their 
problems, so the problematic doctrine o f  temporal becoming is conjoined with a 
problematic doctrine concerning the nature o f  possible worlds. How ever, having led 
the worldly becoming hypothesis to its paradox, I will not labour these additional 
metaphysical problems.
3-4.4 The Accretion oj Facts Hypothesis
The final attempt to account for the passage o f  time that I will examine here 
is the position, varieties o f  which are held by, among others, B road (1923), 
Zeilicovici (1989), Lloyd (1978) and Lucas (1989). It is the position which is most 
eloquently stated by Broad as follows:
It will be observed that such a theory as this accepts the reality o f  the 
present and the past, but holds that the future is simply nothing at all.
Nothing has happened to the present by becoming past except that 
fresh slices o f  existence have been added to the total history o f  the 
world. The past is thus as real as the present. On the o ther hand, the 
essence o f  a present event is, not that it precedes future events, but 
that there is quite literally nothing to which it has the relation o f  
precedence. The sum total o f  existence is always increasing. (Broad 
(1923) pp. 66-67).
This appears to be an entirely different picture o f  temporal becoming from 
the preceding accounts. It does not appear to involve properties o f  pastness,
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presentness and futurity, so it can avoid all the difficulties inherent in theories which 
incorporate them. Neither does it involve a moving N ow , so it can avoid the 
problems that beset such an entity. Its ontological advantage is that it only involves 
one world, a world o f  existence that is continually growing; a world that is 
constituted by a continual accretion o f  facts.
I will first examine an objection to the accr.etion o f  facts hypothesis made by 
Oaklander (1984) which I believe to be unsuccessful. Oaklander attacks Broad's 
account o f  becoming on similar grounds to those which defeated the moving N ow  
hypothesis. He claims that it leads to an infinite regress o f  higher-order time series. 
His argument goes as follows:
The sum total o f  reality is always changing. At one moment, it 
includes a certain number o f  existents and then at a later moment it 
includes a greater number o f  existents. But with becoming and time 
being essential to each other the members o f  the series o f  moments at 
which the sum total o f  existence is x, and then y, must themselves 
undergo becoming which requires a second series o f  m om ents and so 
on. (Oaklander (1984) p. 87).
The problem with the property acquisition and loss hypothesis, and the 
moving N o w  hypothesis is that they are qualitative accounts o f  becoming. W hether 
the moving N ow  is a characteristic, or an object with which events enter into 
relations, this account, no less than the property acquisition and loss hypothesis, 
involves the qualification o f  moments and events by tense. This was problematic in 
the various ways we have seen. The only escape was to  treat the tensed 
characteristics as relational, but that led to the breakdown o f  tensed change itself. It 
seems, at first sight, that Broad has avoided all the problems and contradictions 
involved in a qualitative approach to temporal becoming. His approach, by contrast, 
is quantitative. Becoming, on this account, is not something that happens to a series 
o f  events and moments. It is rather, something that reality undergoes; an expansion. 
Thus Oaklander is mistaken to talk as if there is a series o f  moments which are 
subjected to a process o f  becoming. It is this move that allows him to identify a 
further series o f  moments (the moments at which each moment is present), which, in 
turn, must be subjected to this process o f  becoming. Oaklander is interpreting Broad 
as putting forward a hypothesis similar to the moving N o w  hypothesis. However, 
this is precisely the position Broad attacked with his 'policeman's bull's-eye' analogy.
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Thus, Oaklander's allegation that Broad's account sets up an infinite regress o f  
temporal series is unwarranted. It springs from a misrepresentation o f  Broad's 
account. It is not legitimate to argue that an increase in the sum total o f  reality 
generates a series o f  moments that must themselves undergo temporal becoming.
However, despite the fact that this account is quantitative rather than 
qualitative, we still need a criterion for establishing the distinction between past, 
present and future. I propose the following definitions as illustrative o f  this position:
(1) x  is present —Df X  is at the limit o f  existing reality
(2) x  is past ~Dj- x exists and is not at the limit o f  existing reality
(3) x  is future =Dj- x does not exist
There is a difficulty with (3), in that w e need to be able to distinguish 
between what does not exist in virtue o f  being future, and what does not exist in 
virtue o f  being, say, fictional, impossible, or contingently non-existent. However, the 
major problem is with (1) and (2). Every temporal entity is, at the dawn o f  its 
existence, present. Thereafter it is past. Thus, every temporal entity is both present 
and past. But these characteristics are mutually incompatible. I f  we apply the 
definitions o f  past and present so that there is a genuine distinction between them, 
such that one moment satisfies the definition o f  present, and all the rest satisfy the 
definition o f  past, then the continual increase in reality is effectively halted at that 
point. It is no longer consistent with this distinction. The accretion o f  facts 
hypothesis eventually leads back to its own version o f  M cTaggart's  paradox.
Broad and the other proponents o f  this hypothesis appeared to have fixed 
upon what is problematic for accounts o f  temporal becoming, and to  have omitted it 
from their own account. However, it seems that, despite their best efforts, their 
account is covertly qualitative, and thus, they are unable to construct an account o f  
becoming that steers clear o f  paradox and contradiction.
I conclude that no account o f  the doctrine o f  temporal becoming has been put 
forward which avoids the paradox originally identified by M cTaggart. It is my belief 
that the two essential components o f  the feature o f  time known as tense cannot 
consistently be held together. The claim that there is a genuine ontological 
distinction between past, present and future cannot be preserved together with the 
claim that events and times continually and inexorably change from future to  present 
to past. Theses (2) and (3) o f  the tensed theory are mutually incompatible.
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3.5 There is No Spatial Analogue o f  Any o f  the Features (1) -  (3) which
Uniquely Characterize the Nature o f  Time
Central to the tensed theory is the doctrine that time is relevantly different 
from any o f  the dimensions o f  space. The tensed theory is opposed to what its 
p roponents often refer to as the 'block universe' theory. According to the 'block 
universe' theory time is seen as merely a fourth dimension o f  essentially the same 
kind as the three dimensions o f  space. Tensed theorists, on the o ther hand, hold, as 
we have seen, that temporal becoming is an objective feature o f  time, but there is no 
analogous phenomenon in any o f  the dimensions o f  space. They also hold that past, 
present and future mark genuine, ontological distinctions, but there is no such 
distinction between, for example, here and there, North  and South, or left and right. 
Spatially tensed language is thought by proponents o f  the tensed theory to  be 
covertly relational, while temporally tensed language is irreducibly non-relational.
It is important that tenet (4) is incorporated into the tensed theory, since it 
can be used to block any spatial analogues o f  arguments in favour o f  tensed time. A 
comm on strategy among tenseless theorists is to construct spatial analogues o f  
arguments in favour o f  temporal becoming, or o f  the genuine distinction between 
past, present and fu ture ."  I f  an analogous spatial argument can successfully be 
constructed, then this presents a challenge to the tensed theory o f  time. Its 
proponents must find a flaw in the spatial reasoning in order to  block the analogy, or 
find themselves committed to the conclusion that space flows, or that there is a 
genuine, ontological distinction between here and there.
An alternative strategy, when faced with spatial analogues o f  arguments for 
tensed time, is that adopted by Swinburne (1990) and Sosa (1983a, 1983b). Their 
approach involves what we might call 'biting the bullet'. Faced with spatial analogues 
o f  reasoning that leads to tensed time, they accept the spatial reasoning on the same 
grounds as those which support the temporal reasoning. They embrace the challenge 
that they are committed, by parity o f  reasoning, to a spatially tensed ontology. 
Swinburne writes:
But the proper response must be that there are indeed spatially tensed 
facts. It is a well known phenomenon to have a map o f  some area 
with towns such as Oxford and Cambridge, and their latitude and 
longitude well marked, and yet not to know whether Oxford is here
This strategy has been adopted by, among others, M ellor (1981).
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or somewhere else. Where here is is indeed an additional fact beyond 
those o f  latitude and longitude. (Swinburne (1990) p. 127).
According to Swinburne and Sosa there is no distinction between reality and
the contents o f  our representations o f  reality. Swinburne's example illustrates that he
takes it to be the case that where there is an unanswered question about a state o f
affairs, there is a further fact  about that state o f  affairs that has been omitted. Thus,
when I look at a map and I am unaware that the town represented on the map is also
the tow n that can truly be described as 'here1, then I am unaware o f  thefact that that
tow n is here. According to a more usual tenseless account o f  space, the fact that I
am unaware o f  is a relational fact constituted by the tow n and myself being at the
same location. In any case, the view expressed by Sosa and Swinburne is
exceptional. Tensed theorists usually maintain that, while time is irreducibly tensed, 
space is not.
3.6 Con clusi on
I have identified and examined closely the central doctrines o f  any tensed
theory o f  time. The position o f  the theory I defended in the previous chapter, the
new tenseless token-reflexive theory o f  time, with respect to  theses (1) - (4) is as
follows. The tenseless theory accepts tenet (1), that tensed language is irreducible,
but denies the ontological conclusions that tensed theorists draw  from it. It denies
that there is an objective, ontological distinction between past, present and future. It
also denies that there is any genuinely real phenomenon o f  temporal becoming.
Consequently, it does not face the problem o f  trying to reconcile tenets (2) and (3)
with each other. Finally, it claims that there is an analogy between time and space, in
that neither is tensed. From my analysis o f  tenets (1) to (4), under all their possible
interpretations, I conclude that (2) and (3) are not mutually compatible. (2) without
(3) is not acceptable to a tensed theorist. (3) without (2) is not coherent. Thus,
attempts to conjoin these two theses into a coherent theory o f  time will inevitably 
result in paradox.
Chapter 4
T h e  T e n s e l e s s  T h e o r y  o f  T i m e  a n d  M o d a l  R e a l i s m
The tenseless token-reflexive theory o f  time consists essentially o f  two 
components. Firstly, there is the claim that the truth conditions o f  all tensed sentence 
tokens are token-reflexive, and can be stated in entirely tenseless terms. The second 
claim is that time is tenseless. All times are equally real, and tense is not a 
constituent o f  temporal reality. That is, there is no genuine, ontological distinction 
between past, present and future, and temporal becoming is not a real feature o f  
time. These two features o f  the tenseless token-reflexive theory  o f  time are parallel, 
in some ways, to the essential features o f  David Lewis' theory o f  genuine modal 
realism.1 At the semantic level Lewis offers an indexical account o f  actuality which 
is formally analogous to an indexical account o f  temporal terms such as 'now' and 
'present1. At the ontological level there appears to be an analogy between Lewis' 
account o f  all possible worlds being equally real, and the doctrine o f  the tenseless 
theory that all times are equally real.
M y concern in this chapter is to examine this apparent analogy between these 
tw o theories. H o w  strong is it? H ow  closely does it bind the tw o  theories together? 
Is it strong enough to commit a tenseless theorist, by parity o f  reasoning, to  genuine 
modal realism? M y attempt to answer these questions will involve a close 
examination o f  each theory, an analysis o f  some attempts to  undermine the analogy, 
and a consideration o f  some attempts to reinforce it. Ultimately I hope to prove that, 
as a proponent o f  the new tenseless token-reflexive theory o f  time, I am not forced 
to  countenance Lewis' plurality o f  worlds.
4.1 The New Tenseless Token-Reflexive Theory o f  Time
To recap briefly, this is the theory that, although tense is ineliminable from 
thought and language, nevertheless it does not constitute part o f  temporal reality. So 
the theory does not aim to provide an analytic reduction o f  all tensed sentences to 
tenseless sentences. It recognizes that this is not possible. Instead, it claims to 
provide an ontological reduction o f  tense to tenseless temporal relations. This is
In this essay, where I refer to modal realism, it is genuine modal realism I intend to 
discuss, except where I indicate explicitly that I am discussing ersatz modal realism.
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achieved by giving the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences in entirely tenseless 
terms. The token-reflexivity o f  these truth conditions explains how  different tokens 
o f  the same tensed sentence type can have different truth-values. A token o f  'The 
sun is rising' uttered before dawn is false, as is a token o f  the same type uttered at 
noon. It is only tokens o f  this type uttered simultaneously with the rising o f  the sun 
that are true. The metaphysical implications o f  this truth condition project are that, 
a lthough tense is a fundamental aspect o f  language and thought, it does not exist in 
reality. All that is needed to  account for the objective truth or falsity o f  tensed 
sentences are tenseless temporal relations between events. Thus, the distinction 
betw een past, present and future constitutes no part o f  reality whatsoever, and all 
times are ontologically on a par.
4.2 David Lewis' Theory o f  Genuine Modal Realism
As I see it, there are tw o essential components o f  David Lewis' theory o f  
modality. First o f  all, there is the indexical theory o f  actuality, which is given its 
fullest expression in Lewis (1970). According to Lewis, 'actual' is an indexical term 
and should be subject to an analysis o f  the same kind as that appropriate for other, 
more familiar indexicals such as 'here', 'now' and 'I'. The appropriate analysis for 
these indexicals is that their reference is wholly determined by, and varies according 
to, particular features o f  the context in which they are uttered .2 The reference o f  the 
indexical expression 'here' varies according to the place at which it is uttered or 
inscribed, so a token o f 'here ' refers to  the place at which it is produced. Tokens o f  
'I' refer to the person who produces them, so their reference varies according to a 
different feature o f  the context o f  utterance: the utterer. Similarly, 'now' refers to  the 
time at which it is uttered o r  inscribed, so non-simultaneous tokens o f  'now' refer to 
different times. W hat then, is the appropriate feature o f  the context o f  utterance
The analysis o f indcxical expressions here is essentially the direct reference theory of 
indexicals. In chapter 6 I will argue that, strictly speaking, the tenseless token-reflexive theory o f  
time is not consistent with the direct rcfcrcncc theory o f indexicals, since the latter theory requires 
times to be incorporated into the truth conditions o f sentences containing indexicals, but the former 
theory only invokes events, utterances and temporal relations in stating their truth conditions. 
However, I will also argue that the reasons which motivate the direct reference theory o f  indexicals 
are consistent with the tenseless token-reflexive theory o f time. Consequently, the tenseless token- 
reflexive theory' can preserve the central insights o f the direct reference theory o f  indexicals without 
explicitly invoking times into the truth conditions o f tensed sentences. Hence, there is no genuine 
inconsistency between these two theories. Consequently, in this chapter I w ill continue to employ 
the terminology o f the direct reference theory o f indexicals.
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according to which the reference o f  the supposed indexical term 'actual' 
systematically varies? Lewis writes:
I suggest that 'actual' and its cognates should be analyzed as indexical 
terms: terms w hose reference varies, depending on relevant features 
o f  the context o f  utterance. The relevant feature o f  context, for the 
term 'actual', is the world at which a given utterance occurs. 
According to the indexical analysis I propose, 'actual' (in its primary 
sense) refers at any world w to the world w. (Lewis (1970) pp. 184- 
5).
If, as Lewis claims, 'actual' is an indexical expression, such that its reference varies 
from world to world then, he maintains, we can explain why skepticism about our 
own actuality is absurd:
H o w  do w e know  that we are not the unactualized possible
inhabitants o f  some unactualized possible w orld? .....The indexical
analysis o f  actuality explains how  w e know it: in the same way that I 
know  that I am me, that this time is the present, o r  that I am here.
All such sentences as 'This is the actual world,' 'I am actual,' 'I 
actually exist,' and the like are true on any possible occasion o f  
utterance in any possible world. That is why skepticism about our 
own actuality is absurd. (Lewis (1970) p. 186).
Another consequence o f  the indexical theory o f  actuality is the rejection o f  
the thesis that actuality is an absolute, non-relational quality. The indexical theory o f  
actuality denies that what is actual is, in some sense, ontologically superior to what is 
merely possible. I f  the indexical theory o f  actuality is true, it is not the case that one 
world, the actual world, is more real than all the other merely possible worlds. For 
Lewis, this is a benefit o f  the indexical theory o f  actuality as it complements the other 
component o f  his position: modal realism.
Modal realism is 'the thesis that the world we are part o f  is but one o f  a 
plurality o f  worlds, and that we who inhabit this world are only a few out o f  all the 
inhabitants o f  all the worlds' (Lewis (1986) p. vii). Each world in this plurality is as 
real and concrete as every other world, although they are causally and 
spatiotemporally isolated from each other. Other worlds differ from the world we
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happen to inhabit, not in kind, but only in what goes on at them. The world we 
inhabit might have been different from the way it is, an intuition that we frequently 
express by the use of modal sentences, for example, 'The pyramids might have been 
built by aliens'. According to Lewis, this sentence, if true, is made true by there 
being a world in which the pyramids (or a counterpart thereof) were built by aliens.
Genuine modal realism has one immediately obvious disadvantage: it 
generates an ontological inventory that is uneconomical in the extreme. There are 
many who would not countenance such a vast multitude of existents. Lewis is aware 
of this opinion, admitting that 'modal realism does disagree, to an extreme extent, 
with firm common sense opinion about what there is' (Lewis (1986) p. 133). 
However, he argues that its ontological disvalue is outweighed by its pragmatic 
value: there are 'many ways in which systematic philosophy goes more easily if we 
may presuppose modal realism in our analyses' (Lewis (1986) p. vii). What then, are 
these pragmatic reasons for adopting modal realism; in what ways does it assist the 
progress of philosophy?
One reason in favour of genuine modal realism is that it disposes of the 
question 'Why should anything exist?'. A world is a 'maximal mereological sum of 
spatiotemporally interrelated things,' (Lewis (1986) p. 73). On that analysis there is 
no world where there is nothing at all, so it would seem to be necessary that there is 
something. Lewis does not claim to provide a genuine explanation of why there is 
something rather than nothing. It is merely a feature of his account that it turns out 
to be necessary that something exist, thus disposing of the question by making it 
irrelevant.
A more powerful reason in favour of genuine modal realism is that it affords 
remarkable clarity to analyses of modal expressions, and to modal reasoning.
The standards of validity for modal reasoning have long been unclear; 
they become clear only when we provide a semantic analysis of modal 
logic by reference to possible worlds and to possible things
therein.... Modal reasoning can be replaced by non-modal, ordinary
reasoning about possible things.... Once we have a non-modal
argument we have clear standards of validity; and once we have non- 
modal translations of the premises, we can understand them well 
enough to judge whether they are credible. (Lewis (1970) p. 175),
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The problem that Lewis identifies here, and purports to solve, is that there are many 
ways in which modal reasoning is abstruse if we take modal expressions such as 
'possibly' and 'necessarily' to be primitive and irreducible sentential operators. For 
one thing, modal contexts are intensional such that co-referential terms cannot be 
substituted within them while the sentence as a whole retains the same meaning, or 
even the same truth-value. However, a theory that transforms opaque modal 
locutions into transparent ordinary locutions about modal things (possible worlds and 
possibilia) has the advantage of 'extensionalizing' modal reference and inference. 
Under this approach to modal reasoning the modality is contained within modal 
objects, so that we can refer to them and quantify over them in just the same way as 
we do for ordinary objects. According to this analysis, a sentence of the form 
'Actually/?' is true if and only if p  is true in the world of utterance; 'Possibly p' is true 
if and only if p  is true in at least one world;3 'Necessarily p' is true if and only if/? is 
true in all possible worlds, and ’Not possibly p' is true if and only if p  is true in no 
possible world. This approach yields an analogy with temporal expressions which 
quantify over times in a similar way. 'Actual' is thus analogous to 'present'; 'possible' 
is analogous to any tensed expression which locates an event at some time other than 
the present; 'necessarily' is analogous to 'always' or 'at all times', and 'not possibly' or 
impossibly' is analogous to 'never' or 'at no time1.
We now have before us a clear picture of Lewis' modal realism and his 
indexical theory of actuality, as well as a reminder of the central tenets of the 
tenseless token-reflexive theory of time. These brief excursions through the main 
tenets of each theory have already revealed some of the ways in which these two 
theories might be thought to be analogous. In the next section I will spell out this 
alleged analogy in more detail.
4.3 Tenseless Time and ’Modeless' Modality
The tenseless token-reflexive theory of time offers a token-reflexive analysis 
of tensed language. According to this analysis present tense sentence tokens are true 
if and only if they occur simultaneously with whatever they are about. The truth of 
such tokens requires only that they stand in the tenseless relation of simultaneity to
For Lewis, 'Possibly p' is true if and only if  p is true in at least one world accessible from 
the world o f  utterance. The accessibility relation, within Lewis' theory, is one whose purpose is to 
define different modalities by delineating subsets o f all the possible worlds. I w ill ignore the 
accessibility relation in this essay, as 1 am concerned with possible worlds per se and not with 
particular subsets o f them. This relation docs not contribute significantly to the discussion  
concerning whether there is an analogy between time and modality.
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the event that they refer to. It does not, as some tensed theorists would maintain, 
require that the events or times referred to possess any non-relational property of 
presentness. Nor does it require that the relevant events or times occupy some 
uniquely elevated ontological status, such that the present is more real than the past 
or the future. Every event and moment, according to this analysis, is present relative 
to itself. Thus the token-reflexive analysis of tensed language is consistent with a 
tenseless ontology whereby all times are equally real, and none are uniquely 
distinguished from all the others by some characteristic of presentness. It does not 
entail that time is tensed in any way. A tensed theorist who wished to adopt the 
token-reflexive analysis of tensed language would be obliged to provide independent 
arguments for the conclusion that time is tensed, together with arguments for the 
conclusion that a tensed ontology is consistent with the token-reflexive analysis of 
tensed language. The two components of the tenseless token-reflexive theory of 
time are thus consistent with one another, and indeed, complement each other.
The two components of genuine modal realism appear to be consistent with 
one another, and to complement each other in precisely the same way. If  one 
espouses an indexical analysis of the term 'actual1, such that each world is actual 
relative to itself, is one thereby committed to the view that all worlds are equally 
real? If the indexical theory of actuality is true, then it is not the case that actuality is 
a metaphysically privileged status that one world, our world, attains. Analogously, if 
the status o f  presentness consists simply in the token-reflexivity of present tense 
terms and the temporal indexical 'now', then it is not the case that presentness is a 
metaphysically privileged status that one moment, this moment, attains. I maintain 
that there is a close connection between an indexical analysis of tensed language and 
a tenseless ontology. This connection consists in the fact that, in the absence of 
arguments to support a tensed ontology, together with arguments to defeat the claim 
that a tensed ontology is inherently paradoxical, the only temporal ontology that can 
consistently be maintained in conjunction with a token-reflexive analysis of tensed 
language is a tenseless one. If there is an equally close connection between an 
indexical analysis of actuality and an ontology of genuine possible worlds, then a 
question naturally arises concerning whether a tenseless theorist with respect to time 
is committed, by parity of reasoning, to genuine modal realism. My main objective in 
this chapter is to undermine any suggestion that a proponent of the tenseless theory 
of time is committed by analogy to genuine modal realism. As a first step towards 
that objective I will examine some attempts by other philosophers to undermine the 
apparent analogy.
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4.4 An Examination o f  Some Attempts to Undermine the Analogy
There have been some attempts to uncouple these particular conceptions of 
time and modality from each other. Various strategies have been adopted in order to 
achieve this end. E.J. Lowe, for example, argues that there is a significant 
disanalogy between times and possible worlds that is sufficient to undermine any 
suggestion that the two theories may be analogous in any way. He describes this 
disanalogy as:
An important dissimilarity between temporal relations and relations 
between possible worlds, consisting in the fact that the former put 
instants of time into a unique linear order not paralleled by any 
analogous linear ordering of possible worlds. In short, time 
constitutes a dimension in a way that possibility does not. (Lowe 
(1986) p. 195).
Essentially the argument is that there is a lack of ordering in the domain of possible 
worlds, and that this constitutes an inherent difference between worlds and times, 
such that they cannot be assimilated to one another, or treated in a similar 
metaphysical fashion. That there is a disanalogy here at all has been denied by 
Yourgrau (1986), and of course Lewis,4 who both argue that the relation of 
similarity between worlds is sufficient to provide them with an ordering, even if we 
are unable, in principle, to determine precisely what that ordering is.
It seems to me that this objection, and the response to it, both miss the mark. 
Whether or not possible worlds constitute a dimension seems to be irrelevant to the 
question of whether our reference to our own world, and reference to other worlds 
by their inhabitants, with the use of the expression 'actual' succeeds via an indexical 
mechanism.5 It is also irrelevant to the ontological status of the worlds thus referred 
to. If  we take the terms 'now' and T as being, fairly uncontroversially, indexical 
expressions, we can see clearly that whether the domain of objects referred to by 
these expressions is ordered or not is irrelevant to their indexical nature, and is 
irrelevant to the question of whether every object in the domain is on the same 
ontological level.
See, for example, Lewis (1973).
Although, this is not the point that concerned Lowe in the article I quoted from.
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The reference of the expression 'now' varies according to when it is uttered, 
and the reference of the expression T varies according to who utters it. The domain 
of reference for 'now' is constituted by times which, as Lowe pointed out, are 
ordered by the temporal relations in which they stand to each other ('earlier than' and 
'later than'), in such a way as to constitute a dimension. The domain of reference for 
'I' is constituted by speakers of a common language, and although spatiotemporally 
related to each other, they are not ordered by any 'personal' relation analogous to the 
temporal relations, and do not collectively constitute a dimension. None o f this 
prevents 'I' from functioning successfully as an indexical, nor does it provide any 
grounds for denying that all speakers of a language exist on the same ontological 
level. So, whether the domain of reference of an indexical expression is well ordered 
(as in the case of times), or not (as in the case of speakers o f  a language) does not 
appear to have any consequences for whether that expression qualifies as an 
indexical, or for whether the objects in that domain o f reference are on the same 
ontological level. This objection has indeed focused on a dissimilarity between times 
and possible worlds, but I maintain it is an irrelevant dissimilarity. That is, it has no 
consequences for the existence or otherwise of a semantic or metaphysical analogy 
between genuine modal realism and any theory of temporal reality.
Graeme Forbes adopts a rather different strategy in his attempt to undermine 
the suggestion of an analogy between time and modality. He argues that our 
experience of time differs significantly from our experience of modality. He 
concludes from this that, metaphysically, times are not analogous to possible worlds. 
Consequently there is no threat of there being analogous theories of time and 
modality. We may infer from this that if the tenseless theory of time and modal 
realism appear to be analogous, this is no more than an appearance because there are 
significant underlying differences between the categories o f  time and modality. The
difference that Forbes chooses to describe is that 'we move through time.... but do
not move through the other possible worlds in which we exist,' (Forbes (1983) p. 
127). Is this difference enough to unhitch tenseless time from modal realism?
For the tenseless theory o f  time the claim that we move through time is a 
mere figure of speech used to convey the truth that we have different temporal parts 
that exist at different times. Thus, if the difference identified by Forbes is decisive 
enough to undermine any supposed analogy between times and possible worlds, we 
ought to cash it out in terms consistent with the tenseless theory of time and modal 
realism. In these terms Forbes' disanalogy reduces to the claim that we have 
different temporal parts at different times, but we do not have different 'modal' parts
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at different possible worlds. Restating the disanalogy in these terms results in its 
dissolution. According to modal realism we have many counterparts that exist in 
many different possible worlds. Analogously, according to the tenseless theory of 
time, we have many different temporal parts that exist at many different times.
However, there are some tenseless theorists who deny that individuals have 
temporal parts, and altogether reject temporal part theory.6 It may be that Forbes' 
disanalogy is more effective in divorcing tenseless time from modal realism if 
understood in terms consistent with the tenseless theory of time that rejects temporal 
part theory. According to such a theory, the notion o f movement through time is an 
allusion for an individual's standing in different temporal relations to different events 
and moments of time. For us to recognize an event, e, as being first future, then 
present, and then past, is just for us to judge at some time, t, that e is later than t, and 
at some later time lx that e is simultaneous with and at some still later time t: that 
e is earlier than t2. Within such a theory Forbes' disanalogy reduces to the claim that 
we stand in different temporal relations to different times, but we do not stand in 
analogous relations to different possible worlds. Once more the alleged disanalogy 
dissolves. Tenseless time and modal realism are indeed analogous in this respect. 
Just as we stand in different temporal relations to different times, other possible 
worlds are related to the world we inhabit in virtue of being more or less similar to 
our world. Employing the disanalogy that Forbes fixes on to attempt to release the 
tenseless theory of time from its association with modal realism is unsuccessful.
Martin Davies' strategy looks far more promising in the bid to uncouple 
tenseless time from modal realism. He argues that the indexical theory o f  actuality is 
false. 'Actual' is not an indexical expression, according to Davies, so there is no 
analogy between it and 'now' or 'present'. If Davies' argument is successful, the 
allegedly analogous reasoning does not even get past the first premise. Davies 
writes:
If  a speaker uses 'now'.....in an utterance, then it is not sufficient for
understanding of that utterance that an audience should merely know 
the meaning of the sentence uttered. He must be able to identify the
time.... of the context of utterance; only then will he know what has
been said But one can hardly hold that understanding of an 
utterance involving 'actually' requires identification o f  the actual
For example, Mellor (1981,1991) and MacBeath (1983).
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world from amongst the set W of possible worlds. (Davies (1983) p.
132).
The force of this disanalogy lies in the claim that indexicals typically change their 
reference from one context of utterance to another, and that to understand how the 
reference changes is to understand the indexical expression. The argument continues 
that while this is true for indexicals, it is not true for the term 'actually' because its 
reference does not change in our experience; it always refers, for us, to the world we 
inhabit. To understand this term then, we do not have to identify the context in 
which it is uttered, and so it is not a genuine indexical. A similar objection is made 
by Peter van Inwagen (1980a), who argues that treating 'actually' as an indexical is a 
gratuitous and illegitimate extension of the notion of indexicality, for much the same 
reasons as those offered by Davies. My response is equally applicable to both 
arguments.7
Based on the notion of what it is for an expression to be an indexical, this 
objection begs the question against the indexical theory of actuality. It is true that all 
utterances in this world of'This is the actual world' are true in this world, but this is 
in accordance with Lewis' position. It does not follow from this that utterances in 
other worlds of the same sentence type are not true in those worlds in virtue of the 
term 'actual' referring indexically to those worlds. This objection only has any force 
if one has already decided that 'actually' and its cognates do not function as 
indexicals. It can only be claimed that this is a gratuitous extension of the notion of 
indexicality if one provides solid grounds for that claim. If  the only reason offered is 
merely the assumption that the claim is true, then the objection has no force 
whatsoever.
I believe that the arguments I have discussed in this section are representative 
of objections to the existence of an analogy between time and modality. They 
singularly fail to undermine any such analogy. That being so, the analogy not only 
appears at first sight to be compelling, it is also able to withstand the objections that 
have so far come its way. I turn in the next section to scrutinize one particular 
formulation of the analogy put forward by M.J. Cresswell. D.H. Mellor defends 
McTaggart's argument for the unreality of tense, and adopts a tenseless theory of
In a similar vein Gale (1989) argues that 'actual' is not an indexical because certain salient 
features of the more common indexicals arc not features o f  the term 'actual'. I believe that Gale's 
arguments beg the question against Lewis in the same way that Davies' and van Invvagen's 
arguments do so.
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time as an alternative to McTaggart's own conclusion that time is unreal. Cresswell 
argues that if Mellor's argument for the tenseless theory is successful, and there are 
many who believe that it is, then so too is an equally powerful argument for David 
Lewis' theory of genuine modal realism.
4.5 A Modal Version o f  McTaggart's Paradox,
According to McTaggart tense is unreal because the supposition of its 
existence yields a contradiction. If tense is real then the following two propositions 
must be true:
(1) Past, present and future are incompatible determinations. Every event must 
be one or the other, but no event can be more than one.
(2) But every event has them all. If M  is past, it has been present and future. If 
it is future, it will be present and past. If it is present, it has been future and 
will be past. (McTaggart (1927) Reprinted in R. Le Poidevin and M. 
MacBeath (eds.), (1993) p. 32).
These two propositions clearly contradict one another, so McTaggart concludes that 
tense is unreal. Since he believes that tense is also essential to the reality of time 
itself, he concludes that if tense is unreal, so too is time.8 Mellor draws a different 
conclusion from this contradiction. Since tense is unreal, but time exists, time must 
be tenseless. M. J. Cresswell constructs a modal analogue o f McTaggart's paradox 
with the aim of proving that, just as tense is unreal, primitive modality is unreal, and 
consequently modal reality must consist in a plurality of Lewisian worlds. The modal 
analogue goes as follows:
Many M  positions are incompatible with each other. An event which 
is merely possible for example cannot also be actual. Being merely 
possible and being actual are mutually incompatible properties of 
things and events. But because they are contingencies everything has 
to have them all. Everything occupies every M  position from merely 
possible to actual. But nothing can really have incompatible 
properties, so nothing in reality has modal properties. M  positions 
are a myth. (Cresswell (1990) p. 165-6).
For a fuller discussion o f  McTaggart's paradox, see chapter 1 o f this thesis.
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First of all, what are we to understand by an 'M  position'? Cresswell intends 
it to be the modal analogue of an A series position, which is a position in time 
identified as either past, present or future. Let us suppose then, that an M  position is 
a position in 'modal space', identified as, for example, actual, merely possible, 
impossible, necessary and so on. However, if this, is the correct interpretation of an 
M  position, then the argument is quite disanalogous to McTaggart's temporal 
argument. There are many M  positions that are quite compatible with each other. 
An event may be, for example, both actual and necessary, actual and contingent, or 
possible and necessary. So, it would seem that, for many of these M  positions there 
is really no difficulty in saying that events can occupy more than one of them. 
McTaggart, on the other hand, is quite right to say that every A position is mutually 
incompatible with every other A position. However, it is possible that Cresswell 
intends to talk only of actuality and mere possibility as representing M  positions. 
Since these two M  positions are incompatible, the argument goes through, up to this 
point at least, although it remains puzzling just what Cresswell means when he says 
'Everything occupies every M  position from merely possible to actual'. What M  
positions are there between actual and merely possible?
The next move in McTaggart's argument, after establishing that every A 
position is incompatible with every other A position, is to note that every event 
occupies every A series position. Because the tenses of events are forever changing, 
every event has to have them all. The modal counterpart o f this move in Cresswell's 
argument is to say that because M  positions are 'contingencies', every event has to 
have them all. Cresswell appears to imply that there is an analogy between the 
continual change of tense that events undergo, and the contingency of modal 
properties. If there is an analogy here at all it is a weak one, certainly too weak to 
support the inference to the claim that everything occupies every M  position. 
Furthermore, is it really the case that M  positions are occupied contingently? 
Modalities are generally taken to be ascribed necessarily and not contingently, for 
instance, it is necessarily necessary that 2 + 2 = 4. Is Cresswell suggesting that we 
dispense with this practice so that mathematical truths are merely contingently 
necessary?
In seeking to construct a modal analogue of McTaggart's paradox, Cresswell 
faltered when it came to invoking a modal analogue of the continual change of tense 
that events undergo. He appealed to the 'contingency' of modal properties, but it 
clearly does not validate the analogous modal inference. Thus, this modal analogue
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of McTaggart's paradox fails to force one into the position either of rejecting 
modality as incoherent (as McTaggart rejects tense as incoherent) or of adopting 
modal realism (as Mellor adopts tenseless time). It fails, I believe, because there is 
no clear modal analogue of the change of tense that events and times appear to 
undergo. Modal realism may be analogous to tenseless time in many respects, but it 
is not the case, as Cresswell claims, that a modal analogue of McTaggart's paradox 
commits us to modal realism. The analogy may be powerful, but it is not that 
powerful. However, it may still be powerful enough to compel a tenseless theorist to 
adopt modal realism or admit inconsistency. In order to avoid facing that choice I 
turn now to examine Lewis' theory a little more closely.
4.6 Token-Rejlexivity and Real Worlds
Lewis' conception of modal reality consists in his genuine modal realism 
together with the indexical theory of actuality. Aware that the major disadvantage of 
his position is its extreme ontological requirements, Lewis invites us to peruse its 
advantages, which are largely pragmatic, and to consider whether the ontological 
price is worth paying. Many of its pragmatic benefits derive from its association with 
the indexical theory of actuality. But what precisely is the relation between the two 
components of his theory? Does the indexical theory of actuality entail modal 
realism, or does modal realism entail the indexical theory o f  actuality? I maintain 
that neither entailment relation obtains.
To see that the indexical theory of actuality does not commit us to a plurality 
of worlds, consider the following example. According to the indexical theory of 
actuality, a token of the sentence 'It is actually the case that the sky is blue1 is true if 
and only if the sky is blue in the world in which that token is produced. So far there 
is no commitment to the existence of any world except the world in which the token 
occurs. What if things had been different? What if the sky had been khaki? In that 
case the expression 'the actual world' would have denoted a different world if the 
indexical theory of actuality were true. However, this does not commit me to the 
existence of a world where the sky, as seen from a counterpart o f  the planet earth, is 
a uniform shade of khaki. One can adopt the indexical theory of actuality even if the 
expression 'actual' only applies to one world.
To illuminate this restriction, it might be useful to consider the indexicality of 
the pronoun 'I' as understood by a solipsist who believes that, as a matter of fact, no 
other minds exist apart from her own. Sally the solipsist will be quite happy to adopt 
an indexical analysis of'I' such that it refers, on each occasion of use, to the one who
utters it, even though there is, as a matter of fact, only one speaker that this indexical 
expression ever successfully refers to: herself. The fact that Sally believes herself to 
be the only person who genuinely exists will not cause her to redefine the meaning of 
T such that it is an alternative name for herself. She already has a perfectly good 
name. No, the indexical analysis of T is the most useful and explanatory account of 
that expression, despite the effective limitation in its genuine reference.
Thus, one can hold the indexical theory of actuality without thereby being 
committed to genuine modal realism. The indexical theory o f actuality is quite 
consistent with a picture of modal reality according to which only one world 
genuinely exists It is noteworthy that one can also adopt genuine modal realism 
without thereby being committed to the indexical theory of actuality. One can hold 
that there is a plurality of genuine worlds, except that one of them differs from all the 
others by possessing the absolute, non-relational quality of actuality. Such a theory 
is attributed by Armstrong to Leibniz, although he notes that 'the textual warrant for 
this is dubious,' (Armstrong (1989) p. 3). According to a theory of this kind,
Over and above the actual world there are an indefinite multiplicity of 
merely possible worlds. They constitute all the ways the world could
have been.... It is natural to develop this view by saying that it
involves two levels o f being. The actual world has the superior sort 
of being: actuality. The merely possible worlds have some sort of 
being, but they lack actuality. (Armstrong (1989) pp. 3-4).
Arguably, a proponent of such a theory faces even more difficulties than Lewis. Not 
only does this theory have the ontological drawbacks of Lewisian modal realism, but 
it must also provide an account o f  that in virtue of which this world is actual, and not 
some other world. Indeed, on this view, our world might not be actual and we may 
be deluded in thinking that it is. It must also account for the fact that it seems to 
involve two levels of being: actual existence and merely possible existence.
1 he indexical theory of actuality and genuine modal realism can be prized 
apart from one another. Opponents of genuine modal realism can adopt the indexical 
theory of actuality, with all its attendant pragmatic benefits. One might object that, 
as a theory for illuminating modal expressions of ordinary language, the indexical 
theory of actuality is effectively rendered useless without the notion of possible 
worlds. Arguably it would be rendered ineffectual without the notion of possible 
worlds, but we can employ the notion without admitting their concrete existence.
1 1 2
We simply need to find some ontologically benign substitute for Lewis' possible 
worlds. There are a number of alternative theories of modality which employ the 
notion of possible worlds, but which stop short of recognizing their concrete 
existence. For example, those who espouse what Lewis calls ersatz modal realism 
take possible worlds to be abstract entities that represent ways this world might have 
been. They have been construed as, among other .things, maximal consistent sets of 
sentences (Stalnaker (1976)), as true stories (Adams (1974)) and as idealized 
representational pictures. An alternative account of the nature of possible worlds is 
given by Armstrong (1989), who suggests that we should see possible worlds as 
useful fictions, veiy much like the notion of the ideal gas, the average family or the 
economic man.9 We can usefully employ these notions, distinguish true from false 
statements about them, yet there is no need or reason to postulate their very 
existence. I do not mean to take up any particular one of these theories of modality,
I merely wish to point out that there exist more palatable alternatives to Lewisian 
modal realism.
The fact that the two components of his theory can be divorced from one 
another in this way will not deter Lewis from retaining modal realism. He has 
presented a substantial number of arguments against the various alternative accounts 
of possible worlds, which suggests he has no intention of giving up his own 
conception of modal realism in favour of such a theory. In fact, it is more likely to 
be the case that his primary commitment is to modal realism, from which he takes an 
indexical account of actuality to follow:
This makes actuality a relative matter: every world is actual at itself,
and thereby all worlds are on a par.... The 'actual at' relation between
worlds is simply identity.... Given my acceptance of the plurality of
worlds, the relativity is unavoidable. I have no tenable alternative.
(Lewis (1986) p. 93).
Lewis will still adopt modal realism, even though it is not entailed by the indexical 
theory of actuality, believing it to have, on balance, greater pragmatic value than any 
competing alternative account of modality, or any alternative account of the nature
Other proponents o f modal ficlionalism include M enzics and Pettit (1994) and Rosen
(1990).
of a possible world. However, 1 believe that genuine modal realism faces a serious 
problem.
Lewis claims to offer us a completely reductive analysis of modality. He 
maintains that it is a positive advantage of his account that it leaves no unanalyzed 
modal primitives awaiting explanation. Bearing this in mind, let us examine how he 
accounts for the modal notion of impossibility. Nathan Salmon argues that 'whatever 
grounds there may be for believing that there really are possible worlds yield the 
same, or related reasons for believing that there are impossible worlds' (Salmon 
(1984) p. 116). Margery Bedford Naylor (1986) and Takashi Yagisawa (1988) have 
argued that Lewis' own arguments for possible worlds, if successful, work mutatis 
mutandis for impossible worlds. However, Lewis refuses to include impossible 
worlds among his plurality o f  worlds. William G. Lycan (1991a) has argued that, 
this being so, Lewis' concept of a world, of which he espouses a plurality, invokes a 
modally primitive notion.
Lycan's reasoning is that if an argument for the existence o f  a possible world 
yields an equally good argument for the existence of an impossible world, then his 
rejection of impossible worlds and retention of possible worlds depends on our 
antecedent understanding o f the notion of'possible'. The concept of a possible world 
is itself dependent on an unanalyzed modality. This is a serious problem for Lewis 
because he claims to offer us a completely reductive analysis of modality if only we 
will accept his plurality o f  worlds. He urges that this is what makes his theory 
superior to any ersatz modal realism, because the latter theories must retain some 
modal notion as primitive. If, however, it turns out that his theory too retains a 
modal notion as primitive, then, ontologically, we ought to reject his theory.10
Richard B. Miller defends Lewis by offering the following as a definition of 
'world' that supposedly appeals to no modal primitive:
(1) Individuals are worldmates if they are spatiotemporally related.
(2) A world is a mereological sum of worldmates. (Miller (1989) p. 477).
Lycan responds:
1 13
Rosenberg (1989) has also argued that Lewis' modal realism is either ungraspable, or it 
reduces to ersatz modal realism, or it covertly relies on modal notions and so its explanations are 
circular.
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Since nothing but the impossibility of round square cupolas in the first 
place keeps a round square cupola from being spatiotemporally 
related to another, perhaps less exotic object, Miller's Lewis would 
not be able to rule out worlds containing round square cupolas.
(Lycan (1991b) p. 212).
Miller is not convinced:
'Round square cupola1 purports to be a description of a possible 
object, but it is not. It is a contradictory description and so describes 
nothing. Hence it describes no individual. Hence it describes no 
individual having spatiotemporal relations. Hence it describes no 
worldmate. So there is no need to amend the definition o f  world to 
limit worlds to possible worldmates. (Miller (1993) p. 159).
I submit that Miller's response does not succeed in overturning Lycan's 
objection. He claims that 'round square cupola' does not describe a possible object 
because it is a contradictory description. What does Miller mean by 'contradictory' in 
this context'-’ Perhaps he means that it is not possible for any individual to possess 
both of these properties at the same time. If so, then he has failed to find a non- 
modal reason for excluding impossible objects, and hence impossible worlds from the 
modal landscape. Miller anticipates this response and defends his use of the term 
'contradictory':
Genuine modal realism provides the resources to define 
'contradictory' without the primitive modal operator. We require only 
quantification over worlds and define 'contradictory' as false in every 
world. (Miller (1993) p. 160).
At this point I contend that Miller has led the argument full circle without ultimately 
defeating the objection. 'Contradictory' means false in every world simply because 
Miller and Lewis reject the existence of impossible worlds. I f  there were any 
impossible worlds, then 'contradictory' would have to be defined as 'true in some 
impossible world'. Miller and Lewis must reject the existence of impossible worlds 
because their stipulation that worlds are concrete, physical things prevents there 
being any impossible ones. However, this rejection of impossible worlds is based on
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the prior distinction between possible and impossible - a modal distinction. I 
conclude that there is an inherent circularity in Lewis' genuine modal realism because 
he cannot eliminate modally primitive notions from the account, while claiming to 
provide a completely reductive analysis of the modalities. This difficulty, taken 
together with the extreme ontological disvalue of genuine modal realism, renders it a 
highly problematic account of modality.
The difficulties I have identified with Lewis' modal realism are at least 
twofold. First of all, the pragmatic value of Lewis' theory as a whole derives largely 
from its association with the indexical theory of actuality together with some notion 
of possible worlds over which one can quantify. However, as it turns out, one can 
adopt these highly illuminating aspects of Lewis' position without having to take on 
board his genuine modal realism. The indexical theory of actuality is what one might 
call a promiscuous theory, able to attach itself to any coherent account of the nature 
of a possible world. Given any such coherent account, we can also quantify over 
possible worlds thus retaining these two important benefits, but dispensing with the 
drawback of a plurality of genuine worlds.
Lewis himself does not agree with that conclusion. He believes that the 
alternative accounts of possible worlds, on balance, run into more problems than 
does his own account of them. He asks us to grit our teeth and embrace an ontology 
o f genuine possible worlds. It is worth it, he tells us, for only by doing so can we 
achieve a completely reductive analysis of modality. However, the Miller-Lycan 
problem reveals that it is only apparently completely reductive. There are primitive 
modalities hidden away among those possible worlds. On the whole then, I choose 
to reject genuine modal realism. However, it remains to be seen whether I can 
consistently do so while retaining a tenseless and token-reflexive account of time.
4. 7 Token-Reflexivity and Real Times
Earlier in this paper it became clear that there are reasons to suppose that a 
tenseless token-reflexive theoiy of time is closely analogous to Lewis' genuine modal 
realism. In the previous section I identified some serious problems for the latter 
theory. My task in this section is to consider whether the problems that infected 
Lewis' theoiy have temporal analogues that do analogous damage to the tenseless 
token-reflexive theory of time.
The first difficulty for Lewis was that the indexical theory of actuality and 
quantification over worlds can both be adopted independently of a genuine ontology 
of possible worlds. These two beneficial aspects of his theory can be prized apart
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from its problematic aspect. Can an indexical account of'now' and 'present', together 
with quantification over times be similarly prized apart from a genuine tenseless 
ontology whereby all times are equally real?
A token-reflexive analysis of tensed sentences appeals to the existence of 
events, times and the temporal relations of precedence, subsequence and 
simultaneity. For the tenseless theory, these temporal relations are constitutive of 
time. Thus, the fact that the token-reflexive analysis of tensed language requires 
their existence gives us reason to suppose that the semantic and the ontological 
aspects of this theory complement each other. However there are at least two tensed 
theories that purport to adopt a token-reflexive analysis of tensed language in 
conjunction with a tensed ontology. These are the theories o f  Quentin Smith and 
E.J. Lowe. The existence o f  these theories suggests that, perhaps a token-reflexive 
analysis of tensed language is not as closely tied to a tenseless ontology, according to 
which all times are equally real, as tenseless theorists would like to think.
Quentin Smith's theory of temporal reality incorporates a token-reflexive 
analysis of tensed language into an ultimately tensed theory of time. He argues that 
tensed sentence tokens have token-reflexive rules of usage, but that this is 
insufficient to ensure the truth of a tenseless theory of time. Indeed, he argues, the 
hypothesis that tensed sentences express non-relational tensed propositions is not 
only consistent with these tenseless rules of usage, but also explains why tensed 
sentences obey them. For example, on this account, a token T of the tensed sentence 
The storm is approaching' is true if and only if both T  and the storm's approach are 
present. That is, they both possess the irreducible, non-token-reflexive property of 
presentness (Smith (1993) p. 98). If these events are both present, it follows that the 
token-reflexive truth conditions of 7 also obtain. That is, T  is simultaneous with the 
storm's approach.
Now, what makes Smith's theory tensed is his inclusion in it of tensed, non­
token-reflexive properties, such as pastness, presentness and futurity. However, 
there is nothing in the token-reflexive analysis of tensed language itself which entails 
the existence of such properties. Independent reasons need to be given to invoke 
their existence. In my view, Quentin Smith's position does not threaten to divorce 
the token-reflexive analysis from a tenseless ontology. Rather, Smith is introducing 
an additional category of temporal entity into his ontology, a move which leaves the 
onus firmly with him to provide justification for it. Furthermore, his account must 
overcome the problems inherent in adopting a tensed ontology that I identified in 
chapters 1 and 3 of this thesis. 1 hat is, Smith must defeat McTaggart's argument for
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the conclusion that real tense is inherently self-contradictory. He must also provide 
an account of how the notions of past, present and future can coherently be thought 
o f  as properties, together with an account of how the existence o f such properties is 
consistent with the notion of temporal becoming. In chapter 3 I argued that the 
possibility of providing such accounts seems remote.
The theory espoused by E.J. Lowe purports to accommodate the token- 
reflexivity of tensed sentences. Lowe offers token-reflexive truth conditions for 
tensed sentences that relate utterances to the events they are about according to the 
temporal relations of 'earlier than', 'later than' and 'simultaneous with'. However, 
what makes Lowe's theory tensed is that the times at which these events occur, and 
between which these relations obtain, are A series times rather than B series times. 
As he remarks in his (1993) 'I don't believe that times can ultimately be specified in 
purely tenseless terms,' (p. 173). As I noted earlier, the ontological requirements of 
the token-reflexive analysis of tensed language are that times, events and temporal 
relations exist. Lowe's theory, it seems, fulfils those requirements, leaving nothing 
out and smuggling nothing additional in to the ontological inventory. The token- 
reflexive analysis requires the existence of times, but it is silent as to the requisite 
nature of those times. It seems that there is nothing to prevent Lowe from adopting 
the token-reflexive analysis in conjunction with an ontology of A series times. Just 
as the ersatz modal realists are free to adopt the indexical theory of actuality in 
conjunction with their own account of the nature of possible worlds, so Lowe, it 
seems, is free to adopt the token-reflexive analysis of tensed language together with 
his own account of the nature of times.
Lowe's theory seems so similar to the tenseless token-reflexive theory of 
time, that one is tempted to ask why he advocates the reality of the A series rather 
than the B series. What is the point of maintaining that the A series is real? The 
point is, of course, to support the claim that there is a real, non-relational distinction 
between the past, present and future. To attest the reality of this distinction is not 
merely to recognize a semantic distinction, but to hold that there is a real, ontological 
disparity between what can truly be described as past, present and future. The belief 
that there is such an ontological distinction is sometimes thought to underlie the 
intuition that the future does not exist as the present and the past do. Indeed, Lowe 
admits to recognizing some such distinction when he says:
Unlike the definite description 'the past', the definite description 'the
future' is non-denoting, by virtue of the fact that there are (barring
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determinism) many possible futures, no one of which is ontologically
privileged, but only one (actual) past. (Lowe (1993) p. 173).
It seems to me that there is nothing in the token-reflexive analysis of tensed 
language that would support the existence of such an ontological asymmetry. 
Indeed, it is arguable that the token-reflexive theory requires the reality of all times. 
If a future tense sentence has truth conditions that relate the present utterance to the 
future event that it is about, then the fulfilment of those truth conditions arguably 
requires the existence of that future event to stand in that temporal relation. I submit 
that Lowe must supplement his theory in the following way. He must provide 
independent support for the ontological asymmetry between past, present and future, 
together with arguments to the effect that the token-reflexive analysis is consistent 
with such an asymmetry. Furthermore, he too must overcome arguments such as 
McTaggart's for the conclusion that real tense is inherently self-contradictory. 
Hence, I contend, Lowe's position is similar to that of Smith's. Each of them has yet 
to prove that the token-reflexive analysis is consistent with a tensed ontology. 
However, its ontological requirements show that it is most naturally associated with 
a tenseless ontology.
In the preceding discussions I do not claim to have defeated either Smith's 
theory or Lowe's. What I hope to have shown is that, unlike Lewis' opponents, these 
two theorists have not managed to drive a wedge between the semantic aspect of the 
tenseless token-reflexive theory and its ontological conclusions. What they have 
both done is to attempt to supplement the ontological commitments of the token- 
reflexive analysis with additional tensed entities. I have argued that there is 
insufficient reason to suppose that temporal ontology is lacking without these 
additional tensed items, and that the onus remains with them to prove that it is.
I intimated above that Lowe's strategy is rather similar to that of the ersatz 
modal realists who argue that they can employ possible worlds discourse while 
offering their own account of the nature of possible worlds. Lowe claims to employ 
a token-reflexive analysis of tensed language while offering his own account o f  the 
nature of times. However, there is a significant difference between these two 
strategies. Ersatz modal realists, as well as other philosophers who employ the 
notion o f possible worlds without admitting their concrete existence, claim that 
possible worlds are not worlds in the sense that this world is. They take worlds to 
be entities of a wholly different kind, for example, maximal consistent sets of 
sentences or useful fictions. I do not think Lowe would maintain that past and future
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times are entities of a wholly different kind from the present time. However, there is 
a theory of the nature of temporal reality that advocates just such a position. It is 
worth taking a look at this position because it has an obvious modal counterpart.
The position with respect to time known as temporal solipsism11 holds that 
only the present exists. As Prior put it:
The present simply is the real considered in relation to two particular 
species of unreality, namely the past and the future. (Prior (1970) p.
245).
The parallel with the modal position known as actualism should be clear. According 
to actualism only one world exists, the actual world, other possible worlds being a 
mere species of unreality. Temporal solipsism has received its fullest treatment to 
date in Le Poidevin (1991). As a theoty of time it poses a potential threat to the 
tenseless token-reflexive theory of time in a way that the theories of Smith and Lowe 
failed to do so. It threatens to drive a wedge between the token-reflexive analysis of 
tensed language and a genuine tenseless ontology. We saw earlier that it is quite 
consistent to adopt an indexical analysis of actuality, such that utterances of'actual' 
refer indexically to the world in which they occur, while holding that, as a matter of 
fact, only one world exists. Similarly, it is quite consistent to adopt an indexical 
analysis of T even if, as a solipsist, one holds that there is only one existent to which 
T ever genuinely refers. Temporal solipsism is able to exploit this feature of 
indexicality, adopting an indexical analysis of 'now' while holding that only the 
present moment genuinely exists. If this theory is genuinely workable, then it 
represents a radical schism between a token-reflexive analysis of tensed language and 
a tenseless ontology.
Temporal solipsism, however, is not a genuine alternative to the tenseless 
token-reflexive theory of time. In his (1991) Le Poidevin issues several decisive 
blows against temporal solipsism, rendering it, in my view, untenable as a theory of 
time. In what follows I will examine one of Le Poidevin's arguments against 
temporal solipsism, which illustrates how this theory actually differs substantially 
from its apparent modal counterpart, actualism.
This position is held by Prior (1970) and Christensen (1993), A similar view is put 
forward by Romney (1978).
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The temporal solipsist is faced with the task of providing a reductionist 
account of instants. Since she maintains that the past and the future are unreal, she 
must either 'regard all talk of past and future instants as contentless, which is absurd,' 
(Le Poidevin (1991) p. 54), or else she must 'reconstrue such talk' (Ibid.). Le 
Poidevin examines various alternative entities which the temporal solipsist may 
choose to identify with past and future instants, but concludes that,
The only remotely plausible reductionist strategy open to him is to 
identify instants with propositions', an instant is the conjunction of 
propositions which would ordinarily be said to be true at that time.
(Ibid.).
Such a propositional theory of instants is quite analogous to that particular brand of 
ersatz modal realism which construes possible worlds as maximal consistent sets of 
sentences. However, the propositional theory of instants faces a serious problem. 
The temporal solipsist takes past and future times to be identical with conjunctions of 
propositions and, according to Le Poidevin, must do so. It follows that she cannot, 
without circularity, hold that times are part o f the content of those propositions. 
Thus, two tokens of the same tensed sentence type uttered at different times must 
express the same proposition. This is because all that differentiates them is the time 
at which they are uttered, but it is not open to the temporal solipsist to invoke this 
difference in order to distinguish them from each other. As Le Poidevin remarks:
On the solipsist's picture, then, different tokens of the same tensed 
type, even when uttered at different times, express the same 
proposition. The consequence is that the very same tensed token 
(e.g. this very inscription of 'Socrates is sitting') can be true at one 
time and false at another. This makes nonsense of tensed assertion.
(Le Poidevin (1991) p. 55).
There is no analogous problem for theories of ersatz modal realism which 
take other possible worlds to be, for example, maximal consistent sets of sentences. 
The very same sentence token can be located at different worlds, under this picture 
of modal reality, and possess different truth-values at some of those worlds. The 
ersatzer does not have to invoke 'occurrence at a world' to distinguish between 
different tokens of the same sentence type. This is because there is nothing
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incoherent in supposing that dillerent tokens of the same type express the same 
proposition in different worlds and yet differ in truth-value in those worlds. Their 
individual truth-values depend on what is the case in the world in which they are 
uttered, which of course, differs from world to world. Consequently, it is perfectly 
coherent to maintain that any two such tokens express the same proposition and yet 
differ from each other in truth-value. All this, in .my view provides more reason to 
let go of the idea of an analogy between time and modality. The 'common sense' 
modal position of actualism has a far-fetched and ultimately untenable temporal 
analogue.
To conclude this section 1 will briefly consider whether the tenseless token- 
reflexive theory of time suffers from a difficulty analogous to the circularity problem 
that infected Lewis' genuine modal realism. Lewis claims to offer a completely 
reductive analysis of modality, although the Miller-Lycan discussion revealed that his 
theory in fact retains the modal distinction between possible and impossible as 
primitive. Lewis is forced to deny the existence of impossible worlds. There is no 
temporal analogue of this problem. Within Lewis' theory there are modal reasons for 
rejecting the existence of impossible worlds. There are no temporal reasons for 
rejecting the existence of non-existent times. Such times might have existed. There 
is no temporal principle which rules out non-existent times, as there is a modal 
principle which Lewis employs to rule out non-existent worlds. Thus, the tenseless 
theory of time does not suffer from the same kind of circularity as Lewis' modal 
realism because, whereas Lewis smuggles irreducibly modal notions into his analysis 
o f  modality, there is nothing irreducibly tensed in the ontology o f the tenseless theory 
o f  time.
To put the point more simply, Lewis claims to offer a completely reductive 
analysis of modal notions in terms of possible worlds discourse. The new tenseless 
theory of time, by contrast, does not claim to offer a completely reductive analysis of 
tense in terms of a tenseless language. The claim of the new tenseless theory of time 
consists merely in an ontological reduction of tense to tenseless relations, but it 
retains tense as an irreducible feature of language and thought. Thus, the new 
tenseless theory of time cannot be charged with claiming to offer a completely 
reductive analysis of tense while retaining irreducibly tensed notions in the account, 
since it does not claim to provide a completely reductive analysis of tense.
An alternative interpretation of a temporal analogue of Lewis' circularity 
problem might be as follows. Lewis' rejection of impossible worlds could be 
construed as a rejection of worlds which are inaccessible from the world of
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utterance, or worlds that are modally disconnected from the world of utterance. 
Furthermore, the arguments of section 4.4 of this chapter showed that Lewis is 
forced to deny the existence of such worlds, but he has no real, non-modal 
justification for rejecting them. The temporal analogue of the problem construed in 
this way would arise if the tenseless theory of time is forced to reject the existence of 
times which are temporally disconnected from the time of utterance, while having no 
justification for rejecting such times. However, the possibility o f  the existence of 
temporal series which are temporally disconnected from each other is not an 
incoherent one. Indeed, there is a sense in which the existence of this possibility 
supports the tenseless theory of time over the tensed theory.
If there exists more than one temporal series, each temporally disconnected 
from the others, then it is conceptually coherent to conceive of the events and times 
within those series being temporally related to each other by the tenseless relations of 
precedence, subsequence and simultaneity. However, it is not easy to make sense of 
the distinction between past, present and future applying to those series. This is 
because, arguably, one needs to be temporally located within a temporal series in 
order coherently to apply the concepts of past, present and future to the events and 
times of that series. Thus, one cannot coherently apply the concepts of past, present 
and future to a temporal series that is temporally disconnected from the temporal 
series in which one is located. This supports the conclusion that the concepts of 
past, present and future are not intrinsic to a temporal series, but merely dependent 
on one's being temporally located within it. By contrast, the temporal relations of 
'earlier than', 'later than' and 'simultaneous with' are, arguably, intrinsic to a temporal 
series, since their application to such a series is not dependent on one's being located 
within it.12
To sum up the conclusions of this section, I argued that tensed theories such 
as those offered by Lowe and Smith do not threaten to divorce the token-reflexive 
analysis of tensed language from a tenseless ontology in the same way that 
alternative accounts of modality can divorce possible worlds discourse from an 
ontology of genuine modal realism. Temporal solipsism offered, at first sight, a more 
palpable threat to the tenseless theory of time, since it is capable of adopting the
In his (1996) Lc Poidevin argues that the possibility o f disunified time is harder to 
reconcile with the tensed theory o f time than with the tenseless theory o f time. Currie (1992) 
provides further support for this conclusion by arguing that the events in a fictional time series, and 
thus in a time series temporally disconncclcd from our own, are ordered by temporal relations, but 
do not have tenses.
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token-reflexive analysis of tensed language in conjunction with an ontology in which 
only the present exists. However, I argued, with Le Poidevin, that temporal 
solipsism is ultimately untenable as a theory of time. Finally I considered whether 
the circularity problem that infected Lewis' account of modality had a temporal 
analogue that might undermine the tenseless theory of time. I argued that, under one 
possible account of such an analogy, there is no problem generated for the tenseless 
theory of time. Under another possible account the temporal analogue generated, far 
from being incoherent, actually supports the tenseless theory, while creating serious 
problems for the tensed theory.
4.8 Conclusion
It seems at first sight that there is a compelling analogy between genuine 
modal realism and the tenseless token-reflexive theory of time. A consideration of 
some earlier attempts to undermine any such analogy showed that they failed, thus 
giving us more reason to suppose that the analogy is robust. For a tenseless theorist 
who did not wish to be compelled, by parity of reasoning, to adopt genuine modal 
realism, things were looking grim. I then examined an attempt to construct a modal 
analogue of McTaggart's paradox, and concluded that it failed. Hence, one route 
towards the adoption of a tenseless ontology did not yield an analogous modal path 
towards Lewis' genuine ontology of possible worlds. A detailed analysis of Lewis' 
position revealed that his indexical theory of actuality does not entail, nor is it 
entailed by his possible worlds ontology. These two elements of his theory can be 
prized apart. For those who endorse the indexicality of actuality, but reject a 
plurality of worlds, this is good news, but Lewis himself continues to endorse the 
plurality of worlds. It then became clear that genuine modal realism fails in its quest 
to provide a completely reductive analysis of modality, because its treatment of the 
notion of impossibility reveals that primitive modal notions are retained within the 
account. All this is reason enough for me to reject Lewis' genuine modal realism. It 
remained for me to consider whether these lines of thought spawned analogous 
reasons to reject the tenseless theory of time.
I examined the theories of Smith and Lowe which purport to combine a 
token-reflexive analysis of tensed language with a tensed ontology. Neither theory 
managed to divorce token-reflexivity from a tenseless ontology. Instead, they sought 
to introduce additional tensed items into their temporal ontology. In each case more 
argument is needed to accept the existence of such items. Temporal solipsism 
initially appeared to pose more of a threat to the tenseless ontology, with its ability to
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combine a token-reflexive analysis with the ontological position that only the present 
exists. The arguments of Le Poidevin proved this position to be untenable. Finally I 
examined whether tenseless time suffers from an analogous circularity problem to 
that which infects Lewis' modal realism, and concluded that it does not.
In conclusion, I admit that the analogy between these two theories appeared 
cogent, but I have argued that this was only an appearance of cogency. Proponents 
of the tenseless token-reflexive theory of time do not find themselves unwittingly 
committed by analogy to the concrete existence of a plurality o f  worlds.
Chapter 5
T e n s e l e s s  T e m p o r a l  A s y m m e t r y  a n d  t h e  D ir e c t io n  o f  T im e
The metaphysical implications of the new tenseless token-reflexive theory of 
time are that there is no ontological asymmetry between past, present and future, and 
that temporal becoming is not a constituent of temporal reality. Since, according to 
this theory, all times are equally real, and time does not flow in one direction, the 
question naturally arises as to whether it can adequately account for the claim that 
time has a direction. In this chapter I will examine the nature of the claim that time 
has a direction, and assess various interpretations of what it has been taken to mean. 
I will then undertake a conceptual analysis of some of the key concepts employed in 
making claims about the direction of time. I will then consider whether the tensed 
and the tenseless theories of time have the necessary conceptual equipment to 
account satisfactorily for the notion of the direction of time.
5.1 What Do We Mean By 'The Direction o f  Time'?
There seem to be many aspects of our own temporal existence which suggest 
that there is a sense in which time has a direction. For example, our knowledge of 
the past seems to be significantly greater than our knowledge of the future. We have 
memories that enable us to recall events and states of affairs from earlier times but 
not from later times. We see traces of the past all around us, but never traces of the 
future. We make decisions and undertake actions that are intended to, and indeed 
sometimes do, affect the future, but there seems to be something mildly absurd about 
acting in order to affect the past. Furthermore, we seem to care more about what 
will happen to us in the future than about what has happened. For example, I am 
more concerned about a forthcoming driving test than I am about one that I have 
already failed; we generally hope that the good times are ahead and not behind us. In 
these and other ways our experience of time appears to be, at the very least, 
asymmetric. Does this provide us with sufficient grounds to conclude that time has a 
direction?
Discussions of the direction of time have often focused on the existence of 
temporal asymmetries in the world around us. For example, the order of cause and 
effect in the world appears to be temporally biased in that effects never seem to 
precede their causes. In addition, although the laws of nature are theoretically time-
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symmetric,1-2 the temporal inverses of many processes never occur in nature. For 
example, an oak tree never decreases in size until finally becoming an acorn. Do 
these time-biased physical phenomena provide us with sufficient grounds for 
concluding that time has a direction?
There is yet another feature of time that seems to provide evidence of a 
marked asymmetry with respect to the past and .the future. I refer here to the 
pervasive phenomenological feeling that we 'move through time in the direction of 
the future', or, to put it another way, the impression that time 'flows' past us. If time 
flows, and flows in one direction only, then arguably there is a clear sense in which 
time has a direction.3 The expressions we use to convey this temporal 
phenomenological feature are clearly metaphorical, at least to a certain extent, and I 
have argued in chapter 3 that they must be understood as wholly metaphorical. 
However, these metaphorical expressions convey a truth of some kind about the 
nature of our temporal experience. Whatever the precise nature of that truth, and of 
the underlying temporal facts, it is clear that this phenomenological feeling remains 
an aspect of our experience. Furthermore, it is an aspect of our experience that leads 
us to talk of there being a fundamental asymmetry between the direction of time into 
the past, and the direction of time into the future.4 There is a need to examine the 
features of temporal reality that lead us to draw such conclusions. Does time itself 
exhibit a fundamental asymmetry between its two directions; that into the past and 
that into the future, or does this asymmetry originate from the way in which we 
experience events in time? I have argued in chapter 3 that it is simply incoherent to 
suppose that time flows in any real sense. However, it seems pertinent to ask what
1 According to Gardner (1979), there are certain anomalous, weak interactions that have
occurred in laboratory conditions that 'can go only one way' (p. 240), and are thus genuinely time- 
asymmetric. However, it has not been suggested that these irreversible phenomena could be the 
underlying basis for the 'arrow o f time'. Furthermore, despite the existence o f these phenomena, the 
basic laws o f  nature remain timc-svmmclric.
Further on in this chapter, a discussion o f Earman (1969) w ill reveal that the laws o f  
nature can be time-symmetric in at least two different ways.
3 McGilvray (1979) argues that the claim that time has a direction provides support for the 
tensed view that time flows.
4 In the current discussion I have referred to the idea that time has a unique direction, and to 
the idea that time has two distinct directions, that into the past, and that into the future. These two 
notions need to be disambiguated. Clearly, by defining one direction o f  anything one thereby 
defines its converse, so one will always be able to identify two distinct directions. For example, one 
can pick out one direction along the M l motorway, the direction towards Leeds, but by identifying 
this direction, one is thereby able to pick out its converse, the direction towards London. However, 
our intuitions concerning time's direction lead us to question whether time has a unique direction. 
By asking this question we arc clTcctivcly asking whether one o f  time's directions is more 
important, or is o f more interest to us than its converse.
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gives rise to our apparent phenomenological experience of the flow of time, and 
whether the basis of this experience can provide us with sufficient grounds to 
conclude that time has a direction.
The preceding discussion has illustrated that there is at least an intuitive sense 
in which one would assent to the claim that 'time has a direction'. However, it is far 
from clear precisely what is meant or entailed by such a claim. There do indeed seem 
to be many temporal phenomena that systematically exhibit a preference for one of 
the directions of time over the other. However, it is unclear precisely what 
information this provides us with about the nature of time itself. In addition, there 
are many metaphors and truisms that express our intuition that 'time has a direction', 
but again, it is unclear just what underlies this intuition. Indeed, does the question of 
whether or not time has a direction have a clear and unequivocal meaning?
I maintain that there is a great deal of conceptual confusion and lack of 
clarity surrounding the issue of the direction of time. To approach the issue without 
establishing the nature of the questions we are asking; without clarifying the 
distinctions between, say, direction, asymmetry and anisotropy, would be futile. I 
intend to initiate the process of conceptual clarification by examining and analysing 
the key concepts that recur throughout discussions of this issue. I aim to arrive at a 
satisfactory and workable account of the key concepts, together with some 
suggestions as to possible accounts of the underlying basis of the intuition that 'time 
has a direction'. I will then proceed to ask how the tensed and tenseless theories of 
time might incorporate these concepts into their overall account of temporal reality. 
In addition, I will consider how each theory might approach the problem of 
accounting for the underlying basis of the intuitive 'direction of time'.
5.2 A Conceptual Analysis
5.2.1 A symmetry
The concept of asymmetry, broadly speaking, implies non-conformity or 
incommensurability between the parts of a substance or a system. This preliminary 
attempt at capturing the essence of this concept is necessarily vague and ill-defined, 
since the concept of asymmetry applies in different ways to the many different kinds 
of entity to which it is genuinely applicable. I intend to examine the various 
applications of the concept of asymmetry, to establish the connections between them, 
and to consider the results they might yield when applied to time.
A core application of the concept of asymmetry is in geometrical contexts. 
An object, a figure, or a dimension is asymmetric about a median plane, line or point
if its parts fail to correspond metrically to each other with reference to that median. 
Clearly, this geometric application of the concept of asymmetry applies primarily in 
spatial rather than temporal contexts. A three-dimensional object is asymmetric if it 
has no plane of symmetry as described above. Similarly, a two-dimensional figure 
can be asymmetric about a median line, as described above, but this too is a spatial 
application of the concept of asymmetry. However, it is also possible for a one­
dimensional series of figures, or one dimension of an object or figure to be 
asymmetric in this respect about a median point. Could there be a temporal analogue 
of this one-dimensional asymmetry?
A series of figures along one spatial dimension is asymmetric if its parts fail 
to correspond metrically to each other with reference to a median point. The 
temporal counterpart of a spatial point is most naturally conceived as an instant or 
moment.5 Thus, the temporal counterpart of this kind of asymmetry would be a 
series of temporal items whose parts fail to correspond metrically to each other 
about a median instant. This sounds plausible as a basis for providing an account of 
the way in which time could be thought to be asymmetric, but there is a problem. If 
we are considering whether time itself is asymmetric, which temporal item 
constitutes the median instant?
A natural response to this question may be to suggest that the present 
moment should be taken as the median, since it is generally taken to be the moment 
that divides the past from the future. However, this response relies on one's having 
adopted a tensed theory of time. The tenseless theory denies that there is any 
ontological significance to the attribution of presentness to a moment of time. Thus, 
if no moment is objectively present, we are unable to use this criterion to pick out an 
instant as the median instant about which the asymmetry or otherwise of time can be 
established. A tensed theory would be able to employ this criterion, but according to 
the tensed theory the attribution of presentness is constantly shifting to later and later 
moments. According to this criterion therefore, the median instant is constantly 
changing from one instant to the next. Thus, we are unable to specify a unique 
instant as the median instant, since each instant successively becomes the median as it 
becomes present.
In order to avoid this difficulty, a proponent of the tensed theory might adjust 
the question so that, instead of asking 'Is time asymmetric in this geometric sense?',
This discussion in terms o f 'instants' and 'moments' does not commit me either to a 
substantival or a relational conception of time. In the same way, talking o f  spatial points docs not 
commit one cither to a substantival or a relational conception o f spacc.
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she asks 'Is time asymmetric now in this geometric sense?'. It seems to me that this 
question avoids one difficulty at the expense of facing another. We are concerned to 
establish whether time is asymmetric simpliciter, not whether it is asymmetric at a 
certain moment of time. However, I shall pursue the question for the sake of 
completeness. Having identified a moment, the present moment, as the median point 
of the temporal dimension, the question now arises: do the parts of the temporal 
dimension correspond metrically to each other about that median? This is equivalent 
to asking whether the past corresponds metrically to the future. Consequently it is a 
question concerning the temporal extensions of the past and the future, and whether 
they correspond to each other. It is my contention that, although this is an important 
issue in itself, concerning as it does the existence of the past and the future, and the 
notions of the beginning and end o f time, it is not the issue we are aiming to clarify in 
discussions of the direction of time.
An alternative approach to the question of whether time is asymmetric in this 
geometrical sense would be to consider whether the concept applies to a finite series 
of events in time. As I pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, many temporal 
processes are asymmetric insofar as there is a significant distinction between the 
earlier and later parts of such processes and insofar as they are not reversible. 
However, it is reasonable to suppose that this tells us more about the asymmetry of 
the sequence of events we have selected for investigation than about the asymmetry 
of time itself. I maintain that any attempt to apply this geometric concept of 
asymmetry to time will be problematic, and will fall short of providing an explanation 
of what we mean by the direction of time. Consequently, our intuition that 'time has 
a direction' is not to be explained by time's exhibiting asymmetry in this geometric 
sense.
There is a logical application of the concept of asymmetry. A relation, R, is 
asymmetric if, for any x and y, if x  stands in R to y, then y  does not stand in R to x. 
In logical notation this can be represented as:
\/x\/y{Rxy —> ~Ryx)
So, for example, comparative relations such as 'larger than', 'wider than' and 'lower 
than' are asymmetric in this sense. If x is larger than_y, then y  is not larger than x. 
According to this application of the concept, asymmetry is a logical property of 
relations. In what way then, might it be possible for time to be asymmetric in this 
sense?
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According to the tenseless theory of time, the temporal relations 'earlier than1 
and 'later than' are constitutive of time itself. Both of these relations are asymmetric 
in the logical sense under discussion.6 If x is earlier thany, thenj; is not earlier than 
x. Conversely, if_y is later than x, x is not later than y. The other logical properties 
that these relations exhibit are transitivity and irreflexivity. A relation, /?, is transitive 
if, for any x, y  and z, if x stands in R to y, and y  stands in R to z, then x stands in R to 
z. This can be represented in logical notation as:
\/xVy\/z((Rxy & Ryz) —> Rxz)
Thus, ifx  is earlier than j; and j '  is earlier than z, then x is earlier than z. A relation, 
R, is irreflexive if, for any x, it is not the case that x stands in R  to itself. 
Symbolically:
Vx ~Rxx
Clearly, nothing is earlier than itself, nor is anything later than itself.
Any relation with the logical properties of transitivity, irreflexivity and 
asymmetry is capable of generating an ordered series. For example, the ordered 
series of natural numbers can be generated by the relation 'greater than', or its 
converse 'less than'. Similarly, any number of non-simultaneous times or events can 
be ordered according to the temporal relation 'earlier than' or its converse 'later than'. 
Since the generating relation of such a series exhibits logical asymmetry, the series 
itself can also be correctly described as asymmetric. Is this, then, the underlying 
basis to the intuition that 'time has a direction'? According to Newton-Smith (1980) 
it is in precisely this sense that time has a direction:
In what follows the term directed order relation will be used to refer 
to any two-place asymmetrical, transitive relation. The statement that 
time has a direction can be construed as the claim that it is 
appropriate in giving the order of things in time (and of temporal
In the following discussion I am making the reasonable assumption that time is not closed. 
If it were, then both of these relations would be symmetrical, i.e. VxVy(Rxy —» Ryx). The question 
o f the logical properties o f temporal relations is closely connected to the question o f the topology o f  
time.
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items) to employ a directed temporal ordering relation. (Newton-
Smith (1980) p. 202).
I would dispute Newton-Smith's claim. If all there is to the notion of the 
direction of time is the fact that the generating relation of a temporal series is 
logically asymmetric and transitive, then, it follows, any other kind of series with a 
logically asymmetric and transitive generating relation must also have a direction in 
the sense in which we intuitively ascribe a direction to time. A group of people 
standing in order according to their height must have a direction in the same sense 
that time has a direction. The natural number series must also have a direction in the 
same sense. The natural number series is logically asymmetric because the 
generating relations 'greater than' and 'less than' are asymmetric. This enables us to 
distinguish between the two directions along this series. We can distinguish between 
the direction from smaller to larger numbers and the direction from larger to smaller 
numbers. However, this does not give us any grounds for picking out one of these 
directions as the direction of the natural number series. Similarly, we can distinguish 
between the direction from earlier to later and the direction from later to earlier, but 
this distinction does not provide us with sufficient grounds for picking out one of 
these directions as the direction of time. I am not disputing that time is asymmetric 
in this logical sense. It may even be the case that this notion is partly constitutive of 
the concept of the direction of time. I am simply disputing the claim that this notion 
is all there is to the concept of the direction of time.
There is a further possible application of the concept of asymmetry to time. 
My initial attempt to capture the essence of asymmetry made reference to non­
uniformity or incommensurability between the parts of a substance or a system. If, 
as the tensed theory would have it, the distinction between past, present and future is 
objectively real, such that there is an ontological distinction between these three 
temporal categories, then it would be the case that time exhibits an ontological 
asymmetry. Clearly, this is one of the main points at issue between tensed and 
tenseless theories, and I have argued in chapter 3 that no such ontological distinction 
exists. It is my position that time is not ontologically asymmetric in this sense. It is 
worth noting that if such a distinction did exist, it would follow automatically that 
time was asymmetric in this sense.
However, the supposition that past, present and future are ontologically 
distinct would not, I submit, provide grounds for assigning a direction to time. 
Unicorns and horses are ontologically distinct in that the former do not exist while
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the latter do. As such, there is an ontological asymmetry between them, yet this has 
no connection with the concept of direction. If the tensed theory is capable of 
accounting for the direction of time it is more likely to be as a result of the doctrine 
of temporal becoming, according to which time 'flows' in one direction. The 
supposition of ontological asymmetry between past, present and future alone is 
incapable of accounting for the direction of time. I will argue shortly that the 
doctrine of temporal becoming is equally incapable of grounding the direction of 
time.
I have distinguished three different senses of the concept of asymmetry. 
Geometrical asymmetry is primarily a spatial concept. The only sense in which it 
might plausibly apply to time yields questions of whether past and future are finite or 
infinite in extent. This application of the concept of asymmetry offers no 
clarification of the notion of time's direction. Time exhibits logical asymmetry 
insofar as the temporal relations 'earlier than' and 'later than' are logically 
asymmetric. This fact has some bearing on time's direction in that it enables us to 
distinguish between the direction from earlier to later and that from later to earlier, 
but it fails to account completely for the direction of time. It gives us no grounds for 
picking out one of these directions as the direction of time. I have argued that there 
is more to the direction of time than mere logical asymmetry. Finally, I considered 
the tensed supposition that time exhibits ontological asymmetry. I argued that even 
if this application of the concept of asymmetry were genuinely applicable to time, it 
would not be sufficient to account for the direction of time.
This discussion of the concept of asymmetry has shown that there is a 
connection between asymmetry and direction. However, the relationship is not 
straightforward. Not everything that exhibits asymmetry, under any of its 
interpretations, thereby has a direction. It is my belief that this complex relationship 
is partly responsible for the widespread conceptual confusion surrounding the issue 
of the direction of time. Similarly, the concept of direction has also been confused 
with that of anisotropy. In what follows I will examine this latter concept to see 
what light it sheds on the issue of the direction of time.
5.2.2 Anisotropy
To be isotropic is to have uniform physical properties in all directions. To be 
anisotropic is therefore to have non-uniform or different physical properties in 
different directions. The concept of anisotropy is thus closely connected to at least 
one interpretation of the concept of direction. It has already been established that
the logical asymmetry of the temporal relations enables us to distinguish between the 
two directions of time. It is now necessary to establish whether the two directions of 
time differ from each other in their physical properties. This, in itself, is a question 
not without ambiguity. What sort of physical properties does time possess?
It is possible that this question is concerned with time's topological 
properties, and whether they differ along each of time's directions. For example, if 
time has a branching topology, then that would suggest that time differs significantly 
along each of its directions, and therefore that time is anisotropic. However, even if 
time does exhibit anisotropy in this sense, it is not clear that this is the sense in which 
time has a direction. Discussions of the anisotropy of time usually focus on physical 
processes that are irreversible. There are many physical processes that occur along 
the temporal direction earlier to later, but which never occur along the temporal 
direction later to earlier. I intend to examine the significance of this for the 
anisotropy, or for the direction of time.
Grunbaum (1964) discusses the anisotropy of time. Earman (1969) 
summarizes Grunbaum's position as follows:
Time is anisotropic if and only if the 'directions' of the sequence of 
states of the world ordered by the relation of temporal betweenness 
are distinguished by the structural property that some kinds of 
sequences encountered along one direction are not encountered along 
the other. (Earman (1969) p. 277).
Grunbaum here identifies the relation of temporal betweenness as the fundamental 
temporal ordering relation. This relation is not logically asymmetric in the same way 
that 'earlier than' and 'later than' are asymmetric. If an event, y, occurs between 
events x and z, then it is consistent with this that the events occur in the order xyz or 
in the order zyx. Grunbaum thus takes as basic a temporal relation that does not 
distinguish between the two directions of time. He then stipulates that the 
anisotropy of time is to be determined by the sequences of events that occur along 
the two directions of time. This suggests that, if time is anisotropic it is merely as a 
result of the anisotropy of physical processes that take place in the world.
Earman (1969) offers an interpretation of Grunbaum's claim:
A fair restatement of Grunbaum's position would seem to be: time is 
anisotropic if and only if there are kinds of physical processes that
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occur in nature but whose temporal inverses do not occur. (Earman 
(1969) p. 277).
Thus, according to Griinbaum, all that is required in order for us to conclude 
that time is anisotropic is the existence of certain processes, the temporal inverses of 
which do not occur in nature. For example, if someone drops a bone china tea cup 
so that it hits a hard surface, it is highly likely that the tea cup will shatter into many 
pieces. Flowever, one never observes many fragments o f  bone china simultaneously 
leaping off a hard surface and coming together to form a tea cup. Thus, we have a 
physical process that is quite familiar, but whose temporal inverse fails to occur in 
nature. This, for Grtinbaiim, is sufficient to establish the anisotropy o f time.
Earman argues, successfully I think, that such de facto irreversible processes 
are insufficient to establish the anisotropy of time. His reason is that de facto 
irreversible processes, and even low level nomological irreversibilities can be 
explained by more fundamental laws. The pertinent question then becomes, 'do the 
fundamental laws of nature exhibit anisotropy, thereby giving us reason to conclude 
that time is anisotropic?'. Earman offers a spatial analogy to support his claim that 
the question of anisotropy should be directed at fundamental laws of nature rather 
than mere de facto processes:
One feels that the low level biological law that 'Most humans have 
their heart on the left side' does not establish anything about the 
handedness of space since one believes (or hopes, if you will) that 
such low level laws can be explained from more fundamental laws 
and initial conditions and that the more fundamental laws do not 
show any preference for right or left. (Earman (1969) p. 291).
Earman's own position is that time is anisotropic if and only if the 
fundamental laws of nature are not symmetric with respect to time. However, he 
distinguishes two senses in which laws can be 'time-symmetric'. They can either be 
invariant under time reversal or invariant under the interchange of the roles of earlier 
and later in the expression of those laws. The first kind of time-symmetry is best 
expressed as follows: '-/ can be substituted for / in the statement of any basic law and 
the law remains as applicable to the world as before; it describes something nature 
can do' (Gardner (1979) p. 240). The second kind of time-symmetry would require 
that the roles of'earlier than' and 'later than' could be interchanged with each other in
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the sentences expressing the laws of nature, and the resulting sentences would 
express the same laws. For example, if C is a consequence of law L, and C' is 
obtained from C by interchanging the roles of earlier and later,7 we must ask whether 
C' is equally a consequence of L. If C  is a consequence of L, then L is invariant 
under the interchange of roles of earlier and later. If C' is not a consequence o f  L, 
then L is not invariant under the interchange of roles of earlier and later. Earman 
argues that, while the fundamental laws of nature are invariant under time reversal, 
they are not invariant under the interchange of roles of earlier and later. He uses this 
distinction to lay to rest the commonly stated 'puzzle':
The universe seems asymmetric with respect to past and future in a 
very deep and non-accidental way, and yet all the laws of nature are 
purely time-symmetric. So where can the asymmetry come from17 
(Earman (1969) p. 282).
Earman resolves the puzzle by pointing out that, while the laws of nature are time- 
symmetric insofar as they are invariant under time reversal, they are not invariant 
under the interchange of roles of earlier and later. The implication of this is that this 
latter kind of time-asymmetry is responsible for our sense that the universe is 
asymmetric in a 'deep and non-accidental way'. Thus, the fact that the laws of nature 
are symmetric as a result of being invariant under time reversal does not conflict so 
directly with our sense of the universe's past-future asymmetry. This concurs with 
Horwich's (1987) position according to which all the empirical evidence points to the 
conclusion that 'our fundamental physical theories do not incorporate a time bias' 
(Horwich (1987) p. 55). This leads Horwich to conclude that 'time itself has no 
intrinsic directionality or asymmetry' (Horwich (1987) p. 12).
I believe that Earman's distinction between the two kinds of temporal 
invariance of physical laws is highly revealing. The laws of nature are invariant 
under time reversal, so under this interpretation of temporal asymmetry, the laws of 
nature can tell us nothing about the direction of time. However, in the statements 
that express laws of nature, we cannot exchange occurrences of the relation 'earlier 
than' with occurrences of the relation 'later than', and vice versa, without
Earman notes that 'The interchange is not accomplished simply by replacing every explicit 
occurrence of earlier by later and vicc versa, but by also making appropriate changes in expressions 
that implicitly rely on these relations; e.g. 'moves from P to O' is replaced by 'moves from 0  to P'\ 
reference to a state .v is replaced by reference to the reversed state sJ<, etc.' (Earman (1967) p. 548n).
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fundamentally altering what has been expressed. As we saw above, Earman believes 
that it is this feature of laws of nature that underlies our profound sense of there 
being a past-future asymmetry. Thus, it seems, if the laws of nature are to tell us 
anything about the direction of time, it is only as a result of the occurrence in the 
statements of those laws of the temporal relations of earlier and later. The peculiar 
features of these temporal relations are responsible for the anisotropy of time under 
Earman's interpretation of that concept. We have already seen that these relations 
are logically asymmetric, so it is a reasonable supposition that it is the temporal 
relations and their essential characteristics that are the proper focus for a discussion 
of the direction of time.
The ongoing discussion concerning the anisotropy of time, carried out in 
terms of the symmetry or otherwise of physical laws and physical processes is, no 
doubt, an important one. However, it is my contention that this discussion is not 
central to the question of the direction of time. In the first place, it is no simple 
matter to determine how much time-asymmetric physical processes and laws tell us 
about time, and how much they tell us about, say, bone china and the effects of 
gravity. Furthermore, if the question of time's anisotropy is rightly directed at laws 
of nature rather than de facto asymmetries, then the fact that these laws are time- 
symmetric in at least one sense leaves us without an explanation as to time's 
anisotropy in terms of those laws. Finally, my discussion of Earman (1969) revealed 
that the only sense in which the physical laws of nature may support the notion of 
temporal anisotropy is through the occurrence of the temporal relations of earlier 
and later in the expression of those laws. We have already seen that these relations 
are logically asymmetric. All this suggests to me that the proper focus for an 
investigation into the direction of time is not the concept of anisotropy, nor the fact­
like or law-like physical asymmetries that occur in nature. Rather, it is the temporal 
relations of'earlier than' and 'later than' themselves.
In order to render my conceptual analysis of the relevant concepts complete, 
I will turn next to the concept of direction itself.
5.2.3 Direction
We have already seen some of the ways in which the concepts of asymmetry 
and anisotropy overlap with each other and with the concept of direction. In this 
section I intend to examine the various possible interpretations of the concept of 
direction, and consider how they might apply to time.
Chapman (1982) identifies three senses of'direction':
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(i) conventional and relational in which sense something is in a 
'northerly' direction or to the left of something else; (ii) the objective 
sense employed in the distinction between vector and scalar 
quantities; (iii) the sense in which a series that exhibits serial order has 
a'direction'. (Chapman ( 1982) p. 87).
I would further subdivide the first sense in the following way. Something can be 
moving in a northerly direction or facing  in a northerly direction. Thus the 
conventional sense of direction can either be connected with the idea of motion, or 
be used to describe the position of a stationary object. Furthermore, when it is 
connected with motion the concept of direction can be associated with ordinary 
spatial motion, where something moves from one place to another, but it can also be 
associated with other kinds of change. Leaves can change from  green to brown; a 
political party can become more right wing, so that it moves in the direction o f  the 
right; an historian might describe England in the eighteenth century as changingyhwz 
an agricultural to an industrial society. These are all legitimate uses of the concept 
of direction in connection with motion or change.
Where the conventional sense of direction is used to describe the position of 
a stationary object, for example, 'the signpost is pointing in a northerly direction', the 
concept of direction is closely associated with the concept of geometrical 
asymmetry, as discussed in section 5.2.1 above. If a three-dimensional object is 
asymmetric, then we can distinguish different parts of it, and say that it 'faces' or 
'points' in one direction rather than another. This stationary sense of direction is also 
involved when we speak of one object being related to another object along a 
specified direction. Thus, 'Leeds is north of London' conveys that Leeds and 
London are spatially related with respect to a given direction. The conventional 
sense of direction can thus be used to describe the position of a stationary object 
relative to another object, with reference to a specified direction.
The second sense of direction identified by Chapman is that used to 
distinguish vector from scalar quantities. In a clear and straightforward sense a 
scalar quantity is one that has magnitude but not direction, such as a given 
temperature. A vector quantity is one that has magnitude and direction, such as a 
given force. Chapman remarks that:
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The only sense of 'has a direction' which is clearly distinct from 'is 
asymmetric' is the second one mentioned above and it appears to be 
fairly clear that in this sense time does not have a direction at all. 
(Chapman (1982) p. 88).
I am happy to concur with Chapman on this point. The distinction between vector 
and scalar quantities is a fairly specialized notion, and I believe that there is sufficient 
conceptual equipment in the first and third senses of direction to enable me to 
provide a satisfactory account of the sense in which time has a direction.
The third sense of'direction' identified by Chapman is that in which a series 
that exhibits serial order has a direction. We have already seen that 'earlier than' and 
'later than' are asymmetric, transitive and irreflexive, and that they are capable of 
generating a series. Furthermore, any series so generated will be asymmetric insofar 
as there is a basis for distinguishing each of its directions from the other. Hence, a 
series generated by the temporal relations 'earlier than' and 'later than' possesses 
direction in the third sense identified by Chapman. Thus, in Chapman's third sense of 
'direction', a series of times has a direction in virtue of the logical properties of the 
generating relations 'earlier than' and 'later than'. However, as Chapman points out 
with respect to a series of numbers generated by the relation 'less than',
They increase from left to right, so one might assign the direction
with an arrow.... but it is worth noting that one could equally well
give a reason for drawing the arrow pointing in the opposite 
direction. (Chapman (1982) p. 87).
Thus, as we saw in the discussion of logical asymmetry, a relation which exhibits the 
logical properties of asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity is capable of generating 
a series. Furthermore, those logical properties provide a basis for distinguishing 
between the two directions of any series so generated. However, they do not 
provide a basis for picking out one of these directions as more fundamental than the 
other. Since the temporal relations of 'earlier than' and 'later than' exhibit the 
requisite logical properties, they provide us with a basis for distinguishing between 
the direction from earlier to later and the direction from later to earlier. However, 
they do not provide us with a basis for picking out one or these directions as the 
direction of time.
What connection, if any, is there between Chapman's first and third senses of
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'direction'? The notion of serial direction can clearly be applied to time, and may 
prove explanatory in accounting for the direction of time. The conventional notion 
of direction, however, seems to apply primarily in spatial contexts. In what follows I 
will attempt to identify the connections between these two notions of direction, and 
to establish the relevance of these connections for the notion of the direction of time.
The conventional sense of direction, I argued, has two principal kinds of 
application. It applies in contexts involving motion or change, where the motion or 
change itself is ascribed a direction. It also applies in contexts where no motion is 
involved, in which case it applies either to asymmetrical objects that can be described 
as pointing or facing in a particular direction, or to objects that are spatially related 
with respect to a specified direction. The application of direction to asymmetrical 
objects is closely associated with the notion of geometrical asymmetry. Indeed, I 
would argue that it is necessarily associated with this notion. An object can only be 
described as pointing or facing in a particular direction if it is geometrically 
asymmetric. Since geometric asymmetry is not a concept that can satisfactorily be 
applied to time, insofar as one is concerned to explain the direction of time, I submit 
that this application of direction will not help to clarify the notion of the direction of 
time. The alternative stationary application of the concept of direction in its 
conventional sense is that in which two objects are spatially related to each other and 
that spatial relation is itself ascribed a direction. For example, each of the relations 'x 
is to the north of /  and 'x is to the left o f /  convey that x and y  stand in a spatial 
relation to each other. They also convey that the spatial relation itself is invested 
with a particular direction.
There are thus, two remaining conventional senses of direction that may 
prove explanatory in accounting for the direction of time: that connected with 
motion, and that connected with spatial relations. O f these, the latter is clearly 
related to the notion of serial direction. Serial direction is generated by relations 
with particular logical properties. Do the spatial relations that exhibit direction 
possess the same logical properties (asymmetry, transitivity, irreflexivity)? Clearly, 
the two relations I have picked out for scrutiny, 'being to the left of and 'being to the 
north of, are logically asymmetric, transitive and irreflexive. However, there are 
some crucial differences between these spatial relations which are capable of 
determining direction and the temporal relations 'earlier than' and 'later than'.
According to Black (1959) the spatial relation 'being to the left o f is an 
incomplete relation. By this he means that the truth of a statement 'x is to the left of 
/  cannot be determined without reference to at least one additional object or spatial
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location. This is correct, as far as it goes, since x can be to the left of^y from my 
standpoint, but from the standpoint of someone facing me, x  is to the right of_y. 
However, the temporal relations 'earlier than' and later than are not incomplete in a 
temporally analogous sense. Whether x is to the left o fy  depends on a third spatial 
reference point. Whether x is earlier than>> does not depend on any further temporal 
reference point. If the statement 'x is earlier than y' is true, then it is true no matter 
when it is tokened.
Grunbaum (1964) makes a closely related point concerning the difference 
between 'being to the left of and 'being earlier than. He notes that there is a 
distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic serial order. Earman (1967), commenting 
on this distinction noted by Grunbaum, clarifies it as follows:
The serial order of the points on a line is extrinsic in that it is 
conventional or involves an essential reference to an external 
observer; to give a serial order to the points we must choose two 
reference points P, O and lay down as a matter of convention that, 
say, P is to the left of O, or else we must make some reference to an 
external observer, Jones, and his orientation with respect to the line. 
(Earman (1967) p. 547).
We can conclude from this that the direction exhibited by the spatial relation to the 
left of is extrinsic to the relation itself It is an additional component of the relation 
that is dependent on an external spatial reference point, or on a convention. The 
same is true of the spatial relation 'to the north of. The direction expressed by this 
relation is extrinsic to the relation itself, since it is dependent on an implicit reference 
to an additional spatial location. In order to determine objectively whether x is to 
the north of y, we need to determine which of x and y  is closer to the North Pole. 
This location has been adopted as a conventional reference point, so the direction 
expressed by 'to the north of is a matter of convention. It is thus extrinsic to the 
relation.
It would seem, therefore, that among relations that express direction, the 
direction can be either intrinsic to the relation or extrinsic to the relation. What 
determines whether direction is intrinsic or extrinsic to a relation? I submit that 
whether direction is intrinsic or extrinsic to a relation depends on the nature of the 
relata, and whether they stand in the given relation essentially or merely accidentally.
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A property is essential to an entity if, necessarily, the entity cannot exist 
without being an instance of the property. Conversely, a property is accidental to an 
entity if it is possible for the entity to exist without being an instance of the property. 
Whether or not the essential-accidental distinction can legitimately be applied to 
relations as well as to properties is not wholly uncontroversial. However, I think 
there is good reason to suppose that an entity does stand in some o f its relations to 
other entities essentially. For example, the essence of a number consists in the place 
it occupies in a system of other numbers, or the relations it stands in to other 
numbers. Similarly, it is arguable that I stand in an essential relation to my parents. 
That is, I could not have been the person that I am and have had different parents.
Consider now an entity standing in a spatial relation to another entity. For 
example, my printer stands to the left of my keyboard. Clearly, being to the left of 
the keyboard is not an essential property of the printer. It would still be the same 
printer if it stood to the right of the keyboard. Strictly speaking, the place an object 
occupies is extrinsic to that object. 1 am located in Leeds and my sister is located in 
London. Clearly, the situation could have been reversed without affecting who each 
of us is. The situation is not quite so straightforward for less mobile objects. For 
example, would Leeds have been the same city if it had been located 1,000 miles 
further south, or the Eiffel tower if it had been 500 miles further north? However, I 
think a case can be made for arguing that the spatial location of an entity, and the 
spatial relations it stands in to other entities are accidental properties of that entity. 
Can the same be said for the temporal location of an entity and the temporal relations
it stands in to other entities?
It is usual to talk of events being the typical temporal entities which stand in 
temporal relations to other events. It is reasonable to suggest that the temporal 
location of an event, and the temporal relations it stands in to other events are at 
least partly definitive of the event itself. According to Davidson (1969) events are 
identical if and only if they have exactly the same causes and effects. This entails 
that the temporal relations an event stands in to the events which are its causes and 
those which are its effects are essential to that event. To put it another way, an 
event could not be the event it is if it did not stand in certain temporal relations to 
certain other events. According to Wilson (1974), who takes facts to be less 
problematic entities than events, a time is an essential component of a fact:
The point is that the fact is constituted by an individual, a property
and a time and it cannot have fewer components.... Obviously this is
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not the only kind of fact there is. There will be facts containing an 
individual, a relation, an individual and a time, as, for example, the 
fact that Columbus discovered America in 1492. (Wilson (1974) p.
311).
Thus, it follows from Wilson's account of the identity conditions of facts and events, 
no less than from Davidson's account, that the time at which an event occurs is 
essential to that event. Hence, it would seem that a case can be made for the 
conclusion that events stand in temporal relations to other events and times 
essentially.
A further consideration in favour of my contention that events stand in 
temporal relations essentially concerns the relationist conception of times. If  this 
conception is correct, a time simply is the set of simultaneous events ordinarily said 
to occur at that time. Thus the relation of simultaneity an event stands in to other 
events is essential to the identity of the time constituted by that set of events. It 
follows straightforwardly from this that the temporal relations that obtain between 
times and events are essential to those times and events. If, on the other hand, the 
substantival conception of times is correct, then times, at least, could be said to stand 
in their temporal relations essentially. None of this is conclusive proof that temporal 
relations are essential to their relata but, I submit, a reasonable case can be made in 
favour o f this conclusion.
I conclude from all this that, although spatial and temporal relations possess 
the same logical properties (asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity), so that they are 
both capable of generating a series with a direction, they differ in the following 
respect. Direction is intrinsic to a series generated by the temporal relations, but 
extrinsic to a series generated by spatial relations. This is so for two reasons. 
Firstly, a direction can only be ascribed to a spatial relation if reference is made to a 
third spatial location or observer external to that relation. A temporal relation, by 
contrast, can be ascribed a direction without any reference being made to any third 
temporal location or observer external to the relation. Furthermore, the temporal 
relations in which an event stands to other temporal items are essential to the identity 
of that event. However, the spatial relations in which an entity stands to other 
spatial entities are accidental to that entity. Thus, I now jettison the conventional 
sense of'direction' that is associated with spatial relations, as it is unable to account 
for the direction of time. Since temporal relations possess direction intrinsically, this 
can be accounted for by the sense of 'direction' associated with serial order. The
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conventional sense of'direction' associated with spatial relations is extrinsic to those 
relations, so this notion will be unable to account for the sense in which time has a 
direction.
I have now worked systematically through all the concepts associated with 
the notion of time's direction. I have rejected some concepts as being unable to 
provide a satisfactory account ol this notion, and I am left with two possible 
contenders for the explanatory basis of the direction of time. These are the 
conventional sense of direction associated with motion or change, and the sense of 
direction associated with serial order. The latter sense is closely connected with the 
logical asymmetry of the temporal relations, and the intrinsic direction they generate 
in any temporal series. Consequently, I maintain that the 'direction of time' is either 
to be explained by some kind of temporal motion in a specified direction, or by the 
intrinsic direction generated by the temporal relations. The first kind of explanation 
would be consistent with a tensed account of time, and the second would be 
consistent with a tenseless account. In the following two sections I will examine 
both tensed and tenseless approaches to the problem of the 'direction of time'.
5.3 The Direction o f  Time: A Tensed Account
If  temporal reality includes a moving Now which is in perpetual motion along 
the temporal series in the same direction, from earlier times to later times, then, it 
would seem we have a straightforward and unequivocal sense in which time has a 
direction. I have argued in chapter 3 that the concept of a moving Now is 
incoherent, and thus cannot characterize any part of temporal reality. However, I 
intend to show in this section that, even if we allow as sensible talk of a moving 
Now, this concept is incapable ol providing a satisfactory explanation o f  the 
direction of time.
In my discussion of the conventional sense of direction associated with 
motion or change, (5.2.3), I noted that the concept of direction can either be 
connected with ordinary spatial motion, or with other kinds of change. It was noted 
in chapter 3 that there are different possible interpretations of the doctrine of 
temporal becoming. In this section 1 intend to look at those interpretations of 
temporal becoming that are most likely to yield an explanation of the direction of 
time in terms of motion or change. These interpretations are the moving Now 
hypothesis and the property acquisition and loss hypothesis.
The moving Now hypothesis appears at first sight to be the most promising 
interpretation of temporal becoming to yield an account of the direction of time.
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According to this hypothesis the Now is an entity taken to be continually sliding 
along the series of events ordered by the relations 'earlier than and later than . When 
the Now coincides with a set of simultaneous events, those events are deemed 
objectively present. Thus, we have an entity which moves along the temporal series 
in the direction from earlier times to later times. Is this not exactly analogous to the 
spatial case of motion from one place to another place? There is, in fact, no analogy 
between spatial movement and the motion of the moving Now, as will become clear 
in the ensuing discussion.
Spatial movement is characterized by an entity's being in one place at one 
time, and then at another place at a later time, so it is a change in spatial position 
relative to a change in temporal location. A direction can then be assigned to the 
motion between the two places. In the case of the moving Now however, the Now 
is located at one time, and then at another time, t2. There is no change in 
temporal location relative to a change along any other dimension. The correct 
spatial analogy of this situation would be, for example, an object that exists at one 
place, and further on, at another place, s2. Any spatial object of finite size fits this 
description. The extremities of any object exist at distinct places, so an object can 
exist at one place, .v,, and further on at another place, s2- This does not describe 
change or motion, because there is no change in spatial location relative to change in 
any other dimension. The same is true for the alleged motion of the moving Now. 
Existing at one time and then existing at another time is a description that applies to 
anything with any temporal extension. Any temporal entity that exists for a finite 
duration exists first at one time, and then later on at another time. This does not 
involve motion or change because there is no change relative to any other dimension.
Thus, the moving Now hypothesis is misleading since it involves no motion 
or change. Consequently, there is no motion to which we can ascribe a direction. 
The moving Now hypothesis cannot provide the basis for an explanation of the 
direction of time. However, reference was made in the initial description of the 
moving Now to the temporal direction 'from earlier times to later times. We have 
already seen that the series of times ordered by the tenseless temporal relations 
'earlier than' and 'later than' have direction, although not in the conventional sense 
involving motion. I believe that it is the logically asymmetric sense of direction, 
which is possessed intrinsically by any temporal series, that lends initial plausibility to 
a description of a Now that moves from earlier times to later times. The confusion is 
this: in everyday conventional discussion, that which is in motion also has direction. 
Of course, it does not follow that everything that has direction is thereby in motion.
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However, I maintain that it is this fallacious inference that is drawn by those who 
talk of a Now that moves in a given direction. That is, since time has an intrinsic 
direction, the fallacy is committed that it must thereby involve some kind of motion. 
In the next section I will expand on the sense in which I believe time has a direction, 
and provide a full explanation for it.
The doctrine of temporal becoming is most often characterized as a change in 
temporal properties that events and times continually undergo. That is, events 
change from being future to being present to being past. It might be argued that this 
kind of change is analogous to the change in properties that objects undergo through 
time. For example, in Autumn the leaves on the trees change from being green to 
being brown. This is a change in properties that leaves undergo, and furthermore, it 
is a change that can be ascribed a direction; it is a change from  green to brown. Is 
the change in temporal properties from future to present to past truly analogous to 
ordinary change, and can it be ascribed a direction? I would argue that, even if the 
temporal properties of 'being past', 'being present' and 'being future' could be 
construed as genuine properties (and I have argued in chapter 3 that they cannot), 
this change in properties by itself cannot account for the direction of time.
I will start by taking a closer look at ordinary change, such as the change 
from green to brown that leaves undergo. I submit that ordinary change such as this 
can only be assigned a direction because the dimension along which it occurs itself 
has an intrinsic direction. That is, the temporal dimension ordered by the relations of 
'earlier than' and 'later than' has an intrinsic direction. The change in properties from 
green to brown occurs along this dimension, such that the property of being green is 
instantiated earlier than the property of being brown. It is the fact that these 
property instantiations stand in this temporal relation to each other that enables us to 
assign a direction to the change in properties. Direction is inherent in the temporal 
relation, and this confers direction on the distinct property instantiations that 
constitute the relata of this relation.
If  the property instantiations stood to each other in a relation without 
intrinsic direction then there would be no possibility of assigning an intrinsic 
direction from one to the other. I-or example, consider a football pitch that is green 
at one end and brown at the other. The distinct property instantiations stand in a 
spatial relation to each other, but as we have seen, spatial relations do not have 
intrinsic direction. Thus we have no grounds for saying that the pitch changes from 
green to brown along a spatial dimension, or for saying it changes from brown to 
green. Direction can only be assigned to a change in properties if the distinct
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property instantiations stand to each other in a relation that has an intrinsic direction. 
Temporal relations have such intrinsic direction, and since ordinary change occurs 
along the temporal dimension ordered by these relations, we have grounds for 
assigning a direction to ordinary change.
I will now examine the tensed theorist's claim that the direction of time can 
be explained in terms of the change in tensed properties that events undergo from 
future to present to past. Once more, I would argue that even if such properties 
exist, and events continually change in respect of them, this process could not, by 
itself, explain the direction of time. The change in tensed properties that events are 
claimed to undergo can only be ascribed a direction because the property 
instantiations stand in temporal relations to each other, and those temporal relations 
possess an intrinsic direction. Thus, the extended event which constitutes the 
Olympic Games changes from being future to being present and then on to being 
past. This change could only be ascribed a direction because the futurity of the event 
is earlier than the presentness of the event which in turn is earlier than the pastness of 
the event. The change in properties occurs along the temporal dimension which is 
ordered by relations with an intrinsic direction. It is this that underlies the possibility 
of assigning a direction to that change. Hence, the property acquisition and loss 
account of temporal becoming alone is incapable of accounting for the direction of 
time.
Of course, proponents of the tensed theory would dispute my conclusion 
because according to them, events and times only stand in temporal relations to each 
other derivatively. That is, the temporal relations that events and times stand in to 
each other depend on the tense determinations of those events and times. For 
example, according to Broad (1923):
Now the intrinsic sense of a series of events in Time is essentially 
bound up with the distinction between past, present and future. A 
precedes B because A is past when B is present. (Broad (1923) p.
58).
However, if Broad is correct and the primary constituents of temporal reality are the 
tense determinations, then time is left without a direction. The change in tensed 
properties would be more akin to the variation of colour across a football pitch that 
is green at one end and brown at the other, than to the change in colour from green 
to brown that leaves undergo. There would be no grounds for assigning a direction
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to the change in tensed properties, because the fundamental temporal constituents 
lack direction in any sense of the word. Monadic properties do not express 
direction. Change in monadic properties only expresses direction if it occurs along a 
dimension ordered by a relation with an intrinsic direction. Consigning the temporal 
relations to the status of being ontologically dependent on the tensed monadic 
properties thus abandons the grounds for assigning a direction to time. If the tensed 
theorist still maintains that time has a direction, then that direction is introduced on 
an ad hoc basis and is left unexplained.
Thus, the two interpretations of temporal becoming which seemed most 
likely to offer an explanation of the direction of time in terms of the conventional 
sense of direction have shown themselves unable to do so. In both discussions I 
appealed to the intrinsic direction possessed by the temporal relations, and the 
temporal series generated by those relations to provide the basis for the direction of 
time when the tensed concepts failed to do so. In the next section I will expand on 
my claim that the intrinsic direction of temporal relations grounds the direction of 
time.
5.4 The Direction o f  Time: A Tenseless Account
It is my belief that the direction of time can be at least partly accounted for 
by the intrinsic direction possessed by the temporal relations and the series generated 
by them. We have already seen in the preceding section how this intrinsic direction 
provides us with grounds for assigning a direction to ordinary change. I believe it is 
also responsible for our intuitive sense in which time has a direction. However, it 
will not have gone unnoticed that in section 5.2.1 I quoted Newton-Smith (1980) 
making almost exactly the same claim, and yet I disputed it. My position stands in 
need of justification, and in what follows I will provide it.
The temporal relations 'earlier than' and 'later than1 indubitably have an 
intrinsic direction. Their logical properties of asymmetry, transitivity and 
irreflexivity allow them to generate an asymmetric series of temporal entities. They 
also provide a basis for distinguishing between the two directions along that series: 
that from earlier to later, and that from later to earlier. Furthermore, the direction 
expressed by these temporal relations is intrinsic to them. All this I have argued for, 
and I find myself in agreement with Newton-Smith up to this point. However, as I 
have already remarked, this cannot be all there is to the direction of time. Time is 
intuitively unidirectional, yet all this only provides us with grounds for distinguishing 
the two directions along a temporal series from each other. As yet there is no basis
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for picking out one of these directions as the direction of time. Time has a direction 
in a more profound sense than, say, a series of people ordered according to the 
relation 'taller than', or even than the natural number series which is ordered 
according to the numerical relations 'greater than' and 'less than'. However, if the 
logical properties of the temporal relations, together with the fact that they express 
direction intrinsically, provided the entire basis for the direction of time, then all 
these series would have a direction in the same sense.
There is, I submit, an additional element to the notion o f the direction of 
time. It is an empirical element which combines with the logical elements I have 
already discussed, and it concerns the way in which we experience temporal 
succession. In my view, the experience of temporal succession is equivalent to a 
series in the process o/being generated by the relation 'earlier than'. Each successive 
moment that we experience is a new member of the series being generated by the 
'earlier than' relation. Each experience is earlier than its subsequent successor. 
Hence, our experience of temporal succession emphasizes the earlier to later 
direction, rather than its converse the later to earlier direction. To put it another 
way, the earlier to later direction defines our experience of temporal succession.
Consider an analogy. The natural number series, as I said, is generated by 
the relations 'less than' and 'greater than' which are analogous to 'earlier than' and 
'later than' in their logical properties. However, the logical properties only allow us 
to distinguish between the two directions along the natural number series. They do 
not provide us with sufficient grounds to pick out one direction as the direction of 
the natural number series. However, the process of counting involves an additional 
empirical element. If we begin at 1 and count upwards (as it were), we embark on 
the process of generating the natural number series according to the relation 'less 
than'. Each new member of the series is less than its subsequent successor (1 is less 
than 2, which is less than 3, and so on). Hence, this process of generating the series 
can be assigned a unique direction. It exhibits the direction from  lesser to greater 
numbers. Conversely, if we began the counting process at, say, 1,000 and counted 
backwards, we would be generating the converse series which would exhibit the 
direction from  greater to lesser numbers.
Thus, the logical properties of the generating relations of the natural number 
series guarantee that this series has direction intrinsically. However, the logical 
properties only provide grounds for distinguishing between the two directions of the 
natural number series. The process of counting contributes an additional empirical 
element to the logical nature o f  the natural number series, and provides us with
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grounds for picking out one of its directions as more fundamental than the other. In 
the case of a temporal series, the logical properties of its generating relations 
guarantee that the series has direction intrinsically, and provide grounds for 
distinguishing between its two directions. Experience of the temporal succession of 
events contributes an additional empirical element to the logical nature of a temporal 
series, providing us with grounds for picking out one of its directions as more 
fundamental than the other. Since we cannot choose the direction in which we 
experience temporal succession, as we can choose the direction in which to count 
the numbers of the natural number series, we assign to time a unique direction; that 
from earlier to later.
I have, thus, identified two distinct aspects of the notion of the direction of 
time. In the first place there is the notion that time intrinsically has direction, which I 
have accounted for by my discussion of temporal relations having direction 
intrinsically. Temporal relations differ from spatial relations in this respect, since the 
relata o f  temporal relations stand in those relations essentially, but the spatial 
relations of an entity are merely accidental to it. Thus, time intrinsically has 
direction, but space does not. Secondly, there is the notion that time is 
unidirectional; that one of time's directions is intuitively more important than its 
converse. I have sought to explain this aspect of the direction of time 
phenomenologically, in terms of our experience of temporal succession being akin to 
a logically asymmetric series in the process of being generated. This aspect of my 
account, taken separately, would be consistent with time itself being directionless, as 
Horwich (1987) and Mellor (1981) believe. I choose to combine it with my account 
o f  time having direction intrinsically.
5.5 Conclusion
My account of the direction of time is, as I have just described, composed of 
two parts. The logical part consists in the logical properties of the generating 
relations 'earlier than' and 'later than', together with the fact that direction is intrinsic 
to temporal series generated by these relations. The empirical part consists in the 
fact that the experience of temporal succession is a temporal series in the process of 
being generated by the relation 'earlier than'.8
8 I w ould like, tentatively, lo suggcsl at this point that the fact that tem poral experience is
akin to a proccss may be one o f  ihc factors responsible for the pervasive m etaphor o f  tem poral flow . 
H ow ever, this idea d early  needs to be worked out fully before I can advocate and defend it.
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Thus, I am equipped to provide a full and coherent account of the intrinsic 
direction of time, and of our experience of time being unidirectional, in entirely 
tenseless terms. This in turn allows me to distinguish the temporal dimension from 
the three spatial dimensions in a non-circular and fruitful way. It is a common 
criticism of the tenseless theory of time that it is unable to distinguish the temporal 
dimension from the three spatial dimensions. On the face of it, it appeared that the 
tensed theory had the best explanation for the direction of time and for the 
distinction between time and space. After all, if time flows, that distinguishes it from 
space. If  it flows in one direction, that provides it with a unique direction. We saw 
in chapter 3 that the proposition that time flows cannot be sustained. We have seen 
here that even if it could be, it would fail to provide an explanation for the direction 
of time.
In conclusion, the metaphysical implications of the new tenseless theory of 
time, that all times are equally real and that time does not flow, do not prevent this 
theory from providing an adequate account of the direction of time. I examined the 
various senses in which we intuitively ascribe a direction to time. I then provided a 
conceptual analysis of the key concepts employed in expressing this intuition; 
asymmetry, anisotropy and direction itself. I examined various ways in which these 
concepts might be thought to provide the explanatory basis of the direction of time, 
and systematically excluded those that proved to be inadequate to the task. The two 
concepts that remained after this process of elimination were then revealed to be one 
that was consistent with a tensed theory of time and one that was consistent with a 
tenseless theory of time. I examined how a tensed theory might account for the 
direction of time, and found that it was incapable of doing so. The tenseless theory, 
on the other hand, has the conceptual equipment necessary to provide a satisfactory 
account of the direction of time.
Chapter 6
T im e , T e n s e  a n d  M e a n in g : A  T e n s e l e s s  A c c o u n t
Throughout the course of this thesis I have been defending and developing 
the new tenseless token-reflexive theory of time. There is, however, a potentially 
devastating objection to Mellor's (1981) version of the theory I defend put forward 
by Smith (1987b, 1993). I will begin this chapter by examining this objection, and 
ultimately resolving the problem. However, my resolution o f  this problem raises an 
important question for the new tenseless theory of time, which concerns the notion 
o f tensed meaning. It appears that a tensed sentence token and the tenseless 
sentence that states its truth conditions both have the same truth conditions, while 
remaining untranslatable by each other. Thus, there is an objective difference in 
meaning between them that cannot be discerned in their truth conditions. What is 
this difference? How can it be accounted for? Would an explanation of the 
underlying basis of this difference have any significant implications for the issue of 
whether temporal reality is tensed or tenseless? Once I have resolved the problem 
created by Smith's objection I will address these questions. I will examine various 
possible responses to the problem, considering their appropriateness as solutions to 
the problem in hand, and whether they carry any implications for a tensed or 
tenseless reality. Finally, I will argue for the position with respect to this problem 
that I believe to the correct one.
6.1 A Problem fo r  the New Tenseless Token-Reflexive Theory o f  Time?
Quentin Smith claims that Hugh Mellor's version of the new tenseless theory 
o f  time, as put forward in Real Time (1981) fails. According to Smith, Mellor's 
theory is self-contradictory. He sets out five tenets o f  Mellor's theory, and goes on 
to argue that they cannot all be held together. These five tenets are:
(1) Tensed sentences have different truth conditions than tenseless sentences, 
and thus are untranslatable by them.
(2) Tensed sentences have tenseless truth conditions, viz., tenseless facts.
(3) These tenseless facts are the only facts needed to make tensed sentences true.
(4) Tensed sentences state the facts that are their truth conditions.
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(5) Tensed sentences state the same facts that are stated by the tenseless 
sentences which state the former sentences’ truth conditions. (Smith (1987b) 
p. 374).
Smith backs up tenets (1) - (4) with quotes from Mellor, and then claims that tenet
(5) follows from the others, an entailment that I shall accept in order to facilitate an 
internal critique of Smith's argument. He goes on to state three assumptions he 
takes to be implicit in Mellor's theory:
(a) Facts correspond to true tokens of sentences, but not to false sentence 
tokens.
(b) Truth conditions, conditions necessary and sufficient to make sentences true, 
are facts.
(c) If  a sentence as tokened on some occasion states a fact, F x, then the sentence 
as tokened on that occasion is true if and only if h  t and every fact implied by 
Fy exists. (Smith (1987b) p. 376).
From his statement of the assumptions implicit in Mellor's theory, Smith goes on to 
make the following inference:
Now, assumptions (a), (b) and (c) entail the principle o f the identity 
o f truth conditions (as I choose to call it):
PITC: If  two tokens of the same sentence or two tokens of different 
sentences state the same fact, F u they have the same truth 
conditions, i.e. are true if and only if F l and every fact implied 
byF j exists. (Smith (1987b) p. 376).
Smith then claims that the conjunction of tenets (1) and (5) contradicts PITC, and 
thus, Mellor's theory contradicts its own assumptions. The contradiction explicitly 
stated is that Mellor holds both that tensed and tenseless sentences have different 
truth conditions, and thus, by (1), cannot translate one another, and that tensed and 
tenseless sentence tokens can state the same fact, and thus, by PITC, must have the
same truth conditions.
Smith goes on to suggest a way out of this contradictory predicament, this 
being that Mellor can reject tenet (1). This appears to be a sensible option as (using 
Mellor's examples) a token S  o f 'I t  is now 1980 and a token U  o f S occurs in 1980
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do seem to have the same truth conditions. They are both true if and only if S occurs 
(tenselessly) in 1980. However, if Mellor takes this option for avoiding the 
contradiction, his theory, Smith claims, collapses into the old tenseless theory of 
time. This is because, by rejecting tenet (1) Mellor would be giving up what he 
takes to be his explanation of the untranslatability thesis. The untranslatability thesis 
is that tenet of the new tenseless theory which states that tensed sentence tokens 
cannot be translated without loss of meaning by tenseless sentence tokens. This 
thesis is, as we have seen, the fundamental constituent of the new theory, and that 
which renders it different from, and immune to the problems of the old theory. 
Mellor's explanation of the untranslatability thesis is that such translations cannot be 
effected because tensed and tenseless sentences have different truth conditions. If 
Mellor relinquishes this claim then, it seems, his theory does indeed collapse into the 
old tenseless theory, as he will no longer have any grounds for maintaining the 
untranslatability thesis.
It is my belief that Mellor's theory is guilty of the charge of being self­
contradictory that Smith levels at it. There is an aspect of Mellor's theory which 
renders it susceptible to just such an attack. This is that he tends to conflate talk of 
the truth conditions of sentence types with talk of the truth conditions of sentence 
tokens. For example, he writes:
Now the truth conditions of tokens of.....temporally tensed types vary 
with their temporal position. So therefore must the truth conditions 
of tokens of their translations. But what makes sentence types
tenseless.... is that the truth conditions of their tokens do not vary in
this way. (Mellor (1981) p. 77).
According to Mellor, this provides him with grounds for the claim that tensed 
sentence tokens are not translatable by tenseless sentence tokens. However, the 
grounds that he appeals to in order to account for this untranslatability is a difference 
between tensed and tenseless sentence types. It is tensed sentence types that have 
tokens each with different truth conditions, and tenseless sentence types whose 
tokens all have the same truth conditions. This clearly tells us nothing about whether 
or not a particular pair of sentence tokens can translate each other. Indeed, 
elsewhere in his (1981), Mellor seems to be aware of this. When he analyses the 
truth conditions of tensed and tenseless sentences, he uses sentence tokens as the 
subjects of this analysis. He asserts that a particular token, S, of the tensed sentence
154
'It is now 1980' is true if and only if it occurs in 1980. However, he goes on to deny 
that the tenseless sentence that states ^ s  truth conditions, namely, the sentence 'S 
occurs in 1980' has the same truth conditions as S. Let us examine the tenseless 
token-reflexive truth conditions of S  and the truth conditions of a token, U, of the 
tenseless sentence 'S occurs in 1980'.
Clearly, the tensed token S  is true if and only if S  occurs in 1980, according 
to Mellor's theory. However, U, it would seem, is also true if and only if S  occurs in 
1980. The clause that occurs to the right of the biconditional in the statement of the 
truth conditions of S  and U  is the same in both cases. Tokens S  and U  are both true 
if and only if S  occurs in 1980. S  and U  thus have the same truth conditions. 
Mellor, however, denies this, but in doing so he appeals to differences between the 
truth conditions of the sentence types of which they are tokens, and not to any 
differences between the truth conditions of the tokens themselves:
S  is true if and only if it occurs in 1980. If a sentence giving another's
truth conditions means what it does.... S  should mean the same as 'S
occurs in 1980'. But these sentences have different truth conditions.
In particular.... if S  occurs in 1980 that is a fact at all times. You
need not be in.... 1980 to meet true tokens of.....'S occurs in 1980'.
But you do need to be in 1980 to meet [a true token of] S. (Mellor 
(1981) p. 74).
The difference referred to by Mellor is clearly a difference between tensed and 
tenseless sentence types, and not between tokens of those types. It is true that the 
truth-values of tokens of temporally tensed types vary according to when they are 
produced, whereas the truth-values of tokens of tenseless types do not. However, 
this is irrelevant to considerations of whether a particular tensed token has the same 
truth conditions as a particular tenseless token. Furthermore, as we have seen, a 
particular tensed token, and a token of the tenseless sentence that states its truth 
conditions do have the same truth conditions.
The conclusion I draw from all this is that Mellor is wrong to deny that 
tensed and tenseless sentence tokens have different truth conditions, and that 
therefore he ought to reject tenet (1) as suggested by Smith. However, as I will 
argue, it does not follow from a rejection of tenet (1) that Mellor would thereby be 
forced to relinquish the untranslatability thesis. Consequently, it does not follow 
that, by making this move, his theory collapses into the old tenseless theory of time.
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As we have seen in previous discussions, particularly in chapter 1, tensed 
sentence tokens are untranslatable by tenseless sentence tokens. One o f  the most 
compelling arguments for this untranslatability thesis is that, given a tensed sentence 
token and a token o f  the tenseless sentence that states its truth conditions, it is 
possible for someone to take different attitudes to the truth-value o f  each. For 
example, a token, u, o f  the tensed sentence 'The eJephant has escaped' and a token, 
v, o f  the tenseless sentence that states u's truth conditions, 'The elephant’s escape is 
earlier than u' have the same truth conditions, a and v are both true if and only if the 
elephant's escape is earlier than u. However, u and v are not translations o f  each 
other, since it is possible for someone who understands both u and v to assent to the 
truth o f  one, but not to assent to the truth o f  the other. For example, someone may 
believe that u is true while believing that v is false, or remaining agnostic about the 
truth-value o f  v. u and v clearly do not convey the same information, and thus they 
are not synonymous with each other and cannot translate each other. The fact that 
they cannot translate each other, however, is clearly no impediment to their having 
the same truth conditions, u and v are both true under the same conditions. The 
obtaining o f  the same state o f  affairs in the world is necessary and sufficient for the 
truth o f  both o f  them, despite the fact that they cannot translate each other.
The same is true o f  Mellor's own examples o f  a token S  o f ' I t  is now 1980' 
and a token U o f'S  occurs in 1980'. As we have seen, they both have the same truth 
conditions. However, S  and U cannot translate one another. It is possible for 
someone who understands both S and U to, say, assent to the truth o f  S while 
rejecting U as false, or remaining agnostic about the truth-value o f  U. Thus, it 
would appear to be consistent to hold that two such sentence tokens have the same 
truth conditions but do not provide translations o f  each other. It follows that Mellor 
ought to replace tenet ( 1) o f  his theory with tenet ( 1*):
( 1*) Tensed sentence tokens can have the same truth conditions as tenseless 
sentence tokens, but are nevertheless untranslatable by them.
By making this move, Mellor's theory is no longer self-contradictory. The 
conjunction of tenets (1*) and (5) does not contradict PITC as the conjunction o f  (1) 
and (5) did. Furthermore, by opting for this solution to the charge of being self­
contradictory, Mellor's theory is able to retain the untranslatability thesis, so his 
theory does not collapse into the old tenseless theory o f  time.
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With this resolution o f  the problem facing Mellor's theory, the new tenseless 
token-reflexive theory o f  time is safe. One question, however, remains unanswered. 
According to Davidson (1967, 1990) and others, the truth conditions o f  a sentence 
token are supposed, in some sense, to give its meaning. As we have seen, however, 
it would seem to be possible for two sentence tokens to have the same truth 
conditions and yet to differ from each other in meaning, since they are unable to 
translate each other. This suggests that it is possible for there to be an objective 
difference in meaning between two sentence tokens that is not discernible in their 
truth conditions. How is this difference in meaning to be accounted for? I will 
address this question in the remainder of this chapter.
6.2 A Restatement o f  the Problem at Issue
Thus, an adequate defence o f  the new tenseless token-reflexive theory o f  time 
can be provided against Smith's (1987b, 1993) argument that it reduces, on pain o f  
self-contradiction, to the old tenseless theory. To sum up briefly, Smith argues that 
the new tenseless token-reflexive theory is committed to two contradictory theses 
regarding the truth conditions o f  tensed and tenseless sentences. The two 
contradictory theses in question are that, in respect o f  a tensed sentence token and 
the tenseless sentence that states its truth conditions, two such sentences have both 
the same truth conditions and different truth conditions. They have the same truth 
conditions in order to ensure that they state the same fact, and they have different 
truth conditions in order to preserve the claim that they cannot translate one another. 
In defence o f  the new theory I argued that it can consistently maintain that two such 
sentences have the same truth conditions, and yet remain untranslatable by each 
other. Hence the new theory does not reduce to the old tenseless theory, and it is 
not internally inconsistent.
However, this solution to the problem posed by Smith, while preserving the 
integrity o f  the new theory, leaves an important question unanswered. Given that 
two such sentences have the same truth conditions and yet remain untranslatable by 
each other, it follows that there is an objective difference in meaning between them 
that cannot be discerned in their truth conditions. In the remainder of this chapter I 
will consider various possible accounts o f  this difference in meaning, and their 
implications. Some o f  the possible solutions to the problem in hand are put forward 
by their proponents in terms o f  a date version o f  the new tenseless theory o f  time. 
We saw in chapter 2 that the date version o f  this theory faces a number o f  problems 
to which the token-reflexive version is immune. It is my contention that the central
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insights o f  these solutions to the problem can be preserved within a token-reflexive 
version o f  the tenseless theory of time, and I will endeavour to show this in section 
6.10. However, for ease o f  exposition, I will discuss these solutions in the terms in 
which they were put forward, that is, in terms o f  a date version of the tenseless 
theory o f  time.
I will enter a further caveat at this stage. My concern in this chapter is with 
the difference in meaning between tensed and tenseless sentence tokens, and how to 
account for it. The prominent characteristic o f  tensed sentence tokens is that they 
are tokens of types whose truth-value appears to vary according to the time at which 
their tokens are produced. Tensed sentence types are thus temporally context- 
dependent. Tenseless sentence types, on the other hand, are not. Tokens of 
tenseless sentence types have the same truth-value whenever they are produced. 
Throughout this chapter, therefore, the feature o f  context-dependence, or context- 
sensitivity, will be paramount, but my particular concern, o f  course, is with temporal 
context-dependence. Sometimes the context-dependence o f  a sentence type will be 
the result o f  that type containing an indexical, such as 'now'. Hence, in my discussion 
I will sometimes refer to indexicals, and sometimes to context-dependence or 
context-sensitivity. I realize that within the philosophy o f  language there is a 
technical distinction between indexicals, tense and context-dependence. However, 
my concern is with the broad phenomenon o f  how the truth-value o f  a sentence 
token can depend on a feature o f  the context in which it is produced. Thus, my use 
o f  these different terms is intended to refer to this particular phenomenon.
6.3 The Co-reporting Theory
Michelle Beer (1988) puts forward a suggestion as to what might account for 
the objective difference between a tensed sentence token and the tenseless sentence 
that states its truth conditions. She argues that two such sentence tokens are 'co­
reporting', but that they differ from each other in sense. The co-reporting theory 
maintains the untranslatability thesis, in that it does not seek an analytic reduction of 
tensed sentence tokens to tenseless sentence tokens. A sentence token (to use Beer's 
examples) such as 'Jones is running now' uttered at time tn, and the tenseless sentence 
that states its truth conditions 'Jones is running at t7', where the verb in this sentence 
is to be taken as tenseless, are insufficient to translate one another. However, these 
two sentence tokens are, according to Beer, co-reporting. What this means is that 
both sentence tokens report the existence of the same state o f  affairs, or the 
occurrence o f  the same event. In order to argue that this is the case, Beer proposes
158
that it is a sufficient condition for an event, e{, to be numerically identical with an 
event, e2, that ex and e2 'involve the same subject instantiating the same property at 
the same time' (Beer (1988) p. 161). Another important supporting tenet o f  the co­
reporting theory is that temporal indexical terms, as uttered on particular occasions, 
are referring terms which denote times. 1 Given these two presuppositions, let us 
now examine the way in which these two sentence tokens can be said to be co­
reporting.
The event referred to by the tensed sentence token is the event o f  Jones' 
running now. Since that sentence token is uttered at t7, 'now' refers directly to t7, so 
the event referred to by the utterance o f  the tensed sentence token at t7 is the event 
o f  Jones' running at t7. The event referred to by the tenseless sentence token is the 
event o f  Jones' running at t7. The event referred to by each o f  these sentence tokens 
thus involves the same subject, Jones, instantiating the same property, that o f  
running, at the same time, t7. Thus, both sentence tokens refer to the same event, 
and according to Beer, are therefore co-reporting. However, these two sentence 
tokens are insufficient to translate each other because it is possible for a competent 
speaker o f  the language to understand both of them at the same time and yet to take 
different attitudes to the truth-value of each. They are not substitutable in all 
contexts salva veritate, and therefore they are not synonymous. Hence, there must 
be an objective difference in meaning between them. This difference Beer identifies 
as a difference in sense. Indeed, she argues that co-reporting sentence tokens can 
differ in informative content. A token o f '/  is now' uttered at t, and a token o f  V is at 
t  are co-reporting, even though the former is informative but the latter is not. The 
use o f  'now' in the first sentence token refers directly to the time o f  its utterance, 
which is /, so that sentence token asserts an identity between the time referred to by 
'now' and the time referred to by 7'. The same sort o f  identity is asserted by such 
sentence tokens as 'Leeds is here' when uttered in Leeds. This sentence token is 
informative, since Leeds might not have been here, or the utterance might not have 
occurred in Leeds, but it asserts an identity by using two different terms to refer to
1 In my discussion  o f  the co-rcporting theory, and in  my d iscussion  o f  K aplan's distinction
betw een character and content I w ill accept, initially, the presupposition that indexical expressions  
are directly referential. H ow ever, in section  6 .10 I w ill argue that the m otivation for m aintain ing  
the direct reference theory o f  indexicals is equally a m otivation for advocating a token-reflexive  
account o f  the m echanism  by w h ich  ind exica ls pick out their referents. Furthermore, a token- 
reflexive account is able to d ischarge the responsibility o f  incorporating tim es in  the truth 
conditions o f  sentence tokens contain ing indexicals. Any account that does introduce tim es into the 
truth conditions o f  tensed or indexical sentences w ill generate a date version  o f  the tenseless theory, 
and thus w ill face the problem s identified for this theory in chapter 2.
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the same place. Similarly, 7 is now1 asserts an identity by using two different terms 
to refer to the same time. Its co-reporting counterpart 7 is at t  asserts an identity in 
a more obvious fashion by using the same term twice to refer to the same time. 
Hence, the latter is not informative, but the former is. The two sentence tokens are 
co-reporting, but they differ in informative content and, according to Beer, they 
differ in sense.
The metaphysical implications o f  the co-reporting theory, according to Beer, 
are that the co-reporting nature o f  sentence tokens such as 'Jones is running now' 
uttered at t7, and 'Jones is running at t7' allows an ontological reduction from the A 
series to the B  series to be effected. An event's possessing an A determination, or a 
tense, is ontologically identical to its standing in a B relation, or a tenseless temporal 
relation, to another event or moment o f  time. Beer claims that this reduction does 
not result in the elimination o f  tense. She compares it to non-eliminative scientific 
reductions such as that water is nothing but H20 ,  and that lightning is nothing more 
than a flow o f  ionized particles. It is an ontological reduction such that the 
possession by an event o f  a tense is nothing more than, or is identical to its standing 
in a tenseless temporal relation to another event or a moment o f  time. She justifies 
this direction o f  the reduction, from the A series to the B  series, by appeal to 
considerations o f  theoretical advantage. She claims that a better, or more complete 
and accurate description o f  the world is obtained by abstracting from features o f  the 
world that are peculiar to the observer. Tenses and temporal indexicals are context- 
sensitive, and thus sentences containing them only hold true at certain times. 
Statements o f  scientific law and complete and correct descriptions o f  the world do 
not contain context-sensitive terms so that they may express propositions that are 
true at any place, time, or any other feature of a context o f  utterance. Thus Beer 
cites theoretical advantage in order to support her claim that the truth o f  the co­
reporting theory justifies the conclusion that temporal reality is tenseless.
It is my contention that Beer is either confused or mistaken over the nature of 
the reduction to be achieved by the co-reporting theory. In chapter 1 I argued that 
any reduction from the A series to the B series, or vice versa, is not a theoretical or 
scientific reduction o f  the same kind as that from water to H 20 .  There are two 
reasons for this. First o f  all, any such reduction claims that the entities referred to by 
the reducing statement and the statement to be reduced are contingently identical. 
Any claim for the contingent identity o f  the A series and the B  series is false, since 
they are logically distinct from each other. The second reason is that such reductions 
are usually based on the results o f  scientific discoveries o f  the underlying nature of
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the entities involved. There are no such scientific discoveries which might support a 
scientific reduction from the A series to the B series. Beer also claims that the co­
reporting theory supports a non-eliminative reduction o f  the A series to the B  series. 
However, the claims o f  the new tenseless theory in general are that tense has no 
metaphysical role to play, and hence, is metaphysically eliminable. Thus, Beer is 
mistaken in her claim that the co-reporting theory supports a non-eliminative 
scientific reduction from the A series to the B series.
However, it is possible that Beer is simply confused. The reasons she gives 
to support her claim o f  effecting a scientific reduction are more consistent with the 
claim that the co-reporting theory supports an ontological reduction from the A 
series to the B  series. I f  such an ontological reduction has been effected, then tense 
has indeed been eliminated from the ontology o f  time, but this kind o f  reduction 
makes no claims for the elimination o f  tense from language and thought. It does not 
claim that tensed sentences can be eliminated in favour o f  tenseless sentences, but 
merely that tense constitutes no part o f  temporal reality. Thus, it is possible that it is 
in this sense that Beer means to claim that the reduction is 'non-eliminative'. Beer's 
claim that the co-reporting theory supports a non-eliminative scientific reduction 
from the A series to the B series is based on her confusion over two issues. First of 
all, she confuses the distinction between a scientific and an ontological reduction. 
Secondly, she is confused over the sense in which tense is eliminable. Tense is 
ineliminable from thought and language, but eliminable from temporal reality. I 
would argue that the co-reporting theory supports the conclusion that temporal 
reality is tenseless. However, the question that concerns me in the light o f  the claims 
o f  the co-reporting theory is: what is the difference in sense between a tensed 
sentence token and the tenseless sentence that states its truth conditions? How can it 
be articulated, and does it have any implications for whether temporal reality is 
tensed or tenseless? Beer does not expand, or offer any thoughts on the nature of 
this difference in sense. I intend to examine some possible explanations o f  this 
objective difference in sense between tensed and tenseless co-reporting sentences.
6.4 Can Frege's Distinction Between Sense and Reference Provide the
Answer?
The terminology o f  the co-reporting theory is suggestive o f  Frege's 
distinction between sense and reference. Co-reporting utterances refer to the same 
state of affairs, so they pick out the same referent, and say the same thing about it, 
while differing from each other in sense. Similarly, Frege argued that two different
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expressions could share a common referent while differing from each other in sense.2 
It is possible that this Fregean distinction could shed some light on the supposed 
difference in sense between tensed and tenseless co-reporting sentence tokens. The 
tensed sentence token, 'Jones is running now' uttered at /7, contains the temporal 
indexical 'now', while the tenseless sentence token, 'Jones is running at /7', does not. 
It might be thought that the difference in sense between these two sentence tokens is 
a result o f  the former being invested with some kind o f  indexical sense while the 
latter is not. In 'The Thought' (1918-19), Frege makes some remarks which support 
this supposition. He writes:
If  a time indication is needed by the present tense one must know 
when the sentence was uttered to apprehend the thought correctly. 
Therefore, the time o f utterance is part o f  the expression o f  the 
thought. I f  someone wants to say the same today as he expressed 
yesterday using the word 'today', he must replace this word with 
'yesterday'. Although the thought is the same its verbal expression 
must be different so that the sense, which would otherwise be 
affected by the differing times of utterance, is readjusted. (Frege 
(1918-19) p. 516).
A temporal indexical thus contributes its peculiar indexical sense to the thought 
expressed by the sentence o f  which it is a constituent. Quentin Smith (1990) has 
argued that implementing a Fregean account of indexical sense and reference is o f  no 
use to the co-reporting theory, since Frege's theory o f  indexicals is logically 
incompatible with the co-reporting theory. He writes:
According to Frege, the time o f  utterance o f  the temporal indexical, 
such as the time /7, in conjunction with the utterance o f  the indexical 
itself, expresses the sense. Thus, the utterance o f 'now ' [in 'It is now 
/7'] in conjunction with the fact that this utterance occurs at tv, 
expresses the sense at t7. But this is the same sense that is expressed 
by 'at tj in the non-indexical sentence 'It is t7 at t-j'. This shows why 
an appeal to Frege cannot save the Co-reporting Theory. The 
difference between the indexical and non-indexical expression, for
Frege (1892).
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Frege, is not a difference in the sense expressed, but in the means o f  
expressing it. It is expressed solely by words (viz., 'at /7') in the non- 
indexical sentence and is expressed by words (viz., 'now') in 
conjunction with the time o f  utterance in the indexical sentence. The 
Fregean theory is inconsistent with the Co-reporting Theory, for the 
latter states that there is a difference in seme between the indexical 
and non-indexical utterances and the Fregean theory says there is the 
same sense and merely a difference in the manner o f  expressing it.
(Smith (1990) p. 216).
The essence o f  Smith's argument is that, according to Frege, the tensed and 
tenseless co-reporting sentence tokens have the same sense, but express it in 
different ways. The co-reporting theory, on the other hand, maintains that they 
express different senses. It is my belief that Smith has misrepresented Frege on this 
point. For Frege, the sentences 'It is now t7\  uttered at t7, and 'It is t7 at t7 clearly 
differ in sense because it is possible for a subject to entertain different attitudes 
towards the thoughts expressed by each o f  these sentence tokens. It is possible for 
someone to doubt the truth o f  the first, but it is difficult to make sense o f  anyone 
seriously doubting the truth of the second. For Frege, a necessary condition for two 
sentences to differ in the sense expressed by each is for it to be possible for a subject 
to understand both and to take different attitudes to the truth-value o f  each. This 
condition is met by any pair o f  co-reporting tensed and tenseless sentences, and so, 
as far as Frege is concerned, they express different thoughts. It follows that their 
constituent expressions differ in sense.
Smith is therefore wrong to argue that the Fregean theory o f  indexicals and 
the co-reporting theory are logically incompatible. However, the Fregean theory of 
indexicals, such as it is, has been widely criticized,3 and it remains unclear whether 
the distinction between sense and reference can be of any value in identifying the 
difference in sense between tensed and tenseless co-reporting sentence tokens. In 
the next section I will explore one possible avenue o f  investigation which might 
suggest that the Fregean distinction succeeds in capturing this difference.
3 For exam ple, Kaplan (1989). Perry (1977), Castaneda (1989 ) and W ettstein (1979).
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6.5 Some Analogies Between Senses and Roles
Frege introduced the distinction between the sense and reference o f  an 
expression when considering pairs o f  expressions which uniquely specify the same 
extra-linguistic entity. For example, the expressions 'The Morning Star' and 'The 
Evening Star' both identify the same object in the world (viz., Venus), so they have 
the same reference. However, these two expressions differ from each other in the 
information they convey about their common referent. In terms o f  what they refer to 
in the world, these expressions have the same meaning; they specify the same object. 
In terms o f  the information they convey about their subject matter, these expressions 
differ from each other in meaning. Thus, Frege argued that there are two distinct 
levels o f  meaning. An expression refers to something in the world, which is its 
reference. However, by identifying the extra-linguistic entity to which an expression 
refers, one has not thereby exhausted its information content. Consider the 
following two statements o f  identity:
( 1) The Morning Star is the Morning Star
(2) The Morning Star is the Evening Star
Since the expressions 'The Morning Star' and 'The Evening Star' share a common 
referent, both statements o f  identity are true. However, (1) is tautological, in an 
epistemic sense, and thus says nothing very interesting about the Morning Star. (2), 
on the other hand, is an empirical truth, and conveys the information that the object 
we identify as the Morning Star is the very same object as the one we identify as the 
Evening Star. Therefore, (1) and (2) clearly differ in meaning, since (2) is 
informative but (1) is not. This difference in meaning, however, is not discernible at 
the level o f  reference, since each constituent expression o f  ( 1) and (2 ) has the same 
reference. The difference in meaning between ( 1) and (2) is to be found at the level 
o f  sense. The expression 'The Morning Star' differs in sense from the expression 
'The Evening Star' and this difference in sense contributes to the difference in sense 
between ( 1) and (2 ).
It seems to me that this distinction between sense and reference is at least 
reminiscent o f  the distinction identified by Beer between tensed and tenseless co­
reporting utterances. Recall the co-reporting utterances 'It is now t  uttered at t, and 
'It is t at l'. Here, the latter is vacuous, but the former is informative. They differ 
from each other insofar as they use two different expressions to refer to the same 
time. Is it not reasonable to suggest that, just as (1) and (2) differ from each other in
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sense, these two co-reporting utterances differ from each other in virtue o f  the 
difference in sense between the two expressions 'now' and 'at t'l The expressions 
'now' and 'at t' appear to have the same reference, in that they both refer to time t, 
but they differ from each other in the information they convey about their common 
referent.
Another analogy between the sense o f  an .ordinary expression, as identified 
by Frege, and the 'sense' o f  the temporal indexical 'now' can be found in the 
relationship between the sense and the reference o f  an expression. As has been 
noted by Perry, Kaplan, Castaneda and others ,4 indexical expressions have roles. 
The role o f  the temporal indexical 'now' is that it refers, on any occasion of 
utterance, to the moment at which it is uttered. Similarly, the role o f  the indexical 
expression 'here' is that it refers, on any occasion o f  utterance to the place at which it 
is uttered, and T refers to the one who utters it. Is it possible for the role o f  an 
indexical to be identified with its sense? Clearly, the role o f  an indexical determines 
its referent on any given occasion o f  use. Thus, the role o f  an indexical is 
instrumental in determining the truth-value o f  a sentence containing it. Similarly, 
according to Frege, the sense o f  an expression determines its reference. The sense 
o f  an expression is the mode o f presentation o f  its referent. An expression picks out 
the extra-linguistic entity that is its referent, but it picks it out in a particular way. It 
is this particular way in which an expression picks out its referent that can be 
identified with its sense. Thus, co-referring terms pick out their common referent in 
different ways, and so they differ from each other in sense. For Frege it is in virtue 
o f  the sense o f  an expression that that expression has the reference that it does. The 
sense o f  an expression is what we grasp when we understand that expression, and it 
is this, the sense, that determines the reference o f  an expression. Therefore, just as 
the role o f  an indexical determines its reference on a given occasion o f  use, the sense 
o f  a non-indexical expression determines that expression's reference. The role o f  an 
indexical is thus instrumental in determining the truth-value o f  a sentence in which it 
occurs. Similarly, the sense o f  a non-indexical expression is instrumental in 
determining the truth-value o f  a sentence in which it occurs.
The role o f  an indexical is an objective part o f  its meaning. When we learn 
how to use the words 'I', 'now' and 'here' correctly, we each learn the same thing. 
We learn that 'I' refers to the one who utters it; 'now' refers to the time o f  utterance, 
and so on. The role is an objective and constant part o f  the meaning o f  an indexical.
Perry (1977 . 1979), Kaplan (1989) and Castaneda (1989).
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Analogously, the sense o f  an expression, according to Frege, is an objective feature 
o f  that expression's meaning. The sense o f  an expression is common to all speakers 
o f  the language. When we grasp the sense o f  an expression, we each grasp the same 
thing. Without this stipulation on the notion of sense, Frege believed we would be 
unable to communicate successfully with one another. Thus we have another 
analogy between a Fregean sense and the role of an indexical.
One final apparent analogy between senses and roles is as follows. The sense 
o f  a declarative sentence is the thought it expresses. The senses o f  the constituent 
expressions o f  such a sentence combine to yield the sense o f  the sentence as a whole. 
Thus, the thought expressed by a declarative sentence is a function o f  the senses of 
its constituent expressions. A sentence containing an indexical can also be said to 
express a thought. When I say 'Jones is running now', what I have said expresses the 
content o f  a belief, or a complete thought. If  that thought is made up o f  the senses 
o f  the constituent expressions o f  the sentence, then it would seem to follow that 
there must be at least a minimal way in which we can say that an indexical expression 
has a sense.
The preceding discussion has revealed a number o f  points o f  analogy 
between the notion o f  a Fregean sense and the semantic role o f  an indexical 
expression. To summarize, the analogies are as follows. Two non-indexical 
sentences can be identical at the level o f  reference, while differing in the information 
they convey about their common referents. Thus there is an objective difference in 
meaning between two such sentences that is not discernible at the level o f  reference. 
Similarly, a pair o f  co-reporting tensed and tenseless utterances differ from each 
other in meaning, although this difference is not discernible at the level o f  truth 
conditions. They too differ in the information they convey about their common 
referents, in that one o f  them employs a context-sensitive expression, and the other 
reports the existence of the same state o f  affairs, or the occurrence o f  the same 
event, but does so without context-sensitive expressions, resulting in a freely 
repeatable sentence. The second analogy between senses and roles is that the sense 
o f  a non-indexical expression determines its reference, while the role of an indexical 
is responsible for determining its reference on a particular occasion o f  use. Thirdly, 
the role o f  an indexical is an objective part of its meaning. Every competent speaker 
o f  the language learns the same thing when they learn how to use an indexical 
correctly. Similarly, the sense o f  an expression is an objective part o f  that 
expression's meaning. When we grasp the sense o f  an expression we each grasp the 
same thing. Finally, the sense o f  a complete sentence, or the thought it expresses, is
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a function o f  the senses o f  its constituent expressions. Since sentences containing 
indexicals express complete thoughts, it would seem natural to infer that indexicals 
express senses which contribute to the complete thought expressed by a sentence of 
which it is a constituent.
However, despite this abundance o f  analogies between senses and roles, that 
is not the end o f  the story. There are also many disanalogies between senses and 
roles. After examining these disanalogies we may conclude, on balance, that the role 
o f  an indexical cannot be subsumed under the notion o f  a Fregean sense.
6.6 Some Disanalogies Between Senses and Roles
Senses serve to identify uniquely the referent o f  an expression, and thus are 
themselves expressible by qualitative definite descriptions, according to the 
traditional interpretation o f  sense. An expression such as 'The Morning Star' 
expresses a sense, and that sense serves to pick out the unique object which is the 
referent o f  the expression on each occasion of its use. There is thus a stable and 
permanent relation between the sense and the referent o f  a non-indexical expression.5 
The role o f  an indexical, on the other hand, serves to pick out the referent o f  the 
expression on a particular occasion o f  use by appeal to features o f  the context in 
which it is uttered. The same indexical, when used on different occasions, can serve 
to pick out different referents, while retaining the same invariant role. Thus, the 
relation between the role o f  an indexical and its referent on different occasions o f  use 
is a changing one. Furthermore, the role o f  an indexical does not determine its 
referent in the same way that the sense o f  a non-indexical expression determines that 
expression's referent. Senses, as I have said, determine reference by means o f  a 
uniquely identifying definite description o f  the referent.6 Roles, on the other hand, 
determine the reference by picking out a feature o f  the context o f  utterance as 
referent. They do not do this via a mediating definite description o f  the referent. 
Indeed it is possible to use an indexical and successfully refer to the appropriate 
referent without being able to identify that referent by means o f  any definite
A ccording to L ew is (1986 ) definite descriptions are m odally  indexica l in that their 
reference can vary depending on the world in w hich they are uttered. M y concern here is w ith  
expressions w hose reference varies according to particular features o f  the context in  w hich  they are 
uttered w here w e, as language users, arc aware o f  this variability o f  reference. H ence I 
acknow ledge Lewis' proposal, but I w ill ignore it for the purposes o f  this chapter.
6 E vans (1982) and D um m ett (1973 ) interpret Frege's account o f  sense and its relation to
reference in  a slightly different way. However, their notion o f  a 'm ode o f  presentation' o f  the 
referent still differs significantly from the connection betw een an indexica l and its referent.
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description. For example, imagine being on the overnight train from London to 
Edinburgh, and waking up at some point in the night. One could ask oneself 'I 
wonder what time it is now?'. By using the temporal indexical one is referring to the 
time o f  utterance, but one might perfectly well be unable to pick out that time by 
means o f  any definite description. One could also, quite reasonably ask oneself 
where one is, and be able successfully to refer to tjiat place as 'here', but not be able 
to identify it under any other description. So, senses and roles serve to identify their 
respective referents in quite different ways. Furthermore, the relation between sense 
and referent on the one hand, and role and referent on the other, are relations o f  a 
quite different nature. The descriptive sense o f  a non-context-dependent expression 
is satisfied by the same object no matter what utterance it occurs in. The role o f  an 
indexical, however, may be satisfied by different objects as it occurs in different 
utterances.
The role o f  an indexical is a rule that carries us from the context o f  utterance 
to the referent. The sense o f  a non-indexical carries us directly to the referent, 
without appeal to any feature o f  the context o f  utterance, uniquely specifying it by 
means o f  some definite description. Thus, as we saw earlier, both roles and senses 
are objective, and can be grasped equally by different speakers o f  the language. 
However, the fact that they are both objectively available to speakers o f  the language 
is not, after all, a point o f  analogy between them. Their functions are entirely 
different, and indeed, can even be mutually exclusive, since one can successfully 
refer indexically without being able to refer descriptively, and vice versa.
These considerations suggest a further disanalogy between senses and roles. 
It is possible for a non-context-dependent expression to have a sense, but no 
reference. For example, the term 'unicorn' has a sense. A token o f  it is capable o f  
contributing to the thought expressed by a sentence o f  which it is a constituent. 
However, it does not refer to anything that exists. Since there are no unicorns, there 
is nothing in the world to which a token o f  the expression 'unicorn' refers. A token 
o f  an indexical, on the other hand, always has a referent. It is difficult even to make 
sense of the notion o f  a particular token of an indexical having a role but no referent. 
Whenever an indexical is produced it refers to a particular feature o f  the context in 
which it is produced. Thus, the very production o f  a token o f  an indexical 
guarantees that that indexical token has a reference.
The most significant point o f  disanalogy between senses and roles concerns 
Frege's criteria of difference for senses and thoughts. The sense o f  a sentence, for 
Frege, is identified with the thought it expresses. According to Perry (1977) there
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are three distinct criteria o f  difference for determining whether two different 
expressions have the same sense, or whether two sentences express the same 
thought. The three criteria are as follows:
(1) I f  A understands S and S', and accepts S  as true while not accepting S', then S 
and S' have different senses.
(2 ) I f  S is true and S' is not, S  and S' express different thoughts.
(3) I f  '^ 4 believes S' is true, and A believes S" is not, then S  and S' do not have the 
same indirect reference. (Perry (1977) p. 476).
These three criteria o f  difference are very closely related to each other, since Frege 
identifies the sense o f  a sentence with the thought it expresses and with its indirect 
reference. In order to identify this disanalogy between senses and roles I will take a 
pair o f  sentence tokens, only one o f  which contains a context-dependent expression, 
and apply the three criteria o f  difference to them.
S : Saturday is tomorrow (uttered on Friday)
S': Saturday is the day o f  the 14th annual egg and spoon race
Suppose both S  and S' are true. That is, S  correctly identifies Saturday as the day 
following the day on which S  is uttered. S', on the other hand, correctly identifies 
the same day, Saturday, as the day that satisfies the definite description 'being the 
day o f  the 14th annual egg and spoon race'. According to the first criterion of 
difference S  and S' have different senses, since it is clearly possible for someone who 
understands both sentence tokens to accept one as true while believing the other to 
be false. The second criterion o f  difference does not apply in this case, since both 
sentence tokens are true. However, since we already know that S  and S' have 
different senses, we are entitled to conclude that they express different thoughts, 
because Frege identifies the sense of a sentence with the thought it expresses. 
Finally, the third criterion o f  difference shows that S  and S' do not have the same 
indirect reference.
Clearly, S  and S' differ in sense. However, the indexical sentence S  expresses 
a complete thought. The sense o f  the sentence as a whole is made up o f  the senses 
o f  its constituents, so the indexical expression 'tomorrow' must, according to Frege, 
contribute a sense of some sort to the sense of the whole. There are two possible 
candidates for the sense o f  the indexical expression. Firstly, the expression could
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contribute the object it specifies to the sense o f  the sentence. This is unacceptable 
because the object specified, the day following the day o f  utterance, is the referent o f  
the expression, and the sense o f  the whole must be made up o f  the senses, not the 
referents, o f  the parts. The second candidate for the sense o f  'tomorrow' is the role 
o f  the expression. The role is the rule that identifies, for any context o f  utterance, 
the referent o f  the expression in that context. Foe 'tomorrow', the role identifies the 
day following the day o f  utterance as referent. However, the role o f  the indexical 
cannot be identified as the sense that the expression contributes to the sense o f  a 
sentence in which it occurs for the following reason. Two tokens o f  the same 
sentence type 'Tomorrow is Saturday' can express different thoughts when uttered in 
different contexts. However, the role o f  the indexical, which we are supposing to be 
the sense o f  the indexical, remains invariant in these two different contexts. This 
results in the unsatisfactory situation that the same expression, 'tomorrow', 
contributes the same aspect o f  meaning, its role, as sense, to two tokens of the same 
sentence 'Tomorrow is Saturday', but the result is that each token expresses a 
different thought. A Friday token of 'Tom orrow  is Saturday' is true, but a Saturday 
token o f  the same sentence type is false. By the second criterion o f  difference, these 
two tokens express different thoughts. However, on the supposition that the role o f  
the indexical is its sense, this expression has contributed the same sense to tokens o f  
the same sentence, but the result is that the two tokens express different thoughts.
Clearly, the role o f  an indexical cannot be subsumed under the notion o f  a 
Fregean sense because it results in a violation o f  the criteria o f  difference for senses. 
Furthermore, the role o f  an indexical and the sense o f  a non-indexical, as I noted 
earlier in this section, behave quite differently, and stand in quite different relations 
to the referents they identify. 1 conclude that roles cannot be identified with senses.7 
I f  roles were to be identified with senses, the coherence and integrity o f  the notion of 
sense as it stands, would have to be unacceptably compromised.
At this stage in my investigation I find myself in the following situation. 
There remains an objective difference between the meaning o f  a tensed sentence 
token and the meaning o f  the tenseless sentence that states its truth conditions. This 
difference in meaning does not exist at the level o f  truth conditions, since two such
D avid  W oodruff Sm ith (1981 ) acknow ledges som e o f  these d ifferences betw een the roles o f  
in d ex ica ls and traditional Fregean senses, but concludes that indexica ls do have senses. He argues 
that indexical senses arc 'non-standard'. 1 find this conclusion  unhelpful for, w h ile  I recognize the 
an a log ies betw een senses and roles, the d isanalogies clearly illustrate that senses and roles are two 
quite different species o f  m eaning. To collect them together under the sam e heading confuses, 
rather than clarifies the nature o f  each.
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sentence tokens have the same truth conditions while remaining untranslatable by 
each other. Michelle Beer identifies this difference as a difference in sense, but does 
not elaborate on what she means by this. I examined the Fregean distinction 
between sense and reference in order to determine whether these two levels of 
meaning in any way mirror the two levels of meaning that exist in tensed sentences. 
The latter two levels o f  meaning are the one that exists at the level o f  truth 
conditions, and the one that results in the difference in meaning between a tensed 
sentence token and its tenseless co-reporting counterpart. At first the investigation 
appeared fruitful, as there were some significant analogies between Frege's notion of 
sense and the role o f  an indexical expression. This notion o f  role is what 
differentiates a tensed sentence token, or a sentence token containing an indexical, 
from the tenseless sentence that states its truth conditions, as it is what renders 
tensed or indexical sentences context-sensitive. However, despite the analogies 
between senses and roles, the disanalogies between these two notions turned out to 
be more significant. Senses and roles behave in such different ways that it is neither 
possible nor illuminating to force them into the same category. Indeed, the notion of 
Fregean sense cannot remain intact if it is widened to include the roles o f  indexicals.
I therefore conclude, at this stage, that we must look elsewhere for the true nature o f  
what Beer calls the difference in sense between tensed and tenseless co-reporting 
sentence tokens.
6.7 A Tensed Solution to the Meaning Problem?
Quentin Smith (1990) has a suggestion as to what might account for the 
difference in meaning between tensed and tenseless co-reporting sentence tokens. 
He responds to Beer's article by arguing that it does not necessarily support the 
tenseless theory o f  time. Speaking o f  the co-reporting utterances 'It is t7 now' 
uttered at /7, and 'It is /7 at /7', he writes:
[T]he premises, that the tensed and tenseless utterances differ in sense 
but refer to the same relata and ascribe the same relation, do not 
entail that the tensed utterance does not ascribe an irreducible A
property.....The locus o f  the invalidity is Beer's and Gale's admission
that the two utterances differ in sense. Neither Beer nor Gale 
explains the exact nature o f  this difference in sense, and the premise 
that the two utterances both refer to /7 and say o f  t7 that it is 
simultaneous with itself is compatible with the supposition that their
difference in sense consists in the fact that the tensed utterance alone 
conveys the information that /7 has an irreducible A property of 
presentness. (Smith (1990) p. 214).8
What are we to make o f  this suggestion? Smith claims that the premises of 
the co-reporting theory do not rule out the conclusion that a tensed utterance 
ascribes an irreducible property o f  pastness, presentness or futurity to the state of 
affairs reported by it In essence then, he argues that he can accept the premises of 
the co-reporting theory, which are that co-reporting utterances differ in sense, but 
refer to the same relata and ascribe the same relation, but that he can undermine its 
conclusion by claiming that the sense o f  the tensed utterance serves to ascribe a 
monadic temporal property to the relata.
My initial response to this suggestion is that there is something implausible 
about agreeing that tensed and tenseless sentence tokens are co-reporting in the way 
that Beer outlines, but then insisting that only one o f  these co-reporting utterances 
ascribes a monadic temporal property. If one of these sentence tokens serves to 
ascribe such a property to a moment, event, or state o f  affairs, but the other one 
does not, then one might reasonably argue that they are not, after all, co-reporting. 
Indeed a difference in meaning o f  this kind would surely reveal itself in the truth 
conditions of the tensed sentence token. One of the conditions for the truth o f  the 
tensed sentence token would have to be that the relevant time, event or state of 
affairs possesses the relevant tensed property. Thus, Smith's claim that his proposal 
is consistent with the premises o f  the co-reporting theory seems dubious. However,
I shall let this objection pass for the time being in order to analyse his proposal more 
closely.
According to Smith's position, the tensed sentence 
u: Jones is now running
where u is uttered at /7, refers to the same relata and ascribes the same relation 
between them as its co-reporting counterpart
v: Jones is running at /7
T he reference to Gale in this quotation is to an article co-authored by Richard G ale and 
M ich elle  Beer (1984), in w hich they provide further support for the co-reporting theory.
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That is, they both refer to the event of Jones' running, and to the time t7. They also 
both ascribe the temporal relation o f  simultaneity between this event and this time. 
However, in addition, the tensed sentence token ascribes the monadic tensed 
property o f  presentness to the relata. Thus, formally, the tensed sentence token it is 
responsible for effecting the following three linguistic functions:
(i) It refers to, or denotes the event or state o f  affairs reported by u.
(ii) It ascribes the temporal relation o f  simultaneity between the event reported, 
Jones' running, and the time /7, the time at which u is produced.
(iii) It ascribes the irreducible, non-relational property o f  presentness to the event 
reported, and to the time /7.
The co-reporting theory claims that the tensed sentence token effects 
functions (i) and (ii). Smith's claim is that function (iii) is consistent with the claims 
o f  the co-reporting theory. Furthermore, he claims that function (iii) just is the 
difference in sense between the tensed and tenseless co-reporting utterances it and v. 
I f  Smith is right, then a tensed sentence token such as u would have to express both 
a dyadic relation and a monadic property. It seems to me that there is an inherent 
difficulty in accepting this position.
A one-place predicate such as '...is red' and a two-place predicate such as 
'...is smaller than...' perform quite different and wholly incompatible logical 
functions. The former expresses a monadic property, the latter a dyadic relation. Is 
it possible for one expression to carry out both of these logical functions? Let us 
allow that it is and see what follows. For an utterance, v, which occurs at time t of  
the sentence 'e is now' to ascribe both the dyadic relation o f  simultaneity and the 
monadic property o f  presentness, it must be analysable as follows:
ip: e is simultaneous with /, and e is present, and t is present.
Notice that the second conjunct o f  w' is synonymous with it, and consequently, must 
be subject to the same analysis. If Smith's position is to be maintained, the analysis 
o f  the second conjunct o f  w must run as follows:
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x: e is simultaneous with /', and e is present, and t' is present.
Here, /' denotes the moment o f  production o f  w. A full analysis o f  the original 
utterance, //, can thus be given as follows:
y: e is simultaneous with /, and c is simultaneous with and e is present, and t
is present, and t' is present.
It should now be clear that this analysis has embarked on an infinite regress, and one 
which I believe to be vicious. This is because it is supposed to provide an analysis o f  
the finite sentence token 'e is now’. Any analysis of this token ought to be finite if it 
is to be a complete and correct analysis. Thus, if Smith's position is committed to a 
regress in the way I have outlined, then his contention that a sentence containing the 
expression '...is now' ascribes both a dyadic relation and a monadic property is not 
acceptable.
There are two possible rejoinders open to Smith against this line of attack. 
The first is to deny that the expressions '...is now' and '...is present' are synonymous. 
The vicious infinite regress would then not ensue because the second conjunct o f  w 
would not be open to the same analysis as that appropriate for u. A complete and 
tinite analysis of // would therefore be given by w alone. Would this defence be 
consistent with Smith's overall position? 1 think not. Smith attributes the following, 
rather versatile role to the expression '...is present'. He claims in his article (1990) 
that it can be used merely predicatively (to ascribe the property o f  presentness) and 
both referentially and predicatively (to pick out a moment o f  time and ascribe to it 
the property o f  presentness). Furthermore, he notes that it can sometimes be taken 
as being synonymous with '...is now'. On these occasions, he suggests, 'We should 
interpret this use o f  'the present' as being in a relevant sense both a referential and 
predicative use' (Smith (1990) p. 221). Thus, a token u o f  the sentence 'e is now' 
uttered at time t, refers to e and refers to /. Since Smith is claiming that his analysis 
is consistent with the claims of the co-reporting theory, this sentence token, on his 
analysis must also ascribe the temporal relation o f  simultaneity between this event 
and this time, and it also ascribes the property o f  presentness to both relata o f  the 
temporal relation.
We can take it then, that according to Smith it is possible for the expressions 
'now' and 'present' to be synonymous, and that when this is so the latter expression is 
both referential and predicative in nature. So, are they synonymous as used within
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the context o f  my argument, or can Smith safely claim that within that context '...is 
present' is merely predicative, thus avoiding the infinite regress?
In another article Smith (1987b) relies on the mutual entailment of the two 
sentences '1980 is now' and '1980 is present' while arguing for the tensed theory o f  
time. This is illuminating for my purposes because it means that within a context 
such as this, Smith is forced to maintain that the expression '...is present' must be 
taken as being both referential and predicative. If he did not, this mutual entailment 
would not hold. That is, if the expression '...is present', as employed in the sentence 
'1980 is present' were merely predicative, that sentence would not entail the sentence 
'1980 is now', which for Smith is both referential and predicative. So, in order to 
maintain a consistent overall position, Smith must hold that, within the context o f  my 
argument, the expression '...is present' is both referential and predicative. 
Furthermore, since he is also arguing that his position is consistent with the co­
reporting theory, the sentence 'e is present' must also ascribe the temporal relation o f  
simultaneity between event e and the time of its utterance. We can conclude from all 
this that Smith cannot adopt the defence I offered him, and that he is indeed 
committed to the vicious infinite regress that I have outlined.
In the preceding discussion I noted that Smith holds that the expression '...is 
now' is both referential and predicative. This suggests a second strategy available to 
him to counteract the vicious infinite regress. Smith could relinquish the second o f  
the three linguistic functions o f  a sentence containing the term 'now'. The second 
function o f  such a sentence was that it serves to ascribe the dyadic relation of 
simultaneity between its two referents, namely, the event or state o f  affairs it is 
about, and the time at which it is produced. The motivation for making this move 
would be that by asserting that a token o f  the sentence 7 is now', uttered at t, 
ascribes simultaneity between a moment o f  time (the time I) and the same moment o f  
time referred to by the use o f  a temporal indexical, this function adds nothing of any 
content to the analysis o f  the temporal indexical. After all, to assert that t is 
simultaneous with / is merely to assert a tautology, as any moment of time is 
necessarily simultaneous with itself. The analysis of 7 is now' can be achieved by 
claiming that its linguistic functions are just that it denotes a time, and that it ascribes 
the monadic property o f  presentness to that time. This removes the difficulty of 
asserting that the expression ascribes both a dyadic relation and a monadic property 
and, it seems, does so at no cost to the informational content o f  the temporal 
expression, as we have simply removed a tautology. This strategy amounts to a 
rejection o f  the co-reporting theory.
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Smith does not adopt this strategy because his claim is that the co-reporting 
theory is compatible with the tensed theory. Furthermore, its consequences are 
unacceptable. To see this, consider a token, z, of the sentence 7 is past' uttered at tv 
(In what follows a parallel argument can be constructed for the sentence 7 is future'). 
I f  we extrapolate from Smith's position with respect to 7 is now', the three linguistic 
functions o f  this tensed sentence are:
(i') It refers to a time, t.
(ii') It asserts that t stands in the temporal relation o f  being earlier than tx.
(iii') It ascribes the irreducible, non-relational property o f  pastness to t.
N ote that (ii') and (iii') are incompatible with one another in the same way as are (ii) 
and (iii). If the sentence 7 is past' is to fulfil both o f  these functions then it must be 
analysable as 7 is earlier than , and / is past'. The second conjunct o f  the analysans 
is synonymous with the analysandum, so it is subject to a reapplication o f  the 
analysis. Thus, we embark once more on a vicious infinite regress.
If  we eliminate (ii1) to remove the incompatibility o f  (ii1) and (iii'), the results 
are unacceptable. By losing this linguistic function, the tensed sentence token no 
longer reports that the same state o f  affairs exists as the sentence we previously took 
to be its co-reporting counterpart: 7 is earlier than This amounts to the denial 
that the occurrence o f  an event, or a state o f  affairs, can be described in tensed terms 
as well as in terms o f  its temporal relations to other moments, and in particular, to 
the moment at which the tensed token is produced. The same consequence applies if 
we deny that the sentence 7 is now' fulfils function (ii). That is, it no longer reports 
that the same state of affairs exists as its co-reporting counterpart 7 is simultaneous 
with /'. Clearly, Smith does not make this move because he agrees with the 
fundamental claims o f  the co-reporting theory, that two such utterances do in fact 
report that the same state o f  affairs exists.
The motivation for relinquishing the second function o f  a tensed sentence 
appears stronger in the case o f  a present tensed sentence, since the relevant temporal 
relation is simultaneity. Thus, the co-reporting counterpart o f  7 is now' uttered at t 
is 7 is simultaneous with which is a tautology. However, in the case o f  past or 
future tensed sentences, the co-reporting counterparts are not tautologous, and the 
real implications o f  denying their co-reporting nature become apparent. To do this is
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to subscribe to a pure tensed theory, with all its attendant problems, rather than the 
hybrid tensed and tenseless theory that Smith wants to maintain. By advocating the 
position that a tensed utterance fulfils functions (i), (ii), and (iii), Smith is effectively 
asserting that such an utterance has tenseless truth conditions (by maintaining (ii)), 
but he is further claiming that this provides only part o f  the full analysis of tensed 
terms. In other words, he is claiming that a tensed utterance has both tenseless truth 
conditions and tensed truth conditions.9 The argument that I have put forward 
shows that this position is untenable.
There is a further difficulty with Smith's characterization of the temporal 
indexical 'now1 that is worth exploring briefly. He maintains that the ascription of the 
monadic property o f  presentness to an event, moment, or state o f  affairs explains the 
difference in sense between tensed and tenseless co-reporting sentence tokens. 
There is a corresponding difference in sense between spatially and personally tensed 
and tenseless co-reporting sentence tokens. For example, consider the spatially 
tensed sentence token 'Leeds is here', uttered in Leeds, and its spatially tenseless co­
reporting counterpart 'Leeds is at the same location as Leeds'. Would Smith wish to 
maintain that the sense of the spatially tensed token 'Leeds is here' consists in its 
ascribing to Leeds the monadic property of'hereness ' 109 I suggest that, at the very 
least, people who are not located in Leeds would disagree with this claim. If  he 
relies on this argument to insist that temporally tensed monadic properties exist, he 
must be prepared either to accept the existence of spatially and personally tensed 
monadic properties, or to provide a good reason why it is only the meanings o f  
temporal indexicals that are deficient unless such properties exist.
To conclude this section I return to my original objection to Smith's proposal 
as to what accounts for the dilference in sense between tensed and tenseless co­
reporting utterances. The problem that I am addressing in this chapter, and the 
problem that Smith claims to address with his proposal, is how to account for the 
objective dilference in meaning between a tensed sentence token and the tenseless 
sentence that states its truth conditions. Since two such sentence tokens have the 
same truth conditions, the difference between them in meaning does not exist at the 
level o f  truth conditions. Each sentence picks out the very same extra-linguistic 
entities and ascribes the very same properties to them and relations between them.
9 In his (1993) Smith cla im s explicitly  that he believes that tensed sentence tokens have both  
tensed and tenseless truth conditions.
10 A s far as 1 know, only two philosophers, Swinburne (1990) and Sosa (1979 , 1983a) 
advocate the ex istence o f spatially tensed m onadic properties such as 'hereness'.
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To argue, as Smith does, that the difference in meaning between them consists in the 
fact that only one o f  them ascribes a monadic tensed property to these extra- 
linguistic entities is thus to deny that the difference between them does not exist at 
the level o f  truth conditions. It is, rather, to claim that there is a difference between 
them in the extra-linguistic entities that they each pick out, since one, and only one, 
o f  them picks out a monadic tensed property as a constituent o f  reality. If  he was 
ri«ht then there would be a difference between two such sentence tokens that does 
exist at the level o f  truth conditions. In other words, Smith's proposal introduces a 
difference in meaning that exists at the extensional level, but ex hyposthesi there is 
no such difference. His proposal addresses the wrong aspect o f  meaning. As we 
saw, however, a close examination o f  this proposal on its own merits reveals that it 
is wholly unacceptable.
In the next section I turn to David Kaplan's (1989) distinction between the 
character and the content o f  expressions, to see if this can shed any light on the 
objective difference in meaning between tensed and tenseless co-reporting sentence 
tokens.
6.8 Kaplan’s Distinction Between Character and Content
Kaplan (1989) identifies two different kinds o f  meaning which can 
appropriately be ascribed to complete sentences and to meaningful constituents o f  
sentences. The distinction is most noticeable, however, when the sentences or 
meaningful expressions to which it is applied are context-sensitive. The first kind of 
meaning identified by Kaplan is the content, or 'what is said' (Kaplan (1989) p. 500). 
The content of a sentence token, as produced in a particular context is the same as 
that which 'has traditionally been called a proposition' (Ibid.). To illustrate the 
notion o f  the content, or what is said by a sentence, suppose I produce an utterance 
o f  the sentence type 'I am going to the opera tomorrow' on Friday, and Fred 
produces an utterance of the same sentence type on Tuesday. Suppose it is the case 
that I am going to the opera on Saturday, and Fred is going to the opera on 
Wednesday. Each of our utterances is true. However, it cannot be denied that each 
utterance says something different from the other. My utterance is about me, and 
Fred's is about Fred. We are each talking about distinct operatic productions, since 
mine occurs on Saturday and Fred's occurs on Wednesday. Each utterance has a 
distinct content. The content o f  each can be identified by fixing upon the extra- 
linguistic entities in the world that the sentence tokens refer to in their respective 
contexts. Furthermore, it is clear that different tokens o f  this same sentence type, as
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uttered in different contexts can have different truth-values. The existence of this 
possibility shows that such tokens each have distinct contents.
A sentence with no context-sensitive components has the same content in 
every context in which it is uttered. Context-sensitive sentences can express 
different contents in different contexts. Furthermore, tokens o f  distinct sentence 
types can express the same content as each other in the appropriate contexts. For 
example, a token uttered on Sunday o f  the sentence type 'United lost the match 
yesterday', and a token uttered on Tuesday of'United lost the match three days ago', 
can be said to have the same content, according to Kaplan, although they are tokens 
o f  distinct sentence types. Each refers to the same event, that o f  United losing the 
match on a particular day, but each locates that event at a different temporal distance 
from the moment of utterance. This is because the time o f  the context o f  utterance 
is different in each case, so the temporal distance between the time of utterance and 
the event reported is different and needs to be accounted for.
In a similar way, the content of individual constituent expressions of a 
complete sentence token can vary from context to context. The content o f 'I ' varies 
according to who utters it. The content o f  'now' varies according to when it is 
uttered. Other expressions have fixed contents, such as the predicate '...is blue' 
which refers to the property o f  being blue on each occasion o f  its utterance. The 
content o f  an expression is that which it refers to; the extra-linguistic entity that it 
identifies.
The notion of the content o f  a sentence token in a particular context is thus 
comparable to Frege's notion o f  the thought expressed by a sentence. Frege noticed 
that we have to change indexicals in order to 'say the same thing' in different 
contexts of utterance. It is also comparable to the notion o f  the truth-conditional 
content o f  a sentence token as uttered in a particular context. The content o f  a 
sentence token can be identified as that which is given by the truth conditions o f  that 
sentence token in its context o f  utterance . 11 The truth conditions of tokens of a non- 
context-sensitive sentence type are the same on each occasion o f  use, and tokens o f  
such a sentence type have, in Kaplan's terminology, a fixed content. For example, 
tokens o f  the sentence type 'Neil Armstrong lands on the moon in 1969' have the 
same truth conditions whenever they may be uttered. Each token is true if and only
11 At least, this is the case on a dale version o f  an account o f  the tenseless truth conditions o f
tensed sentences, w hich  is the format in w hich Kaplan d iscusses the notion o f  content. In the next 
section  I w ill illustrate how the central insights o f  Kaplan's notion o f  content can be preserved  
w ithin  a token-reflexive version o f  the tenseless truth conditions o f  tensed sentences.
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if Neil Armstrong lands on the moon in 1969. Since Neil Armstrong did land on the 
moon in 1969, the truth conditions o f  each token o f  this sentence are satisfied, and 
each token says the same thing.
Tokens o f  context-sensitive sentences, on the other hand, have different truth 
conditions for each occasion o f  utterance. For example, tokens o f  the sentence type 
'Neil Armstrong landed on the moon yesterday', have different truth conditions 
whenever uttered, because the time of utterance itself enters into the truth 
conditions. Thus an utterance o f  this sentence token on 22 July 1969 is true if and 
only if Neil Armstrong landed on the moon the day before 22 July 1969. Utterances 
o f  the same sentence type on different days vary accordingly in their truth conditions. 
In Kaplan's terminology, distinct utterances of this sentence type have different 
contents from each other; they each say something different. Thus, we have the 
notion o f  the content of a sentence token, or o f  a meaningful expression, which can 
best be thought o f  as what is said by a sentence token or an expression. It is 
equivalent to the notion o f  a contextually specific proposition expressed by a 
sentence token.
The other half o f  Kaplan's distinction is the notion of the character o f  a 
sentence token, or o f  a meaningful expression. The character is 'that which 
determines the content is varying contexts' (Kaplan (1989) p. 505). Thus, the 
character o f  an expression is a function that takes one from the context o f  that 
expression's utterance to its content in that context. Non-context-sensitive 
expressions, which have the same content in all contexts, have a fixed character. 
The notion of character is thus most noticeable in expressions and sentence tokens 
that are context-sensitive. In other words, expressions and sentence tokens that are, 
or contain indexicals, or are tensed, or in some other way depend on the context of 
their utterance in order to determine their content, have a character which is a 
significant component of their meaning.
The notion of character is thus comparable to Perry's notion of the role of an 
indexical, although Kaplan's notion is more widely applied than Perry's. Kaplan 
applies the notion of character to sentence tokens and to meaningful expressions, 
both context-sensitive and non-context-sensitive. The character o f  an indexical, or 
otherwise context-sensitive expression, being the function that determines the 
content in each context, is that which we learn when we learn how to use such 
expressions correctly. We learn that, in order to discern the content, or what is said 
by an utterance of'here' we have to look to a certain feature o f  the context in which 
it is uttered, that is, we have to identify the spatial location in which it is uttered.
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This rule or function for determining the content o f  an expression on any given 
occasion of utterance is the expression's character. The character is thus, in one 
sense, a constant part o f  the meaning of a context-sensitive expression. We employ 
the very same function on each occasion of its utterance to identify the varying 
content o f  such an expression. Thus, Kaplan notes 'It is natural to think o f  it [the 
character] as meaning in the sense of what is known by the competent language 
user.' (Kaplan (1989) p. 505). The character is a constant function of the expression 
type which yields a different content for each token utterance o f  the expression.
We now have at our disposal an exposition of Kaplan's distinction between 
character and content. In the next section I will employ this distinction in an 
examination of tensed and tenseless sentences in order to see if it sheds any light on 
the objective difference between them in meaning that does not reveal itself in their 
truth conditions. Furthermore, I will consider whether the central features of 
Kaplan's distinction can be retained within a token-reflexive account o f  the tenseless 
truth conditions o f  tensed sentences.
6.9 The Characters and Contents o f  Tensed and Tenseless Sentences
Let us examine a token, /;, o f  the tensed sentence type 'The volcano is now 
erupting', uttered on 22 April 1996, and a token, q, o f  the tenseless sentence type 
'The volcano erupts on 22 April 1996'. According to one version o f  the tenseless 
theory, the date version, q states the truth conditions o f  p. Kaplan's discussion of 
character and content includes the supposition that indexicals are directly referential, 
that is, indexicals refer directly to their referents, rather than referring through the 
mediation o f  a Fregean sense, or 'manner of presentation'. Consequently, in giving 
an account of the content, or the truth conditions o f  a tensed sentence token 
Kaplan's theory will inevitably include a reference to the time at which that token is 
produced Hence, his account generates a date version o f  the tenseless theory. 
What is Kaplan's motivation for insisting on the direct reference theory of indexicals? 
In 'Demonstratives' (1989), he writes:
The semantical feature that I wish to highlight in calling an expression 
directly referential is not the/c/c7 that it designates the same object in 
every circumstance, but the way in which it designates an object in 
any circumstance. Such an expression is a device o f direct reference.
This does not imply that it has no conventionally fixed semantical 
rules which determine its referent in each context o f  use; quite the
opposite. There are semantical rules which determine the referent in 
each context o f  use - but that is all. The rules do not provide a 
complex which together with a circumstance oj evaluation yields an 
object. They just provide an object. (Kaplan (1989) p. 495, all italics 
are his).
In emphasizing the directly referential nature of indexicals, Kaplan is focusing on the 
way in which a context-sensitive expression picks out its referent. He is arguing that 
such expressions differ from non-context-sensitive expressions in that they do not 
pick out their referent via any mediating definite description or sense, but do so 
directly. A context-sensitive expression is associated with a rule, and for any token 
o f  that expression the rule identifies a particular feature of the context in which it is 
produced as the referent o f  that token in that context. A token-reflexive account of 
the truth conditions o f  tensed sentence tokens can preserve all that is valuable in 
Kaplan's motivation for insisting on the directly referential nature of temporally 
context-sensitive expressions, while stopping short of incorporating times in the 
truth conditions o f  such sentence tokens. This is significant because, as we saw in 
chapter 2 , there are various problems associated with including times as referents in 
the truth conditions of tensed sentence tokens, problems to which a token-reflexive 
theory o f  the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences is immune. In what follows I will 
examine how Kaplan's distinction between character and content can provide an 
account o f  the difference in meaning between a tensed sentence token and the 
tenseless sentence that states its truth conditions. I will illustrate how this account 
yields a date version of the tenseless truth conditions o f  tensed sentence tokens. I 
will then show, in the next section, how Kaplan's insights can be preserved while 
providing a token-reflexive version of the tenseless truth conditions o f  tensed 
sentence tokens.
Thus, we have a token of a tensed sentence, p, and a token, <7, o f  the 
tenseless sentence that states its truth conditions, according to the date version o f  the 
tenseless theory, p and q also have the same truth conditions on this account They 
are both true if and only if the volcano erupts on 22 April 1996. Thus, we have an 
instance o f  the general problem being addressed in this chapter. We have two 
sentence tokens that clearly differ in meaning, but that difference is not discernible in 
their truth conditions. In Beer's terminology, we have tensed and tenseless co­
reporting sentence tokens that differ from each other in 'sense'. Let us see if the
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distinction between character and content can shed any light on what accounts for 
the difference between them.
The sentence tokens p  and q have the same content. They each say the same 
thing about the world, by referring to the same extra-linguistic entities, the volcano's 
eruption and the time o f  that event, and by ascribing the same properties and 
relations to these referents. Their respective contents are given by their truth 
conditions, and since they have the same truth conditions as each other, they have 
the same content. However, p  and q differ from each other in character, p  is a 
token o f  a sentence type that has a context-sensitive character. The contents of 
tokens of this type vary according to the contexts in which they are uttered. The 
character of the sentence type is a function from the context in which a token o f  it is 
produced to the content in that context, <:/, on the other hand, is a token o f  a 
sentence type with a fixed character. It has the same content in every context in 
which tokens of it are produced. The sentence type of which q is a token always 
says the same thing, but the sentence type o f  which p  is a token can have different 
contents in different contexts o f  utterance. We thus have, it seems, the beginnings of 
an explanation of the problem under discussion in this chapter. However, the 
application o f  the distinction between content and character to tensed and tenseless 
co-reporting sentence tokens needs to be examined more closely before we can 
conclude that it provides a complete solution to our problem.
The principle of semantic compositionality is the thesis that the meaning o f  a 
sentence is a function o f  the meanings of its smallest meaningful parts. According to 
Kaplan, the principle o f  semantic compositionality applies separately to both the 
character and the content o f  a sentence. The character o f  a sentence is a function of 
the characters of its parts. Sentence token p  has, as a constituent, the indexical 
expression 'now' which has a context-sensitive character. Consequently, the 
character of p  as a whole is context-sensitive. However, it is not only sentences 
containing explicitly indexical expressions that have context-sensitive characters. 
Any tensed sentence implicitly makes reference to the context in which it is uttered, 
for example, by means o f  verbal tense, in specifying its content, and thus has a 
context-sensitive character. The constituents of sentence token q, on the other hand, 
each have a fixed character, and thus q as a whole has a fixed character.
The principle o f  compositionality also applies to the contents o f  sentences. 
The content of a sentence token as a whole is a function o f  the contents o f  its 
smallest meaningful parts. The contents of the constituents o f  p  are determined by 
reference to the context in which p is uttered and, once identified, contribute to the
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content o f  p  as a whole. No reference to the context o f  utterance need be made in 
order to determine the contents of the constituents o f  q. Each constituent 
contributes its content, the same content in each context o f  utterance, to the content 
o f  fy as a whole. With respect to the adherence o f  his notion o f  content to the 
principle o f  compositionality, Kaplan makes the following remark:
I f  two compound, well-formed expressions, each set in (possibly 
different) contexts differ only with respect to components which 
when taken in their respective contexts have the same content, then 
the content of the two compounds each taken in its own context is 
the same. (Kaplan (1989) p. 507).
Sentence tokens p  and q differ from each other only with respect to certain o f  their 
components, p  contains the indexical expression 'now' and q contains the non 
indexical expression 'on 22 April 1996'. However, when 'now' in p  is taken in its 
appropriate context, the character of this expression determines as content the day 
which can also be denoted as 22 April 1996. Thus, two sentence tokens such as p  
and <7, when taken in their respective contexts have the same content. They are not 
synonymous however, because they differ from each other in one aspect o f  their 
meaning, viz., their character.
Another important feature o f  Kaplan's distinction between character and 
content is that it provides us with a good reason why indexicals cannot be translated 
by non-indexicals, and why tensed sentences cannot be translated by their tenseless 
co-reporting counterparts. An utterance of'now' at time t refers to / via its context- 
sensitive character. That particular utterance o f  'now' has the same referent as an 
utterance o f  the non-context-sensitive expression 'at l'. However, it does not follow 
from the fact that these two token utterances have the same referent that they are 
synonymous with each other. The reason they are not synonymous with each other 
is that they differ from each other in character. The expression type 'now' has a 
context-sensitive character, while the expression type 'at l' has a fixed character. 
However, these two particular tokens of these two expression types have the same 
referent. Given a particular context, the same time can be picked out indexically, or 
via a definite description, but this does not establish synonymy between two such 
expressions, nor between sentences containing such expressions. They are not 
synonymous because the types o f  which they are tokens differ from each other in 
character
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A similar mistake is to suppose that an indexical is synonymous with the rule, 
explicitly stated, that specifies its reference on any occasion o f  utterance. In other 
words, to suppose that 'now' is synonymous with, for example, 'simultaneous with 
this utterance', or some other expression that states the rule that tells us how to 
determine the reference of'now', is to confuse character with content. The character 
gives us a procedure to follow in order to identify the reference o f  an indexical on 
any occasion o f  utterance, but the statement o f  that procedure itself is not identical 
with the content o f  the indexical. Kaplan notes:
Meanings tell us how the content of a word or phrase is determined 
by the context o f  use. Thus the meaning of a word or phrase is what 
I have called its character. (Words and phrases with no indexical 
element express the same content in every context; they have a fixed 
character.) To supply a synonym for a word or phrase is to find 
another with the same character; finding another with the same
content in a particular context certainly won't do .....For two words or
phrases to be synonyms, they must have the same content in every 
context. (Kaplan (1989) p. 521).
Thus, neither the statement o f  the rule that an indexical generates to fix its 
reference in particular contexts, nor a definite description o f  the referent o f  an 
indexical in a particular context, satisfy the conditions for synonymy with the 
indexical itself. This applies to whole sentences as well as to indexical expressions. 
The date version o f  the tenseless statement o f  p's truth conditions, q, 'The volcano 
erupts on 22 April 1996' is not synonymous with p. They may have the same 
content, but they differ in character.
Kaplan notes some important features to keep in mind about the two kinds o f  
meaning, character and content. One of these important features is as follows:
Character applies to words and phrases as types, content to 
occurrences o f  words and phrases in contexts. (Kaplan (1989) p.
524).
This is illuminating for my purposes, since the distinction between types and tokens 
has already played a significant part in my articulation o f  the new tenseless theory. I 
argued in chapter 2 that we can only talk o f  the truth conditions o f  sentence tokens
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in particular contexts, since different tokens o f  the same tensed sentence type can 
have different truth-values in different contexts. In Kaplan's terminology a tensed 
sentence type has a context-sensitive character, and thus tokens of that type can 
express different contents in different contexts. The statement o f  the tenseless truth 
conditions o f  a given tensed token in a particular context cannot have the same 
meaning as the tensed token even though two such tokens have the same content. 
This is because the token o f  the tensed sentence type is a token o f  a type with a 
context-sensitive character. The tenseless token is a token o f  a sentence type with a 
fixed character. Since they have different characters, there is an objective difference 
in meaning between them. However, since they have the same content, the 
difference in meaning between them cannot be discerned in their truth conditions.
One final illuminating aspect of Kaplan's discussion o f  character and content 
is as follows:
The bearers o f  logical truth and o f  contingency are different entities.
It is the character (or, the sentence, if you prefer) that is logically 
true, producing a true content in every context. But it is the content 
(the proposition, if you will) that is contingent or necessary. (Kaplan 
(19S9) p. 539).
Both Beer and Smith discussed co-reporting tensed and tenseless sentence tokens of 
the form 'It is 1996 now' uttered in 1996, and 'It is 1996 at 1996'. We can tell 
straight away that the former is contingent and the latter is necessary, but Kaplan's 
remarks shed some light on the relation between them. A 1996 token o f 'I t  is 1996 
now' is true, but the sentence type o f  which it is a token has a context-sensitive 
character. Thus, different tokens o f  this type can express different contents. It is not 
necessarily true because the content, or what is said by this particular token might 
not have been true; its content is merely contingent. The sentence 'It is 1996 at 
1996' has a fixed character, and the content it expresses is true in all circumstances. 
Therefore, the sentence type is a logical truth, since each token o f  it is true. In 
addition, any given token o f  this type expresses a necessary truth because necessarily 
any time is simultaneous with itself.
Another perspicuous example that Kaplan employs is as follows. The 
sentence type 'I am here now' is a logical truth. Its character is such that it cannot be 
uttered falsely. Tokens o f  this type produce a true content in every context. Prefix 
this sentence with the logical symbol for necessity, however ( '□  I am here now') and
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we have a false sentence. It is not necessarily true that I am here now. I might now 
have been somewhere else, or 1 might have been here at some other time. The 
sentence may express a true content in every context, but that content, or 
proposition expressed, on any given occasion, is not a necessary truth.
I find Kaplan's distinction between character and content a most explanatory 
and theoretically advantageous distinction. It provides a complete and coherent 
explanation o f  how a tensed sentence token and the tenseless sentence that states its 
truth conditions can both have the same truth conditions and yet differ in meaning. 
They differ in meaning because they are tokens of types that differ in character. 
They have the same truth conditions because, in the contexts in which they occur, 
they have the same content. My only qualm is that, as I noted at the beginning o f  
this section, it results in a date version o f  the new tenseless theory. This is because 
o f  the importance to Kaplan of stressing the directly referential nature o f  indexicals. 
In the next section I will argue that all o f  the central insights o f  Kaplan's distinction 
between character and content can be preserved within a token-reflexive version of 
the tenseless theory of time.
6.10 A Token-Reflexive Version o f the Distinction Between Character and
Content
Kaplan's distinction between character and content yields a date version of 
the tenseless theory of time. As we have seen, this is because o f  his insistence on the 
direct reference theory o f  indexicals. To insist on the direct reference theory of 
indexicals is to maintain that, for example, a token of'now' refers directly to the time 
at which it is uttered. Consequently, the time, referred to by some name, definite 
description or date, being the referent of'now', will occur in the truth conditions of a 
sentence token containing it. It is in this way that Kaplan's theory yields a date 
version o f  the tenseless theory o f  time. As we saw at the beginning o f  the previous 
section, Kaplan's reasons for insisting on the direct reference theory o f  indexicals are 
that he wishes to emphasize the distinction between the way an indexical, or other 
context-sensitive expression, picks out its referent, and the way a non-context- 
sensitive expression picks out its referent. The character o f  an indexical expression 
type is a function from the context in which a token o f  it is produced to the content 
o f  that token in that context. The content of a token o f  an indexical expression type 
is thus a particular feature of the context in which that token is produced The 
character o f  a non-indexical expression type is fixed, and thus picks out the same 
content in all contexts. The content of a token of such a type is thus picked out by a
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wholly different mechanism. Such tokens pick out their referents via a mediating 
definite description, or sense.
The token-reflexive version o f  the tenseless theory o f  time recognizes this 
distinction between the way in which a context-sensitive expression picks out its 
referent and the way in which a non-context-sensitive expression does so The only 
difference between this version and the date version o f  the tenseless theory is that the 
former version claims that context-sensitive expressions pick out their referents via a 
token-reflexive mechanism. The latter, on the other hand, claims that they pick out 
their referents via a referring mechanism. Thus, Kaplan's reasons for insisting on the 
direct reference theory o f  indexicals are equally good reasons for insisting on a 
token-reflexive account o f  the way in which context-sensitive expressions pick out 
their referents. The token-reflexive account maintains the distinction between the 
way in which context-sensitive and non-context-sensitive expressions pick out their 
referents. Furthermore, the token-reflexive account illustrates just as well as 
Kaplan's date version how the reference of a context-sensitive expression depends 
upon the context in which tokens o f  it are produced
I will now examine the tensed sentence token, p, and a token, r, o f  the 
tenseless sentence that states p's tenseless truth conditions, according to the token- 
reflexive version of the tenseless theory, 'The volcano erupts simultaneously with p' 
According to the tenseless token-reflexive theory p  and r have the same truth 
conditions. They are both true if and only if the volcano erupts simultaneously with 
p. Hence, they have the same content. They each say the same thing about the 
world by referring to the same extra-linguistic entities, the volcano's eruption and the 
occurrence o f  p, and by ascribing the same relation between them, that of 
simultaneity. However, p  and r are tokens of types with different characters p  is a 
token o f  a type with a context-sensitive character, while r is a token o f  a type with a 
fixed character. The characters o f  the types o f  which p  and r are tokens are both 
functions o f  the characters o f  their parts, thus obeying the principle o f  Semantic 
compositionality. The type o f  which p is a token has a context-sensitive charactei as 
a result of containing the indexical expression 'now'. The type o f  which r is a token 
has a fixed character as a result of containing no context-sensitive expressions
Similarly, the contents o f  p  and r are functions o f  the contents oftheil parts 
In the same way that the content o f  q is a function o f the contents o f  its non-context- 
sensitive constituents, so the content of r  is a function of its non-context-sensitive 
constituents. However, the notion of content on the token-reflexive theory is 
slightly different to Kaplan's account of it. Since p  contains the temporal indexical
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'now' it is token-reflexive, and thus, its content consists in two events and the 
obtaining o f  the temporal relation of simultaneity between them The content of p 
consists in the event that it is about, the eruption o f  the volcano, its own occurrence, 
and the ascription between these two events of simultaneity T hus, the character of 
the expression type 'now' consists in the function o f  making the truth-value of a 
token in which it occurs depend upon the context in which that token is produced 
However, its content on any particular occasion of utterance is not an entity 
Rather, its character determines its token-reflexive content This has implications for 
Kaplan's claim that two tokens o f  different sentence types can have the same 
content.
According to Kaplan, a token on Sunday of'United lost the match yesterday' 
and a token on Tuesday of 'United lost the match three days ago' have the same 
content. They both refer to the same event and the time at which that event 
occurred. On the token-reflexive version however, they have different contents 
because each contains as a constituent a reference to itself the token utterance 
However, it is my contention that the token-reflexive version is more perspicuous 
than Kaplan's on this issue. What these tokens have in common is the extra- 
linguistic entity that they refer to, the event of United's losing the match I hey differ 
from each other, however, in the temporal separation between that event and the 
utterance about it, and the token-reflexive version makes this explicit, whereas the 
date version does not. Two such tokens still 'say the same thing' in the relevant way 
by referring to the same event in the world, but their token-reflexive content is 
different, as it should be, because each token is temporally related to that event in a 
different way. Thus, the token-reflexive version recognizes that we may talk about 
the same extra-linguistic entities, but from different temporal perspectives, and it 
adjusts for that different perspective token-reflexively.
The token-reflexive version of Kaplan's distinction between character and 
content accounts for the objective difference in meaning between tokens such as p 
and r just as well as did Kaplan's own version. Recall my solution to Smith's 
objection to Mellor's theory in section 6.1 of this chapter 1 noticed there that the 
reason Mellor was susceptible to Smith's attack was that he tended to conflate talk 
o f  sentence types with talk of sentence tokens. It is perfectly possible tor a tensed 
sentence token and the tenseless sentence that states its token-reflexive truth 
conditions to have the same truth conditions as each other They remain 
untranslatable by each other however, because they are each tokens o f  sentence 
types that differ from each other in a significant way A tensed sentence type has
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tokens whose truth-values vary according to when they are produced The tokens of 
a tenseless sentence type, however, do not vary in this way It is now clear that the 
features of the sentence types which render particular tokens o f  them untranslatable 
by each other are their differing characters, p  is a token of a sentence type with a 
context-sensitive character, while r is a token o f  a sentence type with a fixed 
character. The particular tokens, p and r, however, have the same token-reflexive 
content as each other, but they remain untranslatable by each other in virtue o f  their 
being tokens of sentence types with different characters As Kaplan noted, a 
sentence can only translate another sentence if it has the same content in all contexts 
I conclude that Kaplan's distinction between character and content can 
successfully be combined with a token-reflexive version o f  the tenseless truth 
conditions o f  tensed sentences, and that when it is so combined it yields a 
satisfactory account o f  the objective difference in meaning between a tensed 
sentence token and the tenseless sentence that states its truth conditions. Indeed, 1 
would argue that the conjunction of Kaplan's distinction and the token-reflexive 
theory is more perspicuous than Kaplan's own date version o f  it It is capable o f  
accounting for how the truth-value o f  a sentence token depends on the temporal 
relation between what the sentence is about and the occurrence o f  the token itself
Two tokens such as p  and r have the same truth conditions, and thus have 
the same token-reflexive content, but they are tokens o f  types with different 
characters, and so they cannot translate each other. This explains why the objective 
difference in meaning between them is not to be found in their truth conditions It is 
a feature of the types o f  which they are tokens. Differences in character do not 
reside in the truth conditions o f  particular sentence tokens
Clearly, the distinction between character and content serves to enhance my 
tenseless token-reflexive analysis of the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences It 
provides an additional level o f  meaning which explains and accounts for the 
difference in meaning between a tensed sentence token and the tenseless sentence 
that states its truth conditions. It does this while allowing that two such sentences 
have the same truth conditions, and thus, say the same thing about the world It 
therefore supports the conclusion that temporal reality is tenseless 
With reference to the indexical 'I' Kaplan notes
A sloppy thinker might succumb to the temptation to slide from an 
acknowledgement of the privileged perspective we each have on 
ourselves - only I can refer to me as 'I' - to the conclusions: first that
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this perspective necessarily yields a privileged picture of  what is seen 
(referred to), and second, that this picture is what is intended when 
one makes use of the privileged perspective (by saying T). The 
character o f  T provides the acknowledged privileged perspective, 
whereas the analysis o f  the content o f  particular occurrences o f  T 
provides for (and needs) no privileged pictures. (Kaplan (1989) p 
533-4).
By analogy, the same is true for occurrences o f  the temporal indexical 'now', and for 
uses o f  all other tensed expressions that implicitly make reference to the time o f  their 
context o f  utterance. We have a privileged perspective on the moment we call 'now1 
or the 'present'. However, to move from this acknowledgement to the conclusion 
that this perspective generates a privileged picture o f  temporal reality is to indulge in 
sloppy thinking. The character o f  'now' and of tensed language provides and 
accounts for our privileged perspective on temporal reality The content of 
particular occurrences of'now' yields no privileged pictures.
6.11 Conclusion
To conclude, 1 will summarize briefly the findings o f  this chapter 1 began by 
considering an objection to Mellor's tenseless token-reflexive theory o f  time put 
forward by Quentin Smith. The objection was that the theory collapses, on pain of 
self-contradiction to the old tenseless theory o f  time. I defended Mellor's theory by 
arguing that it is possible for a tensed and a tenseless sentence token to have the 
same truth conditions as each other, but to remain untranslatable by each other This 
raised a question for the tenseless theory of time, namely, that if it is possible for a 
tensed sentence token and the tenseless sentence that states its truth conditions to 
have the same truth conditions, and yet differ in meaning, what account can be given 
o f  the objective difference between them in meaning? Since they differ in meaning, 
and the difference is not to be found in their truth conditions, my aim was to identify 
and account for this difference in meaning.
Michelle Beer (1988) called two such sentence tokens co-reporting, 
suggesting that they differ from each other in sense However, she omitted to 
elaborate on the nature of this difference, so I investigated Frege's distinction 
between sense and reference to see if it held the answer Despite the many analogies 
between the Fregean notion o f  sense and the role ot an indexical. the disanalogies
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between these two notions prevented me from identifying the difference between 
tensed and tenseless co-reporting utterances as a ditference in Fregean sense 12
I then turned to a possible tensed solution to the problem in hand, the 
solution suggested by Quentin Smith (1990). His suggestion that, o f  tensed and 
tenseless co-reporting utterances, only the tensed one ascribes a monadic tensed 
property to its referents seemed to me to be intuitively implausible Examining it 
closely I found that it led to a vicious infinite regress of analyses This proposal had 
to be rejected.
Finally, I turned to Kaplan's distinction between character and content This 
distinction yielded the most perspicuous and theoretically advantageous solution to 
the problem in hand. However, it generated a date version o f  the tenseless theory, 
which we have seen to be problematic. Hence, I adjusted Kaplan's account to yield a 
token-reflexive version, and found that the problem was solved.
Kaplan (1989) argues that Frege conflatcd the nolions o f  character and contciu in his 
notion o f  Sinn. T his is w hy his theory falls down when dealing w ith indcxicals.
S u m m a r y  a n d  C o n c l u s i o n s
I will now sum up briefly the conclusions I have established in this thesis I 
began by presenting McTaggart's argument for the unreality o f  time which, I argued, 
was responsible for generating the debate between the tensed and the tenseless 
theories o f  time. McTaggart's argument is formally valid, so those who oppose his 
conclusion that time is unreal have sought to prove the falsity o f  one or more of its 
premises, thus showing the argument to be unsound. In general McTaggart's 
conclusion has been rejected, but two very different pictures o f  the nature of 
temporal reality have emerged depending on which o f  his premises have been 
rejected, and which endorsed. McTaggart's argument can be seen as the conjunction 
o f  a positive and a negative thesis. His positive thesis is that the A series is essential 
for time. His negative thesis is that the A series is inherently self-contradictory 
McTaggart thus concludes that time is unreal The tensed theory has adopted his 
positive thesis and rejected his negative thesis. Thus, it argues that the A series is an 
essential feature o f  time, and since the A series is not self-contradictory, time exists 
and is intrinsically tensed. The tenseless theory, by contrast, rejects his positive 
thesis and adopts his negative thesis. Thus, it claims that the A series is self­
contradictory, but since the A series is not essential for time, time exists and is 
intrinsically tenseless.
I showed how each premise of McTaggart's argument was responsible for 
generating a number o f  debates in the philosophy of time For many years these 
debates centred around the analytic reducibility or otherwise o f  the A series to the B 
series, and o f  the B series to the A series. I examined the variety o f  ways in which 
such reductions were claimed to be effected, and the problems encountered by those 
who thought them possible. I then charted the most recent developments in this 
debate, which were made by Smart and Mellor on behalf o f  the tenseless theory of 
time. The new tenseless theory o f  time concedes that the A series is not analytically 
reducible to the B series. However, it rejects the conclusion that tensed theorists 
claim follows from this concession. That is, it rejects the conclusion that since the . 1 
series is analytically irreducible, time is intrinsically tensed Instead, it claims that 
tense is irreducible from language and thought, but since the truth conditions of all 
tensed sentence tokens can be given in entirely tenseless terms, the analytic 
irreducibility of tense does not imply that temporal reality is tensed.
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This conclusion does not, by itself, guarantee that time is tenseless, but when 
taken together with McTaggart's argument for the inherently self-contradictory 
nature o f  tensed time, it provides solid grounds for the metaphysical conclusion that 
temporal reality is tenseless. The new tenseless theory o f  time can thus be defended 
on two fronts. In the first place, it must be shown that the truth conditions o f  all 
tensed sentences can indeed be stated in entirely tenseless terms It must then be 
shown that the supposition that tense is an objectively real feature o f  temporal reality 
is inherently self-contradictory, and thus untenable.
In chapter 2 I sought to defend the new tenseless theory on the first o f  these 
two fronts. I undertook an examination o f  the nature o f  truth conditions, and 
examined what can legitimately be concluded from the claim that the truth conditions 
o f  all tensed sentences can be stated in entirely tenseless terms I suggested that 
truth conditions have both a cognitive and an ontological significance, and that these 
two features o f  the notion o f  truth conditions are not independent o f  each other 1 
examined a possible tensed account of the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences, and 
highlighted a problem for any such account. This is that, under a tensed approach to 
providing the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences, particular token sentences appear 
to change their truth-value over time.
I then examined two distinct versions o f  the new tenseless theory o f  time. 
According to the first version, the truth conditions of tensed sentences involve 
reference to dates. For example, a particular past tense sentence token is true if and 
only if the event referred to by the token occurs earlier than the date at which the 
token itself is produced. I argued that this approach ultimately fails because, 
logically, it is possible for the sentence token to be true while not occurring at the 
date specified in the truth conditions. The second version is the token-reflexive 
version o f  the new tenseless theory o f  time. This approach states the truth 
conditions o f  tensed sentence tokens in terms o f  the temporal relation that obtains 
between what the token is about and the token itself. For example, a particular past 
tense sentence token is true if and only if the event referred to by the token occurs 
earlier than the occurrence o f  the token itself. This approach is motivated by the 
same considerations that motivate the date version, but avoids the problems that 
beset the date version. I then defended the token-reflexive version against a barrage 
o f  objections levelled at it by Smith (1993). I concluded that the token-reflexive 
version o f  the new tenseless theory o f  time provides the only viable account o f  the 
truth conditions of tensed sentences.
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In chapter 3 I sought to defend the new tenseless theory o f  time on the 
second o f  the two fronts noted above. That is, I argued that the supposition o f  real 
tense does indeed lead to self-contradiction and paradox. I argued that tense is a 
concept with two essential features. These are that there is an ontological distinction 
between past, present and future, and that temporal becoming is an objective feature 
o f  temporal reality. I examined various interpretations o f  these two key features o f  
tense, and argued that, under any interpretation, they cannot consistently be 
maintained together. The two key features o f  tense are mutually incompatible, so the 
supposition that tense is an objectively real feature o f  temporal reality is logically 
unsustainable. This conclusion, together with the conclusion o f  chapter 2 provides 
support for both the semantic and the metaphysical claims o f  the new tenseless 
token-reflexive theory o f  time.
In chapter 4 I examined an alleged analogy between the theory of time that 1 
defend and Lewis' theory o f  genuine modal realism. The two theories appeared to be 
analogous at both the semantic and the ontological levels. I examined the analogy in 
detail and argued that it breaks down wherever it is metaphysically significant 
Furthermore, Lewis' theory suffers from a potentially devastating circularity problem, 
but the new tenseless theory is immune from any temporal analogue o f  this problem
Another potential difficulty for the new tenseless theory of time is whether it 
can account adequately for the notion o f  the direction of time. It seems, prima facie, 
that a theory which claims that all times are equally real, and that time does not flow 
in one direction is at a disadvantage when it comes to providing an explanation o f  the 
direction of time. I undertook a conceptual analysis o f  the key concepts emploved in 
discussions o f  the direction o f  time; the concepts o f  asymmetry, anisotropy and 
direction itself. During the course of this analysis I examined various ways in which 
the direction o f  time might be explained, and systematically rejected those concepts 
which proved to be incapable o f  providing such an explanation At the end of this 
process I was left with two concepts which were possible contenders for the 
underlying basis o f  an explanation of the direction o f  time One o f  these was 
consistent with a tensed ontology, while the other was consistent with a tenseless 
ontology. I examined how the tensed and the tenseless theories might seek to 
account for the direction o f  time, and concluded that the tensed theory was singularly 
unable to do so. The tenseless theory, on the other hand, has the conceptual 
equipment to explain how time has a direction. The logical asymmetry o f  the 
temporal relations 'earlier than' and 'later than' is intrinsic to those relations, and thus 
is intrinsic to the temporal series generated by those relations This logical feature,
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taken together with the empirical feature o f  our experience o f  temporal succession, 
which emphasizes the earlier to later direction, is capable o f  accounting for the 
notion o f  the direction o f  time.
In chapter 6 I addressed one final potential difficulty for the new tenseless 
theory o f  time. The problem is whether the theory can provide a satisfactory account 
o f  tensed meaning without appealing to the objective reality o f  tense. It arose after 
consideration o f  a particular objection to the theory put forward by Smith, who 
argued that Mellor's version reduces, on pain o f  self-contradiction to the old 
tenseless theory o f  time. I defended the new tenseless theory against this objection, 
arguing that a tensed sentence token and a token o f  the tenseless sentence that states 
its truth conditions can have the same truth conditions while remaining untranslatable 
by each other. There is, thus, an objective difference in meaning between two such 
sentence tokens that is not discernible in their truth conditions. I then sought to 
account for this objective difference in meaning. After examining various possible 
accounts of this difference, I concluded that Kaplan's distinction between character 
and content provided the best explanation of it. However, Kaplan's account yielded 
a date version of the tenseless theory. I argued that his central insights could be 
retained within a token-reflexive account of the truth conditions o f  tensed sentences, 
and then put forward a token-reflexive version of the distinction between character 
and content. This provided the conceptual equipment necessary and sufficient to 
explain in a perspicuous manner the objective difference in meaning between a tensed 
and a tenseless sentence token that have the same truth conditions.
In conclusion, I have defended the new tenseless token-reflexive theory o f  
time by arguing that it provides the best account o f  the truth conditions o f  tensed 
sentences. I have provided further support for the metaphysical conclusions of this 
theory by arguing that the supposition that tense is objectively real is logically 
unsustainable. I have shown that there is no significant analogy between tenseless 
time and modal realism. I have argued that the new tenseless theory o f  time is best 
placed to provide a satisfactory account of the notion o f  the direction o f  time 
Finally, I have argued that the new tenseless token-reflexive theory o f  time, in 
conjunction with the distinction between character and content provides the best 
available account o f  tensed meaning. Thus, I have defended and developed on 
several fronts the new tenseless token-reflexive theory o f  time
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